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**BASIC INCOME  
AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW EUROPE\***

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"The interest of the [European] Community in a guaranteed minimum income goes back at least to the beginning of the 1980s, and the advent of the Single Market has intensified this concern. [...] The growing links of the East European countries could well reinforce these concerns with a minimum guaranteed income, in view of the increasing insecurity which citizens of the eastern countries are likely to face as they move towards a market society" (Room 1991, 6).

If the new Europe is the one that arises as the European Union's economic integration deepens and as its links with Eastern Europe strengthen, then the issue of a guaranteed minimum income is of central importance to the new Europe, evidently if the European Union means business when it claims to be concerned with social justice, but also, indirectly, if it cared about nothing but economic efficiency. But what sort of guaranteed minimum income? Along with a number of academics and organizations across Europe, I have been arguing for a number of years that, whatever the short-term strategy, the objective must be the introduction of a genuine basic income, i.e. an income granted to every

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\* Part of this paper goes back to the author's contribution to the hearing on "The guaranteed basic income and the future of social security" for the Social Affairs Commission of the European Parliament (Brussels, November 1986), revised versions of which have appeared in *L'Europe en Formation* (Nice) 275, été-automne 1989, 47-57; *Mensuel M* (Paris) octobre-novembre 1991, 27-30; *Garantir le revenu* (Gilles Gantelet et Jean-Paul Maréchal eds.), Paris: Transversales, 1992, 74-82; and *Green Light on Europe* (Sara Parkin & David Fernbach eds.), London: Heretic Books, 1991, 166-76.

citizen or permanent resident on an individual basis, without means test or willingness-to-work condition.<sup>1</sup>

This is obviously not the place to present a comprehensive defense of basic income.<sup>2</sup> I shall restrict myself to highlighting the intuition behind it by sketching the argument for basic income stemming from a concern with poverty and emancipation, respectively. Next I shall present at more length the argument that emphasizes basic income as a strategy against unemployment, by comparing it to two alternative strategies often put forward in today's European debate: statutory working time reduction and employment subsidies. This aspect of the case for basic income is particularly relevant in the context of this book, as persistent mass unemployment constitutes the most conspicuous threat to the European Union's claim to keep offering an appealing socio-economic model to the world. Against this background, I shall next sketch the proposal of a (partial) European basic income. By way of conclusion, I shall spell out the main links between the subject of this chapter and the central issues of the volume.

## **Poverty and emancipation**

It would be ludicrous to maintain that poverty is simply a question of monetary income. Yet it is even more ludicrous to claim that poverty can be overcome without some form of guaranteed minimum income. If I am firmly in favour of the totally unconditional form of guaranteed minimum income represented by a basic income, it is because any form of conditional guaranteed income presents in a high degree one at least of the following three drawbacks (and often all three at once): (1) Owing to the intrusions into an individual's private life which it legitimizes and the social stigma that attaches to it, conditional assistance is humiliating for those receiving it. (2) Since conditional assistance is restricted to those in need of it, it is withdrawn as soon as anyone starts to manage on her/his own and therefore has the effect of catching recipients in the unemployment trap. (3) Conditional assistance allows many of the most deprived to slip through the safety net which it claims to provide, because

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<sup>1</sup> The European literature on basic income has grown very quickly in the last few years. In English, Walter (1989) provides a good, though now outdated, general introduction. Van Parijs ed. (1992) and Van Parijs (1995) concentrate on the ethical issues. Atkinson (1995) presents and discusses the most relevant aspects of the economic literature. Further information on the present state of the European debate is provided by the Citizen's Income Bulletin (Citizens Income Study Centre, St Philips Building, Sheffield Street, London WC2A 2EX ) and by the Newsletter of the Basic Income European Network (BIEN, c/o Chaire Hoover, Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium). BIEN also has a web site which provides, among other things, an integrated and annotated bibliography on basic income (since 1986) in several European languages (<http://www.espo.ucl.ac.be/ETES/BIEN/bien.html>).

<sup>2</sup> I have tried to do so in Van Parijs (1995).

ignorance or intimidation prevents them from claiming their entitlement. A basic income, by contrast, would give rise to no humiliation, it would eliminate the unemployment trap and tighten as far as possible the mesh of the net. Moreover, at any given level of minimum income it would be more expensive than conditional forms of benefit only if the "cost" were naively measured by the volume of financial flows to be handled by the State. If instead the cost were measured by the real resources (in working time, in paperwork, etc.) which a community needs to devote to managing its transfer system, the opposite would be the case.

Emancipation is not just a matter of income either. But it is not possible without a minimum of financial autonomy. The problem is how we can ensure that every person - and particularly those millions of women in Europe who have no income of their own and live in total economic dependence on their spouse - will enjoy that autonomy, while avoiding both of the following pitfalls: either driving women back into the home, which traps them in the family cell; or obliging all women to take up work outside the home, which is tantamount to forced labour. In order to achieve financial autonomy for every individual, male and female, and avoid the first pitfall, one might consider implementing what in Eastern Europe used to be known as the 'anti-parasite' law: making gainful employment both a legal obligation and a legal right of every citizen, to be supplied by the public authorities if the private sector fails to provide it. This avoids the first pitfall, but clearly not the second. To ensure financial autonomy without recourse to forced labour, one solution would be what is sometimes called a 'housewife's wage'. This avoids the second pitfall, but evidently not the first; such a payment would be analogous to the repatriation allowance which some wish to see paid to migrant workers, nappies, pots and pans here playing the role of the country of origin. To achieve financial autonomy for everyone and steer a course between both pitfalls is not, however, impossible. That is precisely what is achieved by a basic income.

