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## 1 • Introduction

In the era of nationalism, nationalist activists justified calls for the creation of an independent nation by referring to the cultural homogeneity of the population concerned — a common history and a common language — and since John Stuart Mill, this homogeneity seemed to be the necessary prerequisite for the formation of a stable and united democratic nation. We are all familiar with the famous idea: “Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion necessary to the working of representative government cannot exist.”<sup>1</sup> Modern theoreticians of nationalism followed the John Stuart Mill “tradition” and theorised the ideas of nationalist activists. To give two examples, Benedict Anderson argues that the invention of the printing press and the diffusion of a common culture through a common language are essential factors in the development of national sentiment.<sup>2</sup> Ernest Gellner shows that in industrial societies, as opposed to traditional agrarian societies, it is indispensable that the entire population uses the same language. Indeed, exchanges between members of the population become increasingly ephemeral, non-repetitive and optional; the context is in constant flux and fortuitous, and thus the contents of these exchanges become essential; the new mode of communication is semantic and requires that everyone speaks the same language.<sup>3</sup>

Indeed, nation-building developed alongside efforts to homogenise linguistically. Having a language for each nation-state became the instrument and the symbol of the modern nation. At the end of the nineteenth century in Europe, it was taken for granted that Germans spoke German, that Romanians spoke Romanian and so on. The exceptions were analysed in terms of historical anomalies, which

## Linguistic pluralism as a serious challenge to democratic life

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1. Stuart Mill (1861: 230).

2. Benedict Anderson (1982).

3. Gellner (1964: 155).

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would sooner or later disappear. However, even today, following the break-up of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, the Serbians and the Croats, the Czechs and the Slovaks all point out that they spoke different languages. National self-determination was automatically born out of a declaration of the existence of a national idiom.

The development of national languages in nineteenth and twentieth-century Europe followed similar paths, and Elie Kedourie found similar patterns in Asian and African nationalisms of the twentieth century.<sup>4</sup> More often than not, one of the languages spoken in one of the regions of a given nation-state was subsequently promoted to the status of the national language, an example being Tuscan becoming the language of Italy following the *Risorgimento*. This was also the case in France, although this process dates back further, to a time when the dialect of the small kingdom of France, based around Paris, was imposed as the official State language, as the kings established the nation, by a skilful policy of conquest and strategic marriages through the centuries. In other countries, a language was invented, or reinvented, more often than not, in the name of tradition, and based on an ancient language, which had been more or less preserved, as well as on popular vernaculars which were recorded by linguistic nationalists. This was the case of the majority of Slavic languages spoken in the Balkans.<sup>5</sup> The example of Hebrew, which was transmitted in dispersed Jewish communities as a traditional language and as the language of religious texts and later elected as the vernacular language in the construction of the State of Israel, is, in this sense, reflective of the desire to associate a specifically national language to the creation of a new nation.<sup>6</sup> There are also those cases where a foreign national language has been preferred to a variety of local languages, so that none of the different historical communities emerges as dominant: the Indian union and most of the sub-Saharan African countries have chosen the old imperial language as the official language of national political life so as to avoid imposing one of the local languages at the expense of others.

Today, the policy of cultural and linguistic homogenisation implemented by the nation State, which during the era of nationalisms, appeared as the necessary prerequisite for unity between nationals, is readily criticised, as are all the general features of the nation-state. The populations living within the same political entity have apparently become more diverse than in the past, but above all, any demands for cultural homogeneity, especially of the linguistic variety, would now seem to be incompatible with democratic values and the symbolic recognition, which, in the name of these values, each democratic individual has the right to obtain. Multilingualism in the private sphere is of course, a freedom which poses no threat

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<sup>4</sup> Kedourie (1970).

<sup>5</sup> Thiesse (1999).

<sup>6</sup> Masson (1983).

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whatsoever to the democratic political order. However, the following question arises: to what extent can a democracy accept political multilingualism — that is, multilinguism in the public sphere — without democratic practice and the notion of the unity of citizens being seriously challenged? Or, more generally, to what extent can cultural diversity be recognised — in accordance with democratic values which stipulate that each person’s authenticity should be recognised — without fundamentally calling into question the principles which define a common public space? To what extent can a society include diversity and what form should this diversity be allowed to take? Indeed, the question posed by Claude Lévi-Strauss is of significance here: “We end up asking whether human societies do not define themselves in terms of their mutual relationships, by a certain *optimum* level of diversity, beyond which, and below which, no society can proceed safely.”<sup>7</sup> This questioning of a more general nature finds a specific expression in democratic societies.

## 2 • Historical experience

Questions pertaining to political philosophy can be renewed by the analysis of concrete historical experience, and as far as multilingual nations are concerned, by the cases of three stable democracies — that is, Canada, Belgium and Switzerland.<sup>8</sup>

I will briefly allude to the cases of Canada and Belgium, two countries which particularly concern some of my fellow presenters with greater knowledge of them than mine, and about which I shall only discuss the following issues. Despite the declaration of official bilingualism in the proclamation of the national pact in Canada and Belgium, in actual fact, stability was guaranteed by the political dominance of one of the two languages, which was the language used by the ruling class and the political elite. In spite of the myth of “two founding peoples”, as proclaimed in the 1867 treaty, English took precedence over the French language in Canada and despite official Belgian bilingualism (since 1898), French kept precedence over Flemish in Belgium. In a context of political domination by Anglophone Canadians and Francophone Belgians, formal recognition of the minority language in the public sphere remained essentially symbolic in both cases. When the francophone Canadians pursued their “quiet revolution” during the 1960s, thus calling into question their status of a protected yet inferior minority, and similarly, when the Flemish population in Belgium became more prosperous and entrepreneurial than the Walloons, both linguistic minorities demonstrated that they no longer accepted the superiority of the

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7. Lévi Strauss (1973).

8. Amongst those countries which Arend Lijphart analyses to show that a stable democracy can develop in a plural society, the Netherlands and Austria have a common language. See Lijphart (1977).

anglophone Canadians and the francophone Belgians as given. The inegalitarian contract between the two groups in each case, which had presided over the construction of the nation-state — became increasingly challenged. Today, both countries have tried to resolve this problem by way of a federalist system.

I will now discuss the case of Switzerland in greater detail, a nation which for one hundred and fifty years has demonstrated true political genius. Multilingualism has been one of the dimensions of the political process and of this national genius, and it has been married with democracy. However, it is important to highlight the very specific circumstances which have characterised Switzerland's case.

The rules governing multilingualism were part of the “political project”<sup>9</sup> of the Swiss Confederation which was established by the Constitution of 1848. These rules were not introduced so as to resolve a conflict, nor were they imposed by a foreign power following a military defeat. They were neither associated with the sufferings of a civil war nor with any collective humiliation. They could therefore be interpreted as a singularity or as an exception — all nations being unique — and thus become part of the national grand narrative. “There is no one quite like us” is an expression which anthropologists have come across amongst all social classes.<sup>10</sup>

In addition, Switzerland was a small country, the independence of which was recognised by neighbouring great powers. For Germany, as for France, the material and political cost of any annexation would have proven far too great and futile: the existence of Switzerland was not a challenge great enough to provide incentive to undertake any such action. For her part, Switzerland had accepted limited political independence and influence. Max Weber argued that Switzerland was not a true nation, since all nations were defined by their will for power.<sup>11</sup> The internal heterogeneity and the very strict nature of the rules governing the representation of the various linguistic groups in the federal public space had the effect of limiting the federal state's capacity of political intervention. During both world wars, the sympathies of the different linguistic groups for the different warring parties were probably not the same, yet the common will to preserve the country's neutrality was an obstacle to the transformation of these sentiments into political action just as much as the fact that in any case the federal government lacked the means to act. As noted by, Arend Lijphart, governments in “consociational” democracies act slowly and risk falling into inaction.<sup>12</sup>

The limits to foreign intervention were closely linked to the conditions necessary for the balance between the linguistic groups. Four conditions in particular have rendered the Swiss model unique.

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<sup>9</sup> Regarding the concept of the political project, see Schnapper (1994: 36-40).

<sup>10</sup> Chiva (1992: 1499-1503).

<sup>11</sup> Weber (1971: 427).

<sup>12</sup> Lijphart (1977: 51).

The first was the multiplicity and the non-coincidence of linguistic, religious and social boundaries: there were German-speaking and Francophone Catholics, German-speaking and Francophone Protestants, Francophone and German-speaking rural and urban communities, just as there were rich and poor Francophones and German-speakers. None of the linguistic groups was particularly disadvantaged. When the inhabitants of a part of the Bern Jura became an economic, social, religious and linguistic minority within the Canton in question, they seceded. The respect for minorities, an essential principle of the political structure, was even greater since each category either enjoyed majority or minority status depending on the political level. The German-speakers, who were the majority group at the federal level, often found themselves in a minority situation in some cantons, villages or towns. This meant that they were less tempted to take advantage of their position at the federal level.

The second condition was the principle of the ultimate respect of internal linguistic frontiers, established by the non-territorial character of the law on languages, which renders the efforts of a group to modify these frontiers futile. In his study, Uli Windisch found that in some villages, where Francophone inhabitants represented less than a quarter of the local population, the official laws continued to be debated and archived in French.<sup>13</sup> This principle is all the more effectively implemented since it is not explicitly articulated in the Constitution — even though article 70 of the Constitution, promulgated in January 2000, provides an interpretation —, but it is the product of progressive developments based on concrete practice and legal precedent.

The third condition was the concern — traditionally respected — for compromise and the respect of minorities in a country which defines its own political project as being that of a minority nation amongst powerful neighbours. Modern Switzerland was born out of the political project linked to the notion of a minority status which in turn is constitutive of the manner in which the Swiss conceptualise their own nation. This interpretation explains why until recently, it was the majority population of German-speakers who learnt French, the minority language, rather than vice versa.<sup>14</sup> The “magic formula” of the Federal Council, adopted in 1959, which took into account and respected the integrity of the specific political entities — the cantons, towns and villages — as well as the various political tendencies, was merely the symbolic expression of practices which had already been adopted, in a more or less formal manner at the Canton level.<sup>15</sup> The Swiss seem to enjoy resolving the problems of linguistic relations and demonstrate an ability to cooperate beyond political and linguistic boundaries.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Windisch (1992).

<sup>14</sup> Windisch (1992: 441).

<sup>15</sup> Aubert (1978).

<sup>16</sup> Windisch (1992: 483).

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Finally, Swiss federalism was based on a sometimes very old tradition of democratic management, in small political entities. The expression of identities and the democratic process has always been the most prominent, and therefore the most legitimate in the cantons and towns, the existence of which is guaranteed by the Constitution and the power of the federal government remains strictly limited. As far as the State legislation is concerned, the Constitution of 1848, which formalised the federalist principle, only deals with the notions of equality and democracy in article 6. André Siegfried argued that “the Constitution administers, the Cantons govern.”<sup>17</sup>

In the case of Switzerland, we can observe that the disuniting potential of linguistic pluralism has been controlled by the strength of the democratic tradition, the separate nature of social and linguistic boundaries, the character of the original political project and the checks and balances on the so-called federal national State’s prerogative in its dual role of internal integration and external action. The national political project allowed for the overcoming of specific regional identities and their unification within a “confederation.”

How can this Swiss experience be used to reflect on multilingualism in other democratic societies?

### 3 • The “ethnic” and the “civic”

Citizenship is a means of managing diversity, in the sense that it is a principle defined by the notion of transcending particularisms of all sorts, each democratic nation thus being, by definition, multicultural.<sup>18</sup> Citizenship sets out to integrate all individuals in a public space, where, above and beyond what can be referred to as the “ethnic” characteristics of individuals, all citizens are regarded as free and equal. However, it is not possible to conclude that all types of diversity can be transcended by the principle of citizenship. Since the democratic nation is at once “ethnic” and “civic” in character, the “civic” principle cannot absorb all “ethnic” characteristics. Certain concrete circumstances are necessary before a given society can be structured by the principles and the institutions of citizenship. To briefly summarise these conditions, the inclusion of all citizens in a nation-state can only become meaningful if these citizens’ principles and practice are not in contradiction with the principles and practice implied by the idea of citizenship itself. Certain arrangements and social practices which are not based on the respect and the dignity of the person — such as, for example the different status of men and women which is a fundamental aspect of certain so-called traditional cultures — are, in themselves incompatible with citizenship.

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<sup>17</sup>. Siegfried (1969: 151).

<sup>18</sup>. Schnapper (1997).

Citizenship has proven particularly effective as far as the management of religious diversity is concerned. Since Locke developed the idea, we have witnessed the construction of democratic States which abstain from intervention in religious life and guarantee equal citizenship to individuals regardless of their religious identity. These States also negotiate the terms of cooperation and compromise with the Churches and religious groups. The modern State has developed a way of transcending the religious by way of the political and has thus guaranteed individual religious practice by according the religious an “ethnic” status, that is, the private individuals are free to embrace their religion in the private sphere as long as they respect the rules of public liberties. Everyone is free to observe, in private, festivals associated with their religious beliefs and to adopt those forms of collective life which are not contradictory with common values. The institutions which are responsible for the religious neutrality of the State guarantee religious freedom. What’s more, the separation of politics and religion protects minority religions. In France, Buddhists have been able to flourish over the last few years thanks to the protection provided by the rigorous laws governing secularism. “Republicans” in the French context, “liberals” in the Anglo-Saxon context, and “communitarians” can only agree on the intrinsic value of institutions which guarantee religious freedom for all through the principle of the abstention of the State (which takes different forms in different nation-states).

Can the abstention of the State from religious life — which facilitates the management of religious diversity and practice — be transposed to the issue of language and is it possible to build a State where multilingualism is recognised? This question is evidently not without practical consequences as far as the political future of Europe is concerned.

We know that language is first and foremost an identity marker. It unites individuals through common knowledge and shared emotions, and thus can be seen as “ethnic” in character. Those people who share the same language, regardless of their national identity, also share certain references and emotions. Having learned how to reflect upon the world and human destiny through the ideas of Pascal, Shakespeare or Goethe gives each individual a different intellectual identity, which he/she more or less has in common with those who have had the same education. Yet language is not only “ethnic” in quality. It is also linked to “civism” and is the prerequisite for civic practice. Language is also the tool of democracy, that is, of the political sphere, common to all, which transcends various particularisms, and it is the instrument of the sphere where collective will and political legitimacy are forged. A common language is essential in order to

establish the exchanges which constitute a democratic order, since it facilitates the resolution of conflicts and rivalries according to the rule of law, negotiation and compromise — and thus through the use of words — instead of violence. In other words, it is essential to get along with one another. Language, as an element of “high culture”, as a feature of modern society, is not only the instrument of economic development and human mobility, as Gellner demonstrates,<sup>19</sup> it is also the instrument of democratic practice. It is the means by which exchanges between individuals take place, as well as being the means by which negotiations between groups and the resolution of conflicts according to universally accepted rules, can be conducted. Finally, it is the instrument by which democratic process develops and is maintained. To what extent can the common public space function if its citizens do not communicate by way of a common language? It goes without saying that everyone has the right to speak whatever language he or she chooses at home, or with friends. Does this mean that everyone should have the right to speak his or her language at school, in hospitals, within the judiciary system and in the various political institutions? Is it possible to organise the translation of legislation — documents which are more and more elaborate and detailed, this feature being a characteristic of “providential democracy”<sup>20</sup> — into a large number of languages? France, which has a long tradition of linguistic unity, harbours no less than twenty-seven languages which could legitimately demand recognition in accordance with the European Charter regarding the protection of “regional and minority languages”.<sup>21</sup> Is it possible to imagine that the public school system, where language and the language of citizenship are acquired, and on a more general level, the public sphere, would not remain the main forum for learning about democratic values and practice, which in turn allow for the development of solidarity between all nationals, thus facilitating the “making of society”?<sup>22</sup>

In other words, it is not feasible to extend the notion of State neutrality as regards religion — in itself, a founding principle of the democratic State, which allows for individuals of different faiths to live together — to the notion of neutrality as regards language. Language is located at the interface of the ethnic and civic dimensions of the nation-state. In contrast to religion, it cannot be exclusively reinterpreted in “ethnic” terms — in other words it cannot be treated as a question of private and individual choice — precisely because language is at once both “ethnic” and “civic”. During the *Ancien Régime*, peasants, who made up the majority of the French population did not need to speak French, since they could not participate in the political sphere. It is significant that the eradication of “patois” or “dialects” and the promotion of a national language by the French Revolutionaries was implemented as soon as they had declared the

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19. Gellner (1983).

20. Schnapper (2002).

21. According to B. Cerquiglini, “the systematic survey of the Republic (the metropole, the overseas departments and territories) amounts to a list of 75 languages”. See Cerquiglini (1999).

22. This of course, and in accordance with democratic principles, does not pose an obstacle to the full recognition of minority populations, to the highlighting of their contribution to collective life, nor to the more liberal organisation of the teaching of so-called languages of origin for those who are interested. Nor is it in contradiction, more generally with the notion of according minorities a place in society as long as this is in tandem with the society’s common values.

new principle of political legitimacy, which would from this point onwards take the community of citizens as its source.<sup>23</sup> If the use of the “king’s language” could be reserved for the elite and the learned, the practice of the national language became the citizen’s responsibility. From that point onwards, and as theorised by Herder, language came to incarnate not only the nation, but the democratic nation as well.

## 4 • Policy

Political entities normally gather together peoples who speak different languages.<sup>24</sup> What are the available options as far as the adoption of the language of democratic practice is concerned? The first solution involves the adoption of one of the languages spoken by one of the groups which constitutes the political entity — that which is spoken by the largest number or by the most powerful. This was the course of action most frequently adopted when nation-states were being formed. However, this amounts to the affirmation of the political superiority of a certain linguistic group over the others and hardly corresponds to new democratic demands. Another solution involves the adoption of a “neutral” language — different from all those indigenous languages spoken within the state — a response which has the merit of symbolically respecting all the languages concerned. This is how English has become the official political language in former Commonwealth countries and French the official mode of expression in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, it is clear that this solution will most likely be of a temporary nature in the sense that it symbolises the colonial past. In addition, only the most educated classes, who master a foreign language, will be able to feel that they participate in public life.<sup>25</sup> The adoption of a non vernacular language does not encourage for democratic development. However, learning the democratic process and its practices is a lengthy task. It is more than likely that in Europe, national languages will be maintained within nation-states, with English being the working language in European institutions. However, in this case, when will Europeans recognise the legitimacy of European institutions? When will they feel like European citizens?

Besides these two solutions, there remains another more attractive one, more or less based on the Swiss model and involving the articulation of complex forms of reciprocal linguistic recognition, which constitute a process of recognition of individual and group identities. However, there should not be too many languages involved. Even in Switzerland, where four national languages are rec-

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<sup>23.</sup> de Certeau, Julia, Revel (1975).

<sup>24.</sup> We know that there are more than 6000 languages and a little more than 200 states, even though the number of states is increasing. On the world system of languages, see Abram de Swaan, *Words of the world. The global language system*, Polity press, 2001.

<sup>25.</sup> According to sociolinguists, 10% of the population of well-known Francophone sub-Saharan African countries speak French. See Héran (dir.) (2002: 66).

ognised by the Constitution, those languages spoken by the two largest groups enjoy a *de facto* special status. In addition, knowledge of other languages requires a certain degree of effort, an effort, which people will generally only make if they see that it is in their interest. If the example of Switzerland demonstrates that cultural homogeneity is not a prerequisite for democratic stability, it does reveal the efforts that have had to be made by the Swiss in order for the legislation governing multilingualism to be functional. Their acceptance — until recently — of these efforts is doubtless due to the fact that they saw this as a condition of their independence and prosperity in the middle of a Europe torn apart by conflicts — a situation which is without a doubt no longer the case today. Such circumstances will not re-emerge easily.

Indeed, the recent decline of the Swiss model invites reflection. It seems that Swiss German-speakers now balk at the idea of learning French and for that matter, even German, and instead argue for the wider use of “Swiss German”. English is becoming more and more common in public life, and not only in the financial and business world. The decision concerning the Geneva airport was taken for strictly economic reasons, and thus independently of any political or symbolic motives for the maintenance of an international airport in German-speaking Switzerland (Zürich) and in French-speaking Switzerland (Geneva). Votes increasingly oppose a German-speaking Switzerland which is hostile to the notion of opening up to Europe and a French-speaking Switzerland, which is more in favour of joining the European institutions. The distinctness of linguistic and political boundaries is being challenged. Linguistic pluralism is thereby less dependent on financial cost than it is on political will.<sup>26</sup> Moreover, the development of European institutions reveals the practical difficulties of multilingualism, even when it is imposed by law. As we know, English is becoming ever more the common language, whilst also being the language of one of the member states, which shows that the respect for multilingualism acquires a theoretical character. Translation costs are high<sup>27</sup> and the right to use all member-state languages certainly contributes to the abstract nature of the debates in the European Parliament, which remains somewhat removed from the people of Europe.

Public recognition of specific languages is no more than a poignant example of the principle of the recognition of all specificities, which the development of democratic society encourages, as it transforms itself into vast and universal Welfare State system.<sup>28</sup> It is possible to argue that multicultural policies form one of the dimensions of this “providential democracy”, which, once having dealt with the social in the narrowest sense of the term, increasingly concerns

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<sup>26</sup>. On this question, see François Gourin’s contribution to this conference, “On the cost of cultural diversity.”

<sup>27</sup>. According to Nicolas-Jean Brehon, the various European institutions devote a third (for the Commission) and 80% (for the Court of Justice) of their administrative budget to the translation and interpretation costs. In 1989, with nine working languages, the cost of multilingualism in the European institutions was 2% of the total European Union budget and quarter of the civil servants working for the Commission were either translators or interpreters. (*Le Monde*, 30 November, 1999). Today, there are twenty-five member states and there are twenty-one official working languages.

<sup>28</sup>. This analysis is developed in Schnapper (2002).

educational, cultural and ethnic issues. Individuals are justified in always demanding that more specific measures are taken, to ensure their personal well-being as well as “real” equality for all. Demands for recognition of difference are thus inherent to the democratic dynamic. Whatever form the recognition of difference takes, it necessarily involves the possibility of a process of endless demands. As far as languages are concerned, why recognise the languages of some historical or cultural groups, living in the same national or supranational political entity, and not accord the same degree of recognition to other languages? In France, how would it be possible to recognise Arabic or Berber and not Chinese, or one of the types of Breton and not the others? In Europe, why recognise national languages only and not those which have become regional languages? How are the criteria for justice established? Differentialism has the individual as its ultimate end. If this principle gains acceptance through the establishment of “cultural (and therefore political) rights” as symbolised by linguistic recognition, the pluralism of social life, which is at once inevitable and desirable — given the values of democratic societies —, runs the risk of creating linguistic and political inequality. The danger of aggravating social fragmentation in democratic societies thus becomes acute, whilst economic and market forces establish themselves at the expense of civic ties, as the pre-eminence of the Welfare State ruins the risk of reducing the political will and as democratic individualism leads to the cultivation of “me” above all else. Up to now, no modern society has existed where the institutional recognition of cultural pluralism has not led to social and political pluralism.

This is why I have some doubts about Philippe Van Parijs’ proposal for “territorial decentralisation”, that is, the imposing of an exclusive political language in a territory which is already linguistically unified.<sup>29</sup> It is argued that this territorial principle would facilitate a response to the challenge of multilingualism in democracies. However, it is possible to question this assumption. Wouldn’t the very logic of “territorial decentralisation” result in further fragmentation as the various particularisms are to be taken into account? No country is ever totally monolingual. The case of Brussels is a well-known illustration of this fact.

The spontaneity of human societies is to be found in the diversity and opposition between populations or historical communities and the role of the political institutions is to allow these populations to live together *in spite* of their diversity and divisions. During the era of nations and nationalisms, politics, which aimed at cultural homogenisation, especially linguistic homogenisation, was considered essential in guaranteeing communication between different popula-

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<sup>29</sup>. Van Parijs (1999).

tions as well as for the democratic management of diversity and conflicts. As unpleasant as it may seem to the democratic good-willed people that we are, it must be observed that few countries have been able to successfully separate “cultural loyalty” and “political loyalty”<sup>30</sup>, or in other words, few have been able to democratically conjugate cultural diversity and political unity. Today, as national identity and investment in a national identity have weakened, and as democratic demands are irresistibly leading to a process of recognition of the rights of individuals and specific groups — a demand to which multicultural policy responds — we easily criticise the policy of cultural homogenisation — which, of course, as with every policy, carries its costs. However, it has not been shown, if we consider historical experience, that the plurality of cultures and languages which are recognised in the public space, can be married, in providential democracies, in the long term, with a minimum of political unity and solidarity, which are so essential if democratic order is to continue to preside over human relations.

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<sup>30</sup>. According to the terms used by Weiner (1965: 57).

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English translation by Nadia Kiwan.

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