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Language Policy and Civil War

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Consider two trends in world history over the past half-century. First, there has been a steady decade-by-decade increase in the number of active civil wars. In sum, there have been 127 civil wars fought in this half-century, killing nearly 17 million people. The rate of outbreak has been on average 2.31 new civil wars per year, but there is neither a steady trend upward or downward in the rate of outbreak across decades. Since civil wars break out at a faster rate than they become resolved, *there has been over the past half-century a steady increase in the number of countries (and percentage of independent countries) involved in fighting civil wars* (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

Second, *there has been a steady increase within states in the rights of speakers of minority languages to state recognition*. Since 1960, twenty-three minority language groups in seventeen countries were granted enhanced official recognition for their languages. In that same period, only nine groups in four countries had official recognition of their languages at local levels repealed by their central states. From a country perspective, since 1945 ten countries that at one time did not provide official services on a regional level to minority groups constituting at least ten percent of the population changed that policy and granted at minimum limited official use for those languages. Meanwhile, only two countries withdrew regional recognition to minority language groups. Furthermore, only four countries have in the period since 1945 declared the language of the plurality group as the sole official language of state business; at the same time five countries have broadened central official policy to accommodate languages beyond the language of the dominant group. [For a list of the countries and their policy shifts, see the Appendix].

To those who hold that civil wars are built upon cultural grievances, there is a powerful anomaly here. A steady *increase* in civil wars correlates with a steady *decrease* in the degree to which states

have oppressed minority language groups. It could be, of course, that this is a spurious correlation. It will be argued here, however, that both trends emanate from a common source — a fundamental decrease in average state power over the course of the past half century.¹ Civil war is the most horrible manifestation of that weakness. Liberal language policies are the benign results of state weakness. The world accommodates to cultural difference then not because of a growing recognition of the rights of minorities but rather because weak states are not fully able to exert domination over their own peripheries.

The grievance explanation for civil war loses credibility when the relationship of democracy (the regime type that is associated with redressing grievances of the population) and civil war is analyzed. Consider Table 1, based on the Stanford version of the Minorities at Risk dataset.² From it, two complementary points are sharply illustrated. First, the more democratic countries of the world are less likely to recognize languages of minority groups than are the less democratic countries. Among the countries that were above the median score for democracy (according to Polity criteria)³ in 1980, 28% of the MAR groups that had a distinct ancestral language different from that of the dominant language group of the country received some degree of official recognition; meanwhile among countries that were below the median score for democracy in 1980, 63% of the MAR groups that had a distinct ancestral language different from that of the dominant language group of the country received some degree of official recognition. Thus, in democracies where politics are presumably more amenable to the redressing of grievances, distinct language groups are less likely to receive official recognition.

Second, language recognition in 1980 of groups with distinct languages is associated with higher levels of rebellion subsequent to 1980 than for groups with distinct languages whose languages received no recognition. This is clearly the case for the more democratic states (those above the world median), where the maximum of the mean rebellion score is 2.68 for groups whose language had received recognition in 1980, but only 1.11 where the group's language did not receive any official recognition. Among the more non-democratic half of the countries, the same (though less startlingly) is true: rebellion scores are higher among groups whose distinct language is recognized than for those whose distinct language receives no recognition. Thus, recognition is hardly associated with enlightened policy; the data on Table 1 suggest rather that recognition is more a last gasp effort by weak centers to (rather unsuccessfully) stave off rebellion.

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1. The average is going down in large part because more and more weak states are entering the international system. Also, but to a lesser extent, average state power decreases to the extent that states cede authority to international institutions.
 2. See Appendix for details on the MAR dataset used for this paper.
 3. The Polity dataset and documentation are available at: <http://weber.ucsd.edu/~kgledits/Polity.html>. As is standard for users of this dataset, I take the value for democracy (a scale that goes from 0 to 10, the higher numbers reflecting greater levels of democratic freedoms) and subtract the value for autocracy (a scale that goes from 0 to 10, the higher numbers reflecting greater levels of autocratic control). This scale yields a range of +10 (the most democratic) through -10 (the most autocratic).

TABLE 1

Language Recognition			Democracy, Language Recognition, and Rebellion
Democracy (a)	No Recognition	Recognition	
Above or equal to country median (≥ -6)	1.11 (b) (63) (c) ; 72 % (d)	2.68 (b) (25) (c) ; 28 % (d)	
Below country median (< -6)	1.42 (b) (31) (c) ; 37 % (d)	1.85 (b) (53) (c) ; 63 % (d)	

Notes:

(a) Based on Polity dataset, which provides a 10-point scale for democratic rights, and another 10-point scale for authoritarian control. We subtract the second scale from the first, giving a democracy index that varies from +10 to -10. In 1980, for the 136 countries with groups represented in this Table, the median democracy score was -6.

(b) This represents the mean value for all groups on the MAR coding for rebellion, ranging from 0 (no rebellion) to 7 (full scale civil war). The rebellion scores are coded every five years. The figures in the boxes represent the mean of the maximum scores for all groups for all five-year periods since 1980.

(c) This represents the number of groups in the dataset for each category. The Stanford version of the MAR dataset has 393 observations (group/country) for the year 1980; of these 393 groups, 172 have distinct languages from the dominant group in the country. This Table analyzes only those 172 groups.

(d) This represents the percentage of distinct groups whose languages were either recognized or not recognized by their states.

To develop this point empirically, I shall in this paper elaborate on three general patterns of language recognition and rebellion in the past half-century. The first pattern is one in which weak groups do not receive language recognition and do not have the capability to sustain a rebellion. In a mirror image of this proposition, strong states do not provide language recognition and are not susceptible to rebellion. In this pattern, non-recognition of language and lack of civil war correlate. The second pattern is one in which weak states, susceptible to rebellion (and in the course of rebellions), offer language recognition to actual or potential rebellious language communities in order to assuage grievances and hopefully to cauterize the rebellion. In this pattern, because recognition is given only to groups that can credibly mount a serious rebellion, recognition of language and civil war correlate. The third pattern is one in which the relative weakening states of the advanced industrial world — in relation to powerfully mobilized cultural groups in the regions and to international organizations — have begun to provide official recognition to minority languages. In these cases, state weakening has not been nearly to the level as to provoke civil war (and thus recognition negatively correlates with civil war), but the process is similar to the other patterns: language recognition is more a result of relative state weak-

ness than an enlightened view of justice — although this latter motive certainly plays a supportive role.

The paper will examine these three patterns of language recognition and implications for civil war. In the conclusion, connecting this paper to the general theme of this volume, it will be pointed out that the official recognition of diversity can have quite different implications for weak states than it does for the stronger states of West Europe and North America. For the former, such recognition is playing with fire; for the latter, it is playing with culture.

1 • Pattern I. Strong states, weak groups and low probability of civil war

In general, states make concessions to groups that are potentially the most threatening to constituted authority. The first implication of this generalization is that weak cultural groups, or those autochthonous groups that had been utterly decimated in the period of state expansion, rarely get cultural recognition. Consider the Roma whose dialects are closely related to the Sanskrit from which all modern Indo-Aryan languages are derived. Romani dialects developed in parallel to its sister languages still spoken in India until the 11th century AD. Then the ancestors of the Roma left India and Romani was influenced in its development by languages spoken elsewhere. These were Persian, Armenian, Byzantine Greek, Old Slavic and Rumanian. The same words from these languages can be found today in all dialects of Romani. This shows that the Roma traveled together as one group until they reached Rumania in the 14th century. In the 15th century, Roma entered Central, Western, Northern and Eastern Europe via Rumania and from then on, a large number of differing Romani dialects evolved in the many countries where the Roma lived as the Roma adopted loan words and grammatical forms from the non-Romani languages spoken around them.

Today, many of these dialects are mutually intelligible among Roma from different countries. Today and in the past, most European governments are trying and have tried to abolish Romani by compelling the Roma to speak only the national language of the country. In the 18th century, Empress Maria Theresa of Austro-Hungary introduced a deliberate program to separate Romani children from their parents and have them brought up by Hungarian foster parents or in state-run orphanages. The result of this is that today large numbers of Hungarian Roma, called Romungere, do not speak Romani. In Spain,

a similar program was practiced and the Spanish Romani dialect called Caló has almost disappeared.⁴

The Roma constitute the population group in Europe that is politically the weakest of any of the groups listed in the MAR dataset. In that dataset, they account for sixteen observations, in Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechoslovakia (1945-1989), Czech Republic (1989), France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Macedonia (1991-), Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic (1991), Spain, Turkey, USSR (1945-91), and Yugoslavia. In none of these countries is there any official recognition of Romani, at either the local level or at the political center. Moreover, in Macedonia, Romania, and Slovakia, Roma constitute close to or above 10% of the population, and by our criteria in the country/year dataset, these countries (due to their treatment of the Roma) are guilty of fomenting a linguistic grievance.

Due to the weakness — politically, economically and demographically — of the Roma, European states have ignored issues that might redress the linguistic injustices from which the Roma have suffered. In Hungary, there is today a European Roma Rights Center that provides legal services and does human rights monitoring for European Romani. Its office has even translated into Romani the substantive paragraphs of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“1951 Geneva Convention”) and its 1967 New York Protocol. But the Center has not sought, nor has any state offered, programs to restore and protect that language.⁵ The point here is simple: the reason that European states have been callous towards Roma culture is the same accounting for the fact that in none of the sixteen European countries in which Roma live has the MAR rebellion score ever gone higher than zero. They are not a threat to rebel; they receive no language rights.

The indigenous populations of the New Worlds (the Americas and Oceania) are similarly situated in regard to language rights. Most of these groups were decimated by disease and defeated by armies going back to the 17th century. The Black Karibs and Indigenous Peoples in Honduras, the Maori in New Zealand, the indigenous populations in El Salvador, Venezuela and Chile, the lowland indigenous peoples of Peru and Bolivia, the highland and lowland indigenous peoples of Ecuador, Native Hawaiians in the USA, and Aborigines in Australia, have neither linguistic rights nor even an approximation of a rebellion in the past half century. The MAR codings report on isolated violent incidents not amounting to sustained rebellion among the Native Americans in the USA, Amazonian Indians in Brazil, and indigenous peoples in Canada and Panama. Genuine rebellions in the last half century among indigenous populations of the New Worlds include only groups in Nicaragua, Guatemala and Mexico

4. Roma Community And Advocacy Centre Toronto, Ontario, Canada, <http://www.romani.org/toronto/FS4lang.html>

5. *European Roma Rights Center*, 1386 Budapest 62, P.O. Box 906/93, Hungary; translation available at: http://www.errc.org/rr_nr2_2002/romani.shtml

(Zapotecs and Mayans). Of all these cases of autochthonous groups in the New Worlds, because of the cultural desuetude in which these languages persist, only the Aborigines of Australia have received significant language recognition. From a statistical point of view, lack of language rights and low probability of rebellion come from the same source: weak societies partially incorporated in strong modern states.

The other side of the coin in regard to the first pattern is that of strong states that dominate society, especially those that consolidated central power before states were in the business of providing free public education, such as France and the United Kingdom.⁶ Japan and Germany, although consolidated at a later period, are strong bureaucratic states that have eliminated (not only from official use, but from everyday use in society) many language forms other than those of the bureaucratic center. All these states came into the post World War II world providing no recognition to minority languages. In the cases of Japan and Germany, there are no observations in the MAR dataset of groups that were present before the 19th century, such as Bavarians in Germany or speakers of western dialects (*hogen*) in Japan. These speech forms have been dubbed dialects of the state language, and never received recognition as separate languages or their speakers minority peoples. In these cases, state strength and no language recognition go hand in hand.

Perhaps the greatest exception to this rule is that of the USSR, one of the most centralized states in world history. However, its major language concessions were made in the 1920s when central state authority was precarious. The Bolshevik policy of *korenizatsiia* (local rooting in cultures) was implemented as a way of co-opting rebellious peripheral nations into the framework of an otherwise centralized socialist union.⁷ Similarly with the case of Spain post-Franco. In this democratic transition, the greatest fear by all parties was a reenactment of the 1936-39 civil war, in which concessions to nationalist forces in two regions (the Basque and Catalan) helped prompt the rebellion of the army officers against the republic. In the transition period after 1975, Catalan and Basque politicians (with great voter support in their respective regions) were demanding autonomy and considerable linguistic concessions. Basically, all political forces in Spain agreed to these concessions, in large part to stave off a nationalist rebellion.⁸ These concessions in Spain were not unlike those of the Bolsheviks in 1920s Soviet Union — language concessions were made because the groups demanding them were capable of challenging the state. In the Soviet Union, the 1917-21 civil war produced the concessions in the mid-1920s; in Spain the civil war of 1936-39 produced the concessions in the mid-1970s. It is the time frame of the

⁶ I make this argument more fully in Laitin (1992).

⁷ I develop this theme in Laitin (2003).

⁸ On transition to democracy and memories of the civil war, see Perez-Diaz (1993).

dataset that obscures the fact that both cases are consistent with the patterns outlined herein.

To conclude in regard to the first pattern, the MAR dataset is replete with minorities that have been marginalized by history, either as travelers or as defeated autochthonous populations — their languages are not recognized for official purposes in modern states and however aggrieved they might be about this, they do not have the resources to mount a rebellion against those states. Here non-recognition of languages and lack of rebellion correlate strongly.

2 • Pattern II. Weak states, recognition and high probability of civil war

Where groups have demonstrated capability of sustaining insurgencies against weak states, recognition of regional languages is common.⁹ In India, which at the time of independence was a federal state granting official language rights to state languages, state weakness and the strength of linguistic groups outside the Hindi speaking core zone led to a cascade of linguistic concessions. It all began when nationalist leaders in the Telugu-speaking areas of Madras, Hyderabad and Mysore states at the time of Indian independence hoped to gain recognition for their homeland as a linguistically-based state. The movement for Telugu autonomy, first organized in the 1930s, was induced in part by the rabid nationalism and the strong cultural revival of the Tamil speakers in the Madras Presidency. This movement struck a positive cord among early nationalist leaders in Telengana, an economically backward region of Telugu speakers in Hyderabad State, and in alliance with the Madras Telugus, a notion of “Vishalandhra” (Greater Andhra), recalling the greatness of the ancient Nizam kingdom, became a mobilizing idea. Despite a thirty year commitment by the Congress Party to reorganize India’s states on the basis of language, however, in the post-independence period two commissions demurred on this promise, arguing that national integration, efficiency of administration, and protection of minorities all argued for the preservation of linguistically mixed states. The second commission (the so-called “JVP” Committee) left the door open for a future Telugu-speaking state, and it helped induce a Gandhi-style movement of protest, culminating in the death through fasting in 1952 of Potti Sriramula. The Congress government was shocked, and a new state was granted in 1953. Linguistic unity prevailed and Andhra Pradesh became a state.

⁹ The subsequent discussions of India and Sri Lanka are more fully explicated in Laitin (2000).

The concession to Andhra for statehood induced yet a third language commission in India, the States Reorganization Commission, which now had to develop a revised long term policy in regard to language and state boundaries. It faced non-violent demands and pressures from all over the country. Once its recommendations were published, however, riots broke out in Bombay (as Marathis and Gujaratis each wanted their own state with Bombay as its capital) in which eighty people were killed. In 1961, the States Reorganization Commission granted separate statehood to Nagaland, where Naga speakers would no longer be under the grips of Assamese-speaking leadership. This helped end a nasty war in the northeastern provinces of India. It also helped establish a linguistic criterion for statehood which increased the number of groups gaining official recognition of their languages. Concurrently, the federal state offered greater protection for minorities within states, adding to the list of officially recognized languages. In the MAR dataset, which does not include any of the state nationalities as minorities at risk, five of the seven listed groups (in which there is a common language distinct from Hindi) get regional recognition. Only the Bodos and Santals (scheduled tribes, and given their marginality, they would fit nicely into pattern number one) have not (yet) been granted linguistic recognition.

Sri Lanka is yet another case where linguistic concessions are the result of the potential (one that was actualized in horrific fashion) for a minority group to mount a successful insurgency. In 1956, the Sinhala majority government passed its infamous Sinhala Only Act, in which the Prime Minister assured the population (of which 14 percent were Tamil speakers) that within twenty-four hours, the linguistic face of the country would be transformed (from having English as the dominant language of state business). As the Parliament was voting on this Sinhala Only Act, the Tamil-led Federal Party leaders (who got little support in 1952, but had much greater success in 1956 as its leaders, in response to Sinhala party promises, spoke out for parity status of the Tamil language) successfully organized a work stoppage in Tamil majority areas and a Gandhi-inspired sit-in in front of the House of Representatives in Colombo. Tamil speakers (at least the Sri Lankan Tamils, originating from the Jaffna Peninsula and the north-east coast; but not the descendents of the Tamil-speaking Indian indentured servants working on the plantations around Kandy) constituted a strong bureaucratic and commercial presence in Sri Lanka, and they were not (like autochthonous or Roma populations) helpless in the face of government repression.