### **The end of full employment ?**

Those who advocate a basic income as a way of fighting poverty or promoting emancipation were as justified in their views two decades ago as they are now. However, a further reason has been apparent for some years now; and it is the strength of this reason which explains why the idea of a basic income has been arousing interest in ever wider circles.

For nearly two decades, most West European countries have been experiencing a situation of massive unemployment. Millions of Europeans are vainly seeking work. There are not enough jobs to go round which are both economically viable (their cost does not exceed what demand is willing to pay) and socially adequate (the earnings from them are not less than the minimum necessary to meet the needs of a household). In order

to put an end to this massive unemployment, it initially seemed obvious that we should try to boost the rate of growth. But in view of the speed with which technical progress was eliminating jobs, it rapidly became apparent that a fantastic rate of growth would be necessary even to stabilize employment, let alone to reduce the number of the unemployed - a rate of growth, indeed, which even if it were possible, would hardly be desirable. Alternatively, one might then want to consider a substantial reduction in workers' earnings, the idea being that by reducing the relative cost of labour, technical change could be redirected in such a way that fewer jobs were sacrificed. Even a relatively modest growth rate would then be able to stabilize and, gradually, reduce present levels of unemployment. However, such a policy would not only hamper productivity growth and run the risk of upsetting the stability of demand. Above all, it would impose an unacceptable standard of living on a large part of the population - all the more so in that a reduction in wages would need to be coupled to a parallel reduction in unemployment benefits and other replacement incomes, so as to preserve work incentives.

If we cannot or will not rely on either accelerated growth or reduced earnings, do we then have no option but to regard full employment as an impossible target ? We are, indeed, condemned to this view if by full employment we mean a situation in which virtually everyone who wants a full-time job can obtain one which is both economically viable (without any subsidy) and socially adequate (without any additional allowance). But we are not if we are willing to redefine full employment by leaving out one, at least, of the three conditions underlined in the foregoing sentence. Corresponding to each of those conditions, there is a potential strategy for reducing unemployment which involves neither an increase in the rate of growth nor a reduction in the level of income.

### **The three dilemmas of working time reduction**

The first is the social redefinition of 'full time', i.e. a reduction in maximum working time, whether through a reduction in the maximum number of years worked (extension of compulsory school attendance, lowering of the retirement age, sabbatical years, etc.) or through a reduction in the maximum number of hours worked per year (longer holidays, the 30-hour week, etc.). Since there are not enough jobs for everyone who would like one, let us not allow a small number people to appropriate them: they must be rationed. If this strategy is to be taken seriously as a way of solving the unemployment problem, the reduction must be both dramatic in its extent (unemployment in Europe is still running at about 10 %) and neutral in its effects on wages (otherwise the negative indirect impact is likely to cancel out the positive direct impact of the sharing of jobs). Working time must therefore be reduced by some 10 % on average with a corresponding (average) reduction in gross earnings levels.

However, such a strategy comes up at once against three unavoidable dilemmas. Firstly, either the across-the-board percentage reduction in gross earnings is not differentiated according to pay levels (hourly wage levels are simply retained unchanged), in which case the lowest wages will fall below the social minimum; or a greater reduction in the highest gross earnings is introduced, thus protecting those with the lowest incomes and maintaining the overall wage bill at the present level, in which case the relative cost of the least skilled jobs increases considerably, stepping up the pressure for their elimination through mechanization. In other words, a dramatic and financially neutral reduction in working time is necessarily detrimental to the least qualified jobs - either because it kills the supply (they pay less than replacement incomes) or because it kills the demand (they cost firms a lot more per hour than they used to).

That is not all. Unemployment is very unevenly distributed, both in terms of regions and in terms of skills. This generates a second dilemma. Either the reduction in working time is undifferentiated across the board — which would lead to massive inefficiencies (bottlenecks for certain skilled jobs and in certain regions, high cost of retraining in new skills, and of moving either the work force or the means of production). Or it is so devised as to affect the various categories of workers only in so far as there are job seekers with the required skills — which ensures that the system is not plagued with the inefficiencies just mentioned but imposes unacceptable inequalities (surgeons and executives, for example, being allowed to continue to work sixty hours a week, whereas primary school teachers and hairdressers might not be allowed to work more than ten).

Finally, when we think of reductions in working time, we are mainly thinking of wage-earners. But what of the self-employed ? Here again, a hard choice has to be made: either they are to be treated in the same way as waged workers and their work must be shared, which would entail intractable enforcement problems (an inspector would have to be able to check exactly how many hours a butcher puts in her/his own back-yard) without much of a guarantee that these efforts would lead to any increase in people working, except in the labour inspectorate; or no reduction is imposed on the working hours of the self-employed, in which case the enforced reduction in the waged workers' hours would mostly serve to increase the number of the 'fake self-employed', i.e. wage-earners artificially detached from the salaried staff of a firm so as to allow them to work 'for themselves' for as many hours as they want. It would, furthermore, constitute a flagrant injustice, victimizing those who have no option but to be and remain waged workers.

**Subsidize the employer or liberate the employee ?**

Awareness of these dilemmas helps us to understand why the campaign to reduce working time, even in those countries in which the Trade Union movement has been sympathetic, is moving at a pace which is insufficient even to make up for the new rationalizations. This forces us to take another possibility into account. Whereas it is not possible to provide everyone seeking employment with a job which is sufficiently productive — without external intervention — to be both economically viable and socially adequate, it may be possible to use those activities which are sufficiently productive to 'subsidize' others, rather than (unsuccessfully) trying to share out "productive" jobs amongst all.

Two options, profoundly different in their consequences, are on offer. One consists, in its pure form, of flat-rate employment subsidies: a lump sum of money is paid to the employer for each person (s)he employs. The other option, in its purest form, is the introduction of a basic income: the same sum is paid directly to every citizen (or permanent resident), and hence to every actual or potential worker, no strings attached.<sup>3</sup> In many ways, a general flat-rate subsidy and a universal basic income are similar. In particular, they both address head on the first dilemma mentioned in connection with working time reduction: the least skilled can be employed at a lower cost to their employer, without this needing to take them below the "social minimum", because of the wedge between direct labour cost and standard of living generated by the subsidy or the benefit.

There is, however, one fundamental difference between the two approaches. In the first, the pressure to take up employment is kept intact. In the second it is reduced. As a result, poorly productive jobs made viable by the first approach are likely to be just as unattractive as those which existed previously, whereas those made viable by the second approach can only exist if workers with the right skills find them sufficiently attractive. If the motive in combating unemployment is not some sort of work fetishism or the fear of leaving part of the population without a job to keep it busy, but rather a concern to give every person the possibility of taking up gainful employment in which (s)he can find some accomplishment, then there is no doubt that the basic income approach is to be preferred. If, moreover, for the reasons outlined earlier, we cannot hope to eliminate unemployment by accelerating growth, lowering wage levels or imposing a reduction in working time, then basic income provides the only viable strategy for effectively fighting unemployment in the sense in which it is essential that the latter should be fought.

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<sup>3</sup> An intermediate option would consist in paying the allowance directly to each (actual or potential) worker, but only on condition that (s)he actually works or makes her/himself available for suitable full-time work .

## **A strategy for the new Europe**

Basic income provides, moreover, a strategy that has been made particularly relevant by the changes that are now occurring, East and West, and giving Europe a new shape. Why?

"1989", the "democratic revolutions" in Eastern Europe have most probably sealed the fate of the socialist dream - the idea that State control over the means of production could provide the core of a desirable society. But it does not follow that there is no major breakthrough ahead, that we are stuck - at best - with roughly the sort of capitalism we have got, and that the battles left are essentially of a defensive nature; to protect civil liberties, the welfare state and our ecosystem against the powerful pressures deriving, directly or indirectly, from capitalist competition. The potential breakthrough that is worth fighting for is precisely the introduction of a basic income. It builds on the conquests of the welfare state in order to achieve for people's real freedom what the abolition of serfdom and slavery did for their formal freedom. This breakthrough is fully consistent with a market society. It provides a "capitalist road to communism", a way of remaining true to the valuable emancipatory ideal incorporated in the communist "realm of freedom", while dismissing the institutional framework of so-called "communist" regimes as an inappropriate way of pursuing it.<sup>4</sup> The collapse of these regimes makes basic income capitalism more relevant than ever as an attractive horizon for European societies.<sup>5</sup>

With "1993" and the establishment of the single European market, the introduction of at least a partial basic income is becoming far more than a sheer horizon. Increased mobility of both people and capital, increased competition in all areas make it imperative and urgent to set up at least an elementary social protection on a European scale. How could this be done? Social insurance systems are structured in such complex ways, and in ways that differ so much from country to country that trying to harmonize them to any significant extent looks like a hopeless task. One might then think of trying, more modestly, to introduce a European guaranteed minimum income scheme - on the pattern of British "supplementary benefits", the Dutch "bijstand", the Belgian "minimex", the German "Sozialhilfe", the French "revenu minimum d'insertion", etc. But if this scheme is to be uniform across the European community, it will either (if low) badly damage the situation of the worst off in the more affluent countries of the Community, whose current minimum income level is higher than the European one would be; or (if high) create a disastrous unemployment trap in the less affluent countries, whose current median wage is close to what the European minimum income

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<sup>4</sup> On this "capitalist road to communism", see chapters 8 to 10 of Van Parijs (1993).

<sup>5</sup> The specific relevance of a basic income to the future of Eastern Europe is discussed by Roland (1989) and Standing (1991).

would be. And if it is not uniform across countries, it can be safely expected to generate all sorts of unfortunