

## **WILL THE SECOND DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION THEORY WORK IN THE AGE OF MULTIPLE MODERNITIES?**

### **SUMMARY**

*The theory of multiple modernities is applied to rethink the global demographic change. Geographic extension of the global low fertility zone will not result in the growth in number of population involved in the second demographic transition (SDT for short). As the non-Western countries will enter the low fertility zone and the share of the non-Western immigrant minorities in the Western countries will increase, percentage of the global population involved in the SDT will stabilize and then will slowly decline. The SDT-theory will retain its explanatory capacity in the Europe but will scarcely succeed outside the West. The multiple modernities paradigm provides the broader framework to study coming demographic changes than single modernity/modernization paradigm and the SDT-theory.*

This paper aimed to examine how the theory of multiple modernities can be used to rethink the global demographic change. A theoretical construction outlined below is based on the paradigm of multiple modernities and opposes to the theory of the second demographic transition (SDT-theory for short), which, on the contrary, is based on the single modernity/modernization paradigm.

### **Multiple modernities and the SDT-theory: disagreement in fundamentals**

The notion of multiple modernity “denotes a certain view of the contemporary world... that goes against the views long prevalent in scholarly and general discourse” (Eisenstadt, 2000:1). In particular, it goes against the idea that “cultural program of modernity as it developed in modern Europe and the basic institutional constellations that emerged there would ultimately take over in all modernizing and modern societies; with the expansions of modernity, they would prevail throughout the world”. According to Eisenstadt, “the actual developments in modernizing societies have refuted the homogenizing and hegemonic assumption of this Western program of modernity” (ibid.:1). Multiple modernities theory, of course, covers wider area than the SDT-theory and therefore cannot be compared with it immediately. Nevertheless, the fundamentals of the SDT-theory are wide enough to be compared with multiple modernities theory.

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According Lesthaeghe (2010: 32, 33) "The answer to the question whether the SDT can spread beyond Western societies and cultures is probably positive... ". He added also that:

"Fundamentalist reactions are likely to occur in response to these [underlying SDT] global ideational shifts, but so far their success has been too limited to stem the overall shift toward "post-materialist" and expressive value orientations. In short, such reactions can slow down SDT trends or produce marked spatial differences, but they cannot stem the tide altogether." (Lesthaeghe, 2010a:245)

Obviously, this world-view opposes in many respects to multiple modernities theory. The key points of contentions are the prospects of the SDT spread and the constraints (economic, political, cultural etc.) that hamper it. The works of Van de Kaa allow considering this question in detail. Van de Kaa (1999:30) links the SDT with the 'bourgeois postmodern' era and states that:

"Rising incomes and the economic and political security which democratic welfare states offer their populations have helped trigger 'a silent revolution'; a shift in 'Maslowian post-materialist' direction where an individual's are accepted for what they are and decisions on divorce, abortion, cohabitation, sterilization and voluntary childlessness are largely left on discretion of individuals and couples involved." (Van de Kaa, 1996:425).

This classic description of the SDT and its motive forces raises, however, a number of questions. Is the entry into the era of 'bourgeois postmodern' a prerequisite of the SDT? Is "a democratic welfare state" the necessary condition of the SDT? Do the state interventions in the demographic and family-related behaviour compatible with the SDT? Is the SDT really possible in the low income or at least in the middle income countries and in the underprivileged social strata? How to distinguish between the SDT and the processes, which appear to be the SDT but are not the SDT indeed? And last but not least, how the country narratives, the middle range theories and the grand theories can be combined in demography? These issues are discussed in the following sections of the paper.

### **Demographic implications of multiple modernities paradigm**

In contrast to their famous predecessors, multiple modernities theorists and civilizational analysts of today are far from considering civilizations as the isolated entities. Rather, they are looking for reasons, why despite of globalization processes, dissimilarity of the societies is so persistent. At least four overlapped realms of this search are of considerable interest for demographic theorizing. Firstly, these are the general reasons that cause the difference among the societies (Mouzelis, 1997; Eizenstadt, 2000 and the previous works). Secondly, this is path dependence phenomenon and, in particular, the mechanisms of power, authority, and control that guarantee the transmission of civilization patterns (Knöbl, 2010). Thirdly, these are the differences in the role of the state in the Western and non-Western societies

(Kirdina, 2001). Fourthly, this is the process, in the course of which non-Western elites select, interpret and reinterpret the ideas and institutions borrowed from the West (Martinelly, 2005).

In his non-European conceptualization of modernity Mouzelis (1997:26) tries “to find a middle position between the obvious eurocentrism of prevailing modernity/modernization descriptions and the ultra-relativistic third world proposals that critics of eurocentrism have to offer us.” He employed Parsons’ schema AGIL (adaptation, goal achievement, integration, latency) to show how the various combinations of differentiated institutional spheres resulted in the different types of modernity. So, in the western modernity, especially in its Anglo-Saxon variant, market logic (A in Parsons’ schema) prevailed over other spheres. Political sphere (G) and state/party logic dominates in socialist modernizations in the former USSR and (at least in its early stages) in People’s Republic of China. Domination of latency (L) is exemplified by Iranian modernization and so on. To put it in simple words, it means that all societies of present-day world are modern but modern differently.

As is known, Parsons’ organicist metaphor has stimulated homeostatic explanations within demographic transition theory. The work of Mouzelis reveals the other demographic overtones of Parsons’ ideas. As it follows from Mouzelis’ reconstruction of AGIL schema, dominance of SDT values and family patterns are only one of the many possible forms of demographic modernity. Non-European family patterns and population policies are, in turn, the natural consequences of the evolutionary diversity and should not be construed as the immature forms of modernity or reduced to the product of “fundamentalist reactions”.

The paradigm of multiple modernities means, no doubt, the break with some seemingly unshakeable premises of demographic theory. The single modernity/modernization paradigm and “classic” demographic transition theory presume the close negative correlation between the advancement of modernization and fertility. Similarly, SDT theory, which is also the derivate of single modernity/modernization paradigm, presumes that transition from “bourgeois modern” to “postmodern” leads to the strictly determined shifts in family-related behaviour such as the earlier sexual début, the growing age of the first marriage and the first birth, the increasing prevalence of cohabitations and high rate of non-marital births.

In contrast to the single modernity theorists, multiple modernities theorists are very cautious when talking about more or less modernized societies; rather they prefer to speak about the societies that are modernized by the different ways. Therefore, the strict adherence to the logic of the multiple modernities leads to the rejection of

the idea that modernization advancement results in the movement from the less to the more advanced patterns of the demographic or family-related behaviour. It also rejects the idea that the degree of proximity to West European model of fertility can be considered as a universal criterion of fertility modernizing. It is meaningless, for example, to discuss in the framework of multiple modernities' paradigm which of the following low fertility model: Brazilian, Chinese, Iranian, Indian (in Kerala and Tamilnadu states) or Russian is a more modernized.

This in turn leads to a shift in the focus of research. Both "classic" demographic transition theory and the SDT-theory tend to focus on the transition's motive forces and obstacles. Their amalgam is often interpreted in political terms as the struggle between liberalism and fundamentalism or even between good and evil. Multiple modernities paradigm proposes more relativistic view of the world and encourages paying more attention to the diversity of the political, social, economic and cultural structures that underlie the demographic changes in the different modern societies. Such an approach is focused on the multiplicity of the ways, used both at macro- and micro- levels to adjust the demographic behaviour to the local and global social changes.

### **The universe of the SDT: expanding or shrinking?**

Expanding of the SDT is usually described in geographic terms. Lesthaeghe (2010:243) notes, for example, that "the SDT did not stop at the Pyrenees or Alps". Should we however expect the expansion of the SDT in terms of the population involved? Or, on the contrary, the share of the world's population involved in the SDT will decrease? Three dimensions of this issue are of paramount importance. The first is a role of the state in demographic shaping and reshaping of the world. The second is the social inequality both within the Western and non-Western societies. The third is the increasing cultural and ethnic heterogeneity of the Western countries.

#### *Demographic role of the state*

The following logical schema will be used below to analyse the constraints of the eventual spread of the SDT. First, the past of the state-individual relations in the country under review is considered. Next, the mechanisms that underlie these relations and cause their agility or persistence are examined. At last, the prospects of the state-individual relations are discussed.

The SDT presumes, by definition, the greater freedom of a choice as compared with the pre-SDT period. It means that the SDT, at least by its original European definition, is absolutely incompatible with the administrative limitations, such as administrative one-child or two-child norm. Moreover, any pronounced political

control of fertility, i.e. non-coercive one, makes questionable attributing the fertility changes to the SDT. In particular, when a demographic policy is aimed to increase fertility, not only pronounced quantum effect but also tempo effect evidence that the reproductive choice is largely influenced by the external, not intrapersonal factors. So, the role of the state should be examined to define in what degree the changes of fertility or family-related behaviour can be really attributed to the SDT.

### *The past half a century*

SDT-theory came into being as a reflection of the large-scale shifts in the relationship between a state and an individual that occurred in the Western Europe since the 1970s. These shifts, in turn, were triggered by the youth riots in the late 1960s. The withdrawal of the state from the demographic scene (liberalization of the divorce and abortion law, the abolition of any limitations for youth's contraception etc.) was the important element of these shifts. Being reflection of these shifts, the SDT-theory stresses the growing role of individual autonomy. It, in turn, implies weakening a role of the state on the demographic arena. It should be underlined, however, that this European trend, while rather important, was not the most important one. The course of events in Asia and Africa, the mighty and effective state interventions in some countries and the failures of a state in others, influenced the size and structure of the world population stronger than the demographic changes in Europe.

The cases of China, India, Indonesia and Nigeria, the countries that concentrate 43 per cent of the world population, corroborate this assertion. While the "net" effect of China's one-child policy can be scarcely separated both from the effect of socioeconomic development and policy-development synergism, the persistence of this policy is the best proof of its significance. According to People's Daily, the Chinese government organ, "since China introduced the family planning policy over 30 years ago, the policy has prevented 400 million births, and delayed the "Day of 7Billion" for five years."<sup>2</sup>. In India, the failure of short-leaving coercive policy in 1977 made the further government family policy much more moderate. There is no doubt, however, that population/family policy have impacted on Indian population size. Population policy of Indonesia has been very successful, while Nigeria has not pursued it at all. As a result in 1965 Nigeria had just half the population of Indonesia; it is now about two-thirds the size (McNicoll, 2011:194).

In Russia two pronatalist programmes launched in 1981 and in 2007 as well as a campaign against heavy drinking in 1985-1987 resulted both in the rapid growth in

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<sup>2</sup> 400 million births prevented by one-child policy. People's Daily on line, October 28, 2011 <http://english.people.com.cn/90882/7629166.html> (retrieved 06.10.2013)

the number of the births and the period TFR (Figure 1). The number of the births in Russia in 2012 has increased by 28.1 per cent as compared with 2006 (Rosstat, 2012; Demographic...2012:65). This growth was mainly caused by the increase of marital births that, in turn, resulted in the downward trend in the extramarital births (Figure 2). The number of the births in January-August 2013 increased, however, only by 0.1 per cent as compared with the same period of 2012 (Rosstat, 2013).

To sum up, the role of the state on the demographic scene varied strongly in the past half a century. The state interventions in fertility were mighty (China, of course, but also India in 1975-77, Indonesia, and Viet Nam), moderate (e.g. in Brazil, India from 1978 to present time, Russia in 1981-1987 and 2007 onward), indirect (as in the case of EU family policy) or absent at all (as in Nigeria, for example). This mosaic cannot be posed on the one-dimensional scale with the most and the least modernized poles. Rather, it can be characterised by McNicoll (2009) triad “legacy, policy, circumstances” and attributed to the different modernities.

### *Mentalities and governmentalities*

To assess the future role of the state in the coming demographic changes, the more general mechanisms that determine this role should be considered at first. Michel Foucault, the French philosopher, coined in his lectures in the late 1970s the term *gouvernementalité* (governmentality) (Foucault, 1991). This concept is multifaceted and comprehends *inter alia* the peculiar ways of problematizing, decision-making and submitting, that are typical for the society under review. The differences in governmentality is the reason why the same methods of fertility control are effective in some countries but do not work in others. For example, Riley and Gardner (1997:44) underline in their review (after Potter and Potter, 1990) that in China:

“villagers resist the state in this matter [fertility control] but not because they believe the state is invading their privacy or trying to dictate private behaviour. In a society where it is considered proper for the state to be involved in “private” social life and where the individual interest of a husband and wife are not defined as socially significant, this kind of intervention is seen as legitimate.”

Potter and Potter (1990:235) note that in China “the concept of privacy, which validates these interests in the West, does not exist to be invoked”.

The opposite case can be exemplified by Finland where:

“the term ‘population policy’ still carries an echo of its past stigma. Reports and committee papers often ask whether the task of the state is to try to influence fertility at all. Finnish population-related texts strongly emphasize reproductive rights, partially because of history’s lessons but also because of ideals regarding the freedom of the individual.” (Isola, 2007-2008:43).




Fig.1. Fertility changes in Russia in 1980-2012 in political context.




Fig.2 Extramarital fertility in Russia in 1991-2011 in political and economic context

The case of Russia is the intermediate both geographically and ideationally. In Russia, according to the sample survey conducted by FOM (Public Opinion Foundation), as much as 81 per cent of the respondents believe in 2011 that the government should take measures to increase fertility (FOM, 2011). In addition, the majority of population believes the government (and the state institutions in general) to be responsible for the demographic situation in the country. Central government, in turn, considers the demographic situation in a region as a criterion of the regional authorities' effectiveness and encourages the regional programmes aimed to increase fertility. Under these conditions, the most of politicians stand, at least publicly, for the pronatalist policy.

Such a policy requires, however, the significant budget allocations. This is a reason why the new pronatalist measures, such as prolonged and paid maternal leaves and maternity capital<sup>3</sup> were launched both in the former USSR and in present-day Russia just in the periods of the high oil and gas prices. Thus, it can be concluded that pronatalist measures in Russia are popular both politically and ideationally but limited financially (see in more details Klupt, 2013).

Thus, although in Western Europe the withdrawal of the state from demographic arena has begun shortly after the end of the first demographic transition, these processes do not obligatory go hand in hand. Both in China and Russia the fertility transition is over but the role of the state remains significant on the demographic arena.

### *Future*

The core of the matter is how persistent are the differences aforesaid. Two approaches will be used below to analyse this question. The first, more abstract is based on the general sociological conceptions. The second, more concrete is focused on analysis of the political, economic and social peculiarities of the country under review.

As stated above, the multiple modernities paradigm presumes persistence of the civilisational differences. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to distinguish among the different layers of the institutional structures. While the deep layers are persistent, the surface ones are more movable. Kirdina (2001) presumes, for example, that non-Western societies are based on civilizational X-matrix, which is characterized by the

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<sup>3</sup> Maternity capital is a lump sum (approximate equivalent of the average yearly salary in Russia) paid normally to women who gave birth to their second (or subsequent) child, if the birth takes place in the period from 2007 through 2016. This lump sum can be spent only on specific items, such as improving the housing conditions or paying for the child's education, or added to the mother's pension savings. Russian officials and experts are discussing now whether this programme should be continued after 2016 or not.

dominance of the institutions of a redistributive economy, unitary or unitary-centralized political order and communitarian ideology. On the contrary, Western societies are based on civilizational Y-matrix, which is characterized by dominance of institutions of market economy, federative or federative-subsidary political order and individualistic ideology.

According to Alexandrov and Kirdina (2013:11):

“During the development of states a dominant position of the basic institutions that are typical to either the X or the Y-matrix, remains unchanged. At the same time the institutions from the matrix of the opposite type – complementary institutions - play a supporting role, as it is necessary, “adding to the whole” of the institutional structure of societies... Percentage of complementary institutions in stable sustainable societies, as might be expected, is approximately one-third (30-35%). If this percentage is less, the total dominance of the basic institutions of society leads to a crisis or stagnation. At the same time, excessive implementation of complementary institutions, attempts to replace the matrix of basic institutions leads to the social upheavals and revolutions.”

It can be drawn from this that governmentalities, peculiar to the different civilisational matrices, may overlap or converge but not coincide. Furthermore, since borrowing the alien institutions is strictly limited, the basic differences are substantial and persistent and cannot be construed as an inessential statistical variation within the series. China’s population policy is the case. This policy’s evolution can be interpreted in Kirdina’s terms as the cautious supplementing the basic non-Western institutions by the limited number of the Western ones.

The eventual scope and the speed of such supplementing can be discussed, of course. Greenhalgh (2003), for example, employed Foucault’s concept of governmentality to show how China’s population policy evolved from mobilization campaigns to the policy that includes more “neoliberal” and “market” components. Jaka, on the contrary, makes the stronger accents on the role of the state and supposes that the monograph written by Greenhalgh and Winkler (2005) “exaggerates the contribution of market entities and downplays the ongoing role of the state and other institutions in creating new desires and practices of self-governance.” (Jaka, 2007:122)

More concrete analysis suggests that the state will retain its key role in China’s demographic scene at least in the near future. One-child policy and a *hukou* (registration) system, two mighty administrative tools, alien to the Western governmentality, are in the hands of Chinese authorities. It is highly probable that China’s government will, depending on the situation, practise more or less significant slackening of the one-child norm and registration system to decide the various (i.e. demographic) problems of the country.

The case of Russia, of course, is not quite the same. The paramount role of the state is based here not only on the historical traditions but also on the economic realities of today. Oil and gas export gives approximately a half of the revenues of Russian state budget. Allocation of these revenues is the prerogative of the state. Central government plays and most probably will play the key role in assigning the share of the revenues to be allocated in fertility motivation. This fact along with almost total conviction that the demographic problems is a realm of government's responsibility will likely preserve an important role of the state on Russian demographic arena.

The non-Western governmentalities select, absorb and reformulate the Western ideas and institutions (Martinelli, 2005). It produces the hybrid phenomena, sometimes rather paradoxical. The legal system of India, for example has been experienced the significant influence of British law. It doesn't prevent, however, from disqualifications of the candidates, who broke two-child norm (Buch, 2005). Neo-Malthusianism, influential in some developing countries, is another example of the radical reinterpretation of the original idea because Malthus himself never stood up for coercive abortions or sterilization camps and was not so far from pro-life in terms of today.

It can be summarised that the state will likely continue playing first fiddle in the countries where the state interventions in fertility is the habitual and legitimised element of governmentality. This fact does not exclude fully the further advancement of the SDT in these countries but limits its coverage and makes highly probable its substantial differences from "the classic" European patterns.

*The third demographic transition as a constraint of the SDT spread*

A lot of the ethnic, religious, "ideational" and low income groups within the Western societies are not involved in the SDT forty years after its beginning. Moreover, there is no assurance that the share of this groups in total population will not increase. The third demographic transition (Coleman, 2006) is an important, although not the only obstacle on the path of the SDT.

Involvement of a minority in the SDT presupposes both its integration in the receiving society, in general, and the fertility at replacement or sub-replacement level, in particular. Only some non-Western minorities (mainly, Chinese and Indians) meet (with the certain reservations though) these conditions.

As the recent censuses evidence, the size of the ethnic minorities increased much more rapidly than population as a whole. For example, in the U.S. the Hispanic population grew by 43 per cent between 2000 and 2010, as compared with growth of total population by 9.7 per cent. (U.S..., 2011:3-4). Total fertility rate for Hispanic women was 2.24 in 2011, i.e. above replacement (U.S....2013:10). In the Netherlands


the number of immigrants and the children of immigrants grew between 2000 and 2010 by 44.4 per cent while population in total increased only by 4.1 per cent. The corresponding indexes in U.K., France and Italy have evidenced the same trends. Fertility among non-European immigrant minorities in Europe exceeds (with some exceptions) replacement level (Coleman, Dubuc, 2010; Sobotka, 2008).

To analyze whether the extent of immigrant minorities' integration increases or not, the changes in migration stocks and the labour market indices should be compared (Klupt, 2012, 2012a). Increasing bulk of findings shows that the rapid growth of migration stock is combined with the high unemployment rates and the slow upward occupational mobility among many immigrant minorities (see e.g. Trajectoires...2010; Office...2011). Although the occupational advancements of Chinese, Indians and some South-East Asian immigration minorities in the Western countries are obvious, the other sizable minorities are not so successful.

*Pseudo-SDT: underprivileged groups*

Some ambiguities in the definition of the SDT may easy lead to misinterpretation of statistical data. Surkyn and Lesthaeghe (2004) have found that certain set of “non-conformist” values (secularization, egalitarianism, accentuation of expressive values, unconventional civil morality, companionship and unconventional marital ethics etc.) is interconnected with the life course typical for the persons involved in SDT. Nevertheless, the prevalence of some non-conformist values in a given social group does not obligatory mean that this group is involved in the SDT. For example, “unconventional civil morality and ethics” as well as “companionship and unconventional marital ethics” were prevalent in many criminal communities long before the beginning of the SDT.

The lonely motherhood may have nothing in common with the “post-materialist” values and caused by the high unemployment rate among the eventual husbands, deteriorating living standards and the prevalence of alcohol and drug addiction in the underprivileged social groups. In Russia, for example, statistically significant negative correlation ( $r=0.79$ ) between life expectancy at birth and percentage of extramarital birth has been found in 2011 for 82 subjects (the largest administrative territorial units) of Russian Federation (Figure 3). Percentage of the extramarital births in Moscow and St.Petersburg, two most advanced Russian megalopolises, (respectively, 20.9 and 21.9) was in 2011 lower than national average (24.5 per cent).



**Fig. 3. Life expectancy at birth and percentage of extramarital births in the regions of Russia**

Results obtained show that the rapid growth of the extramarital birth in Russia in the 1990s, the period of dramatic living standards decline, can only partly be attributed to SDT. The marital fertility, suppressed by the economic crisis in 1990s, was revitalised by the economic upsurge in 2000s. As a result the growth of extramarital births percentage was slowed down. The new pronatalist measures gave the next impulse to the marital fertility and initiated the downward trend in the extramarital births percentage.

These conclusions (Klupt, 2010) are in a good agreement with the findings based on the data of individual biographies obtained by Perelli-Harris and Gerber (2009). Their study has shown that extramarital birth rate among the least educated women is the highest because they have lower chances to get married in the case of premarital conception. Perelli-Harris and Gerber argue that "Russia has more in common with the pattern of disadvantage in the United States, as opposed to the trends described by the second demographic transition." (Ibid., no pagination). Also, some parallels with Brazil where "low educated women are more prone to cohabit rather than get married than their high educated counterparts" (Covre-Sussai, Matthijs, 2013:19) can be drawn.

### *The ideational groups*

The ideational opposition to the SDT values encompasses the sizable groups of population in the Western countries. In the United States, for example, many in Republican electorate reject both the values that underlie the SDT and family-related behaviour typical for the SDT (Lesthaeghe, Neidert, 2008). The wide and persistent popularity of pro-life views in the U.S. has been evidenced by the recent Rasmussen (2013) national telephone survey, in which 43 per cent of likely American voters consider themselves pro-life as compared to 46 per cent pro-choice. There are no any evidences of pro-life group shrinking in the U.S. during last decades.

Proponents of Eurocentric single modernity/modernization paradigm tends to label non-SDT groups old-fashion or even “fundamentalist”. Such interpretation seems to be internally inconsistent. Being based on the “non-conformist” values, the SDT, by definition, cannot proliferate as in Ionesco’s Rhinoceros. It is oversimplification to consider the American Republican, as well as Russian and Brazilian well-educated women, who more prone to get married rather than cohabit, to be “less modernized” than, say, the European supporters of “non-conformist” values.

### *Discussing scenarios*

The lack of conventional definition applicable to the statistical calculations makes it difficult to discuss the future of the SDT in quantitative terms. This notwithstanding some suppositions can be made and some scenarios can be discussed. The eventual expanding, stabilization or shrinking of the SDT in terms of involved population is the main point, of course. The question, in turn, can be divided into two parts, which concern, respectively, the eventual spread of the SDT in the Western and non-Western societies.

Let us consider the first part of the question. The share of population involved in the SDT in the Western countries is the weighted average, in which the shares of the original population and the immigrant minorities are the weights. As the projections evidence, the former will shrink, the latter will increase.

As mentioned above, it is likely that the rapid increase in number of the immigrant minorities will not be accompanied by increase in the proportion of immigrants involved in the SDT. Anyway, this proportion will be less than in the original population. *Ceteris paribus* it means that the rapid growth of immigrants in number has downward effect on the number of the persons involved in the SDT. On the other hand, the ideational plurality of the Western societies will stop earlier or later the increase in the share of original population involved in the SDT. Both factors will likely result in stabilization or even in the slow decline in the share of population involved in the SDT in the Western countries.

Let us turn to the second part of the question. The distance, which separates the largest non-Western societies from the European societies that experience the SDT, varies significantly from country to country (Table 1). This distance, not very large for some countries, is tremendous for others. There is no, however, such a country, in which would occur *all* components of the European SDT and *all* factors that underlie it.

Table 1

**The distance from the SDT in the world's largest non-Western countries**

Dimensions	Brazil	Russia	Japan	China	India	Indonesia	Pakistan	Nigeria
GDP per capita and poverty	1	1	0	2	2	2	2	2
TFR	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2
Share of extramarital births	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	2
Cohabitations' prevalence	0	0	1	2	2	2	2	1
State interventions aimed directly at growth/decline of fertility	0	1	0	2	1	1	0	0
Administrative limitations of fertility	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0
Limitations of cohabitations	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	1
<b>Total distance (in points)</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>
Percentage of world's population in mid-2013	2.8	2.0	1.8	19.0	17.8	3.5	2.7	3.0
Percentage of world's population in mid-2025	2.6	1.8	1.5	17.4	17.8	3.6	3.0	4.5

Notes: the maximal distance from the SDT is marked red and gives two points; the medium distance is marked yellow (one point); the minimal or the lack of the distance (zero points) is marked green.

The dramatic gaps in the living standards as well as the strong religious and cultural oppositions to the cohabitations and extramarital birth in many non-Western societies suggests that the coming demographic changes in the largest non-Western countries will scarcely be a copy of the European SDT. In addition, the persistence of the high fertility and poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa which, by projections, will concentrate about one fifth of the global population in 2050, excludes this region from the candidates for membership in the SDT club. Therefore the increasing involvement of the non-Western societies in the SDT will unlikely be a core of the coming global demographic change. More likely, there will be a lot of the overlapped but not the coincident demographic realities.

### Conclusive Remarks

Samuel Huntington (1996:28) noticed almost two decades ago that “Westerners have reassured themselves and irritated others by expounding the notion that the culture of the West is and ought to be the culture of the world.” Irritation is a bad adviser in a science though. Searching for the new theoretical perspectives is much more efficient.

The SDT theorists are looking for the SDT traces in non-Western societies (Zakharov and Ivanova,1996; Jiang, 2002; Doo-Sub Kim, 2005; Estebe et. al.,2012). The findings obtained are, no doubt, of the prime interest. But is this search-of-traces methodology productive in general? The growing number of the low and middle income countries embarks for the global zone of a low fertility. Does it really mean, however, that they embark for the SDT as well?

As the case-histories considered above have shown, the chances that the major non-Western countries will accept completely the Western patterns of state-individual relations are small. Rather, the appearance of the new hybrid forms that combine both the Western and non-Western practises should be expected. Three theoretical perspectives are visible here.

The first one presumes that the European variant of SDT stands the chances of spreading all over the world. I’m very sceptical about this perspective by many reasons. According to Lesthaeghe (2010a:244), “it is widely acknowledged that mass media are producing a “world culture” in which individual autonomy and self-actualization have a prominent, if not dominant place, and that these provide both motivations and justifications for the onset of the SDT”. Unlike Lesthaeghe, I have no much confidence in the westernizing capacity of the global mass media.

The way of information (and its implications) from a producer to a recipient (and his or her interpretations of information obtained) is crooked. No doubt, it becomes increasingly difficult (while not impossible in principle) to block the information flows. However, the methods of the social control evolve as well. The sovereign states succeed in forming the political and informational background, which allows using the local prejudices to misinterpret the alien information in the direction desired. Also, the enthusiastic consumerism, disseminated by mass media everywhere, is compatible, as experience of many non-Western societies has shown, with the very diverse forms and styles of governance.

The second theoretical perspective is in broadening the SDT definition. Its “Western” attributes, such as “democratic welfare state” and “Maslovian postmaterial values” can be omitted. Although this way, seemingly, preserves the

theoretical continuity, it dilutes, however, the European core of the SDT and makes its idea amorphous.

The third perspective, preferred from my point of view, is in the wake of the multiple modernities theory. It focuses on the various ways of civilisational and regional adjustments to the global challenges. This perspective proposes constructing the set of middle range theories aimed at explaining and forecasting the regional demographic changes. It means, no doubt, abandoning the attempts to construct the single line of the past and coming world's demographic changes. What can it promise in return?

At first, it promises the better understanding of the path dependence phenomena, peculiar to the given country. Secondly, it allows seeing how the country-specific state-individual relations form the population policy and result in demographic changes. Thirdly, it cautions against the mechanical import of the population policy from abroad and call to pay more attention to the country specificity and to the needs of the various groups of a society when developing the national population policy.

This theoretical horizon is not cloudless, of course. Plurality of the middle range theories can easy tear to pieces the entire picture of the world painted by the grand theories of modern demography, the classic demographic transition theory and the SDT-theory. To avoid this danger it is necessary to focus both on the interaction of multiple modernities and on the effects that it produces. New theories should be constructed to understand the regularities of this interaction.

It is time to answer the question raised in the title of the paper. Will the SDT-theory work in the age of multiple modernities? The answer is positive. Nevertheless, it will be able to explain only a certain part of the upcoming demographic reality. Low fertility area expands and includes a growing number of non-Western countries. The differences between these countries and the West are strong and concern not only per capita incomes but also state-individual relationship, culture and religion. The SDT-theory will scarcely be able to succeed the demographic transition theory in this expanding part of the world. The future will show whether the emerging gap will be filled by the new theories, or demography, "a science short on theory but rich in quantification" (Kirk, 1996:361) will limit its efforts by the empirical studies.

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