Partly in reaction to Tamil outrage, and the subsequent riots, the government passed the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act No. 28 of 1958 providing for the use of Tamil as a medium of instruc-

tion in the schools and as a medium of examination for public service jobs. In 1969 an official “clarification” of the rules provided that Sinhala was a necessary language for all official matters, but in the northern and eastern provinces, where Tamil could be used for official purposes, a Tamil version must be attached. The 1972 constitution gave the 1969 clarifications the status of basic law. The 1978 constitution gave near parity to Sinhala, Tamil and English. Thus the status of Sinhala was lowered (it was to be the official language but not the “one official language”) and correspondingly the status of Tamil was raised (it became “an official language”). Both were given equal status as national languages, and all citizens had the right to a basic education in either of the national languages. Each language was envisioned to be prominent in its own regions, but now with English as the link language between them, and a language that could be designated for higher education and for courts of law.

The civil war in Sri Lanka did not begin in earnest until 1983 when Tamil was already a recognized regional language. The positive correlation between recognition and insurgency in this case reflects the weakness of the Sinhalese state in rationalizing language in the mode of the 19th century French state. In large part the weakness was due to the unwillingness of Sinhalese civil servants to switch over from English to Sinhala for their work. But the economic and potential military power of the Tamils compelled concessions as well. The result is the odd sequence of language concessions preceding civil war!

Other cases largely confirm this pattern. In Ethiopia (in regard to Afars, Oromos, Somalis and Tigreans), Niger (in regard to the Taurég) and Sudan (in regard to Southerners in general), language concessions were made official either in the prospect of civil war or shortly after civil wars broke out in full. The language concessions and concomitant insurgencies were both the result of the failure of centralized rule. The only obvious exception to this pattern is the case of Burma, at war for a generation with linguistically distinct Kachins, Karens, Mons, Rohingya, Shans and Zomis, repealed regional language status to these groups in the midst of civil war. But for most weak multinational states that entered the international system in the 20th century, recognition of linguistic rights of minorities (as is the case of facing successful insurgency) is a sign of failure to exert centralized rule.

In sum, the second pattern shows an elective affinity between rebellion and linguistic recognition — both of them symptoms of weak states and insufficiently dominated national groupings.

3 • Pattern III. Advanced industrial states — language recognition in the context of state weakening (but not sufficiently so as to invite insurgency)

In the past quarter-century, formerly consolidated nation-states have begun to lose their cultural monopoly over their citizens (e.g. in school systems, television networks, and the internet). Something like an English speaking international culture is increasingly available to citizens of all states (Laitin 1997). Under these conditions of monopoly lost in rich states, ethnic entrepreneurs in once submerged national groupings have an opportunity to exploit latent cultural solidarity among people they claim to represent. The result is a slow but steady increase in the provision of linguistic rights to well-mobilized minorities.

Reflecting the new balance between states and defunct language groups, in 1981 the Arfé Resolution was adopted in the European Parliament, which called for a charter for regional languages. As a result, a European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages was established in Dublin. By 1983, policies protecting language minorities became a recurrent budget item in the European budget (Coulmas 1991, 14-16). Regional language groups, politically dead for centuries, became mobilized and mobilizable. In Italy, significant Albanian, Catalan, Provençal, Friulan, German, Slovene, Occitan, and Sardinian minority language groups have been identified, with the German and Slovene communities already politically mobilized (Zuanelli, 1991). In France, German, Occitan, Breton, Catalan, Flemish, and Corsican all have over 100,000 speakers. In Germany, there is a large and growing Polish-speaking community. In the United Kingdom, Irish, Scottish Gaelic and Welsh are the principal regional languages. Their official recognition is dubious. But a commission led by Sir John Banham, and supported by both parties, reported in 1997 on a regional government plan for the UK, which dealt with Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The 1998 Government of Wales Act, substantially revising the treaty of 1707 of Union, provided for National Assembly for Wales in which Welsh and English would be co-equal in status (du Granrut 1994). In Belgium, with two official languages, there is also a moderately-sized German language community, which, since the accords of Saint-Michel of 1992, has an elected German Assembly (du Granrut 1994, 59). The Belgian regions have their own delegated official within the official Belgian permanent Representative to the EU. Denmark, too, has a significant German-speaking

community. And Holland's Frisian-speaking community has gotten political support from the EC to the chagrin of Dutch authorities.¹⁰ The recognition of these language communities by the EC, like the *korenizatsiia* policies of the early Soviet state, give a legitimacy and a political agenda for mobilized elites from these groups to further press new language demands on the European political stage. The semi-official recognition of Catalan as a community language is the first elevation of a regional language into a community-wide function.¹¹ While it is true that state languages get stronger and more regular subsidies than the regional languages,¹² and while it is also true that member states have the right to define which languages spoken within their borders are official minority languages,¹³ the footing and resources of these regional languages have been strengthened by EC intervention.

It would be a wild exaggeration to claim that minority language protection in the EC was in any way undermining state power in any serious way. Under conditions of state victory over regional languages in earlier centuries, rich European states face no security threat in making concessions on official recognition of some minority languages. These governments, in facing mobilized groups relying on the language of justice (for minorities) pay little cost in carrying the mantle of justice themselves. After all, the situation has changed for the rich and secure states in the international system. For example, in 18th and 19th century France, minority language protection was a symbol of tradition, against modernity and progress; but in the late 20th and early 21st century, minority language revival is an issue for the left, a kind of welfare policy for endangered species. Minority language demands are hardly in the language of rebellion; rather they are in the language of welfare.¹⁴

In this vein, Simons reports on the *oc* revival movement in southern France. Despite the missionary zeal in which these languages are promoted, she also notes the habits and practices of using French that go back for generations, and also the minimal resources available to the revivalists. The effort appears quixotic.¹⁵ One therefore gets the impression that regional languages may be more of a luxury consumption item for the few than a serious revival movement that will coercively demand language competence in the regional language for all who live within the regional boundaries. Local educational authorities might require a year or two of study of the regional language in primary schools. Urban professionals, living outside their self-identified home region, may enroll their children in summer courses, or give a contribution to the local language activists, or even take a course themselves to reconnect with their roots. These cultural consumption activities are hardly seeding a future rebellion.

¹⁰. Some data for this paragraph are from the Commission of the European Communities (1986). The data do not cover Spain, Portugal and Greece.

¹¹. See the resolution of the European Parliament, "On Languages in the Community and the Situation of Catalan" A3-0169/90. The Catalans hardly got what they asked for in this resolution, but the call for *inter alia* "the publication in Catalan of the Community's treaties and basic texts" was considered by Catalans as a foot in the door.

¹². Koch (1991), pp. 174-5.

¹³. Tabouret-Keller (1991) p. 47.

¹⁴. I owe the subtlety of the French case as described in this paragraph to the comments of Jean Laponce, delivered at the Franqui Prize Conference in Brussels, February 28 to March 1, 2003, in Brussels.

¹⁵. See Marlise Simons, "A Reborn Provençal Heralds Revival of Regional Tongues," *The New York Times* (May 3, 1993), National Edition, pp. 1, 6.

Although the language of magnanimity, justice, and welfare pervades the granting of linguistic rights in the rich states of the world, it is the relative power of the groups in relation to their states that determines to a large extent the level of recognition. The language groups that succeed the most — the Catalans and Basques in Spain; the Flemish in Belgium — represent the stronger minority groups in Europe *viv-à-vis* their states. The Catalans and Basques got greater recognition from Spain than they would ever receive from France because of the weakness of Spanish central authority in the Franquist transition.¹⁶ And groups with no power at all, as was emphasized in the discussion of the first pattern especially in regard to the Roma, get hardly any recognition for their languages. If justice demands recognition of Flemish or Basque, surely it demands recognition of Romani. In none of these cases is there any evidence that people whose ancestors spoke these languages would be better off economically if their children were educated in “their” revived language. That only some languages get official support, and that the amount of support varies considerably, is cogent evidence that the relative power of state and group — and not abstract concern for minority rights — is determining the degree of language recognition.

For the groups that succeed, resources are generated internally by the well-to-do who have the capacity for electoral mobilization in the name of linguistic justice. For weaker groups, getting some initial recognition, the resources are coming from the EU, and only in the context of a supra-national state would these marginalized language groups get support for their languages. It is thus *in the context of states weak in relation to their peripheries or weakened by international membership that local languages have an opening for revival*.¹⁷ While the European states are not anywhere near weak enough to be subject to civil war (and therefore there is not a correlation between these linguistic concessions and insurgency), this third pattern illustrates the general proposition of the paper.¹⁸

4 • Conclusion

This paper has highlighted two macro trends of the past half century — the growing number of civil wars taking place in the world and the increasing number of minority language groups receiving official recognition by states. While no claim is made that language concessions are a cause of civil war, the data presented herein provide powerful evidence against claims that the elimination of minority grievances would be a sure fire way of lowering the incidences of civil war. On a more positive note, this paper conjectures that the cor-

16. Rob Reich’s comments on an earlier version of this paper helped me develop the point about justice vs. power as motivations for European concessions to minority groups. Gourevitch (1979) emphasizes the importance of relative power of the region for successful national revival projects.

17. I once asked a visiting delegation of *landsmaal* cultural activists from Norway why they voted against EU accession given that the EU should have provided more resources for their language than would Norway itself standing outside of the EU. They acknowledged the premise of my question, but they feared losing their Norwegian distinctiveness more than they expected any significant revival of their beloved speech form.

18. The different implications for concessions to minority language demands for rich established states and newly independent ones help explain the puzzle that Kymlicka (2004) poses, *viz.*, why the claims of national minorities are judged ... in the West ... in terms of *justice* [while in East and Central Europe] the claims of minorities are primarily assessed in terms of *security*.”

relation between language concessions and civil war might be the joint result of the profusion of new weak states in the world community of states over the past half century. States that are weak (especially those coming out of colonial rule) and groups that can undermine state power conjoin to yield linguistic recognition.

The paper further illuminates three patterns in the relationship of recognition of minority languages and insurgency. First is the case of weak groups and strong states — here we see neither linguistic concessions nor civil wars. Second is the case of strong groups and weak states — here we see both linguistic concessions and high probabilities of civil war. Third is the case of strong states beginning to weaken, and early trends towards linguistic recognition of minority languages — here we see a counter-trend of linguistic concessions but no civil war — but a trend supporting the paper's conjecture that it is weak states, not attentive ones, that recognize minority languages. Overall, the steady increase in state recognition of languages cannot therefore be interpreted as a trend toward justice; rather it appears to signal a trend towards state weakness.

The findings in this paper speak directly to a core theme developed in this volume. That is, recognition of diversity has vastly different implications for established rich states than for newly independent and economically backward states. The established democracies in Western Europe and North America — even if weakened by globalization, supranational membership, and effective mobilization by some minority groups — can build new forms of state solidarity on notions of multicultural diversity without risking violent escalation in demands by groups that have won recognition. Newer and poorer states send different signals to groups that receive such recognition — these signals are ones of weakness that can be further exploited to the benefit of insurgents claiming to represent minority interests. In rich countries, to put this in terms of the paper by Banting and Kymlicka (this volume), Multi-Cultural Policies (MCPs) give power to service classes, who themselves have an interest in sustaining welfare policies and rebuilding social solidarity on a new foundation. On the other hand, in weak countries MCP's give resources to groups that better allow them to sustain insurgencies. Official recognition of diversity is therefore benign in some contexts but potentially dangerous in others.

Appendix

1. Language recognition histories

For both datasets discussed below, the Stanford team of researchers (James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin), under grants from the National Science Foundation (SES-9876477 and SES-9876530) researched and entered new values for all codings on language grievances. The data were collected mostly from R. E. Asher ed (1994) *The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics* (Oxford: Pergamon Press), Erik V. Gunemark (1992) *Countries, Peoples and their Languages* (Gothenburg, Sweden: Geolingua), and various specialized sources to fill in for missing values.

2. From the MAR dataset

The Minorities at Risk Dataset was originally developed at the University of Maryland, under the direction of Professor Ted Gurr. Full documentation on the data is available at: <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/people.htm>. The Stanford team improved several elements in the original dataset. Most of the Stanford re-codings have already been incorporated in the revised Maryland dataset. For this paper, a Stanford version of the dataset (marwork13.dta), available to interested researchers by the author of this paper, has been used.

Problems of bias in the MAR selection of observations rule out many minorities that the Maryland team did not believe were at risk. As noted in the paper, minority nationalities that received states in India (Tamils, Bengalis, Kannada speakers, etc.) are not included. Nor are *landsmaal* speakers of Norway; nor are Flemish speakers in Belgium. The Quebecois are included, but since French had local recognition in Canada at the point of initial coding (1960) there were no changes to report. Overall, the (surely common) dynamics that led to official bi-lingualism in Belgium, that led to the transformation of Riksmaal into official Bokmaal (and the recognition of Nynorsk as an elaborated form of *landsmaal*) in Norway, and that led to the revitalization of French in Canada cannot be analyzed in the context of the MAR dataset as it now stands. Without doubt these dynamics are quite different from the three patterns discussed in this paper, and merit future analysis along lines set herein.

Presented below are raw data showing groups whose languages have gained or lost official recognition. LangR=1 means that the language has official recognition at the regional level; LangR=0 means that it does not have official recognition at the regional level. The five-year scores of rebel history are summaries of the degree of group rebellion against the state, on a scale from 0 through 7. In the

judgment of the Stanford research team, a score of 4 or higher represents a significant sustained insurgency.

After giving the group and then country, the data below give the two time periods of before and during the change in language recognition. Then, in brackets, the Rebel History of the group is provided, with five-year scores from 1960-1998 (i.e. eight separate values, with 1998 substituting for 1995). It is therefore possible to determine whether in any particular case recognition changes preceded, followed or were more-or-less simultaneous with group rebellion.

2.1 *Positive recognition over time* ***(LangR — changes from 0 to 1)***

Berbers in Algeria 80-85 [61000000]
Aborigines in Australia 70-75 [00000000]
Indigenous Highland in Bolivia 75-80 [00001100]
Afars in Ethiopia 65-70 [00074663]
Oromos in Ethiopia 70-75 [44441554]
Somalis in Ethiopia 70-75 [66074.44]
Tigreans in Ethiopia 70-75 [00067660]
Indigenous People in Guatemala 80-85 [00046440]
Kewri in Mauritania 85-90 [00000440]
Maori in New Zealand 80-85 [00000000]
Indigenous People in Nicaragua 80-85 [000.6611]
Djerema-Songai in Niger 85-90 [0000000.]
Hausa in Niger 85-90 [1100000.]
Tuareg in Niger 85-90 [.....553]
Sindhis in Pakistan 65-70 [00004001]
Indigenous Peoples in Panama 85-90 [30000010]
Indigenous Peoples in Paraguay 60-65 [00000000]
Indigenous Highlands in Peru 70-75 [00000000]
Basques in Spain 70-75 [02222222]
Catalans in Spain 70-75 [00111110]
Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka 70-75 [00000000]
Sri Lankan Tamils in Sri Lanka 70-75 [00127777]
Southerners in Sudan 65-70 [67707777]

2.2 *Withdrawal of recognition over time* ***(LangR — changes from 1 to 0)***

Kachins in Burma 85-90 [77777660]
Karens in Burma 85-90 [77777666]
Mons in Burma 85-90 [.....555]

Rohingya in Burma 85-90 [00044041]
Shans in Burma 85-90 [66666555]
Zomis in Burma 85-90 [00000550]
Hungarians in Slovakia 90-95 [.....00]
Southerners in Sudan 85-90 [67707777]
Hispanics in the US 90-95 [00121210]

3. From the country/year dataset

The country/year dataset used in this paper, and developed at Stanford, will shortly be available at: <http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/>.

In the data below, using the country/year dataset, data describe whether any group that speaks a different language from that of the dominant group, and has at least 10% of the population, has any linguistic recognition. If any group with greater than or equal to 10% of the population has a distinct language that does not receive recognition, we code that state as one promoting a language grievance. The categories listed below record changes in language policy by states.

3.1 *End of language grievance*

Algeria (1987-88)
Angola (1977-78)
Ethiopia (1973-74)
Bolivia (1983-84)
Paraguay (1966-67)
Spain (1977-78)
Niger (1990-91)
Somalia (1971-72)
Sudan (1971-72)
Sri Lanka (1976-77)

3.2 *New language grievance*

Slovakia (1994-95)
Sudan (1989-90)

3.3 *End of rationalization (in which the language of the dominant group is no longer the sole official language of the central state)*

Kyrgyzstan (1996-97)
Canada (1968-69)

Bolivia (1983-84)
Somalia (1973-74)
Sudan (1971-72)

3.4 Rationalization (in which the language of the dominant group becomes the sole official language of the central state)

Laos (1974-75)
Somalia (1971-72)
Sudan (1989-90)
Sri Lanka (1956-57)

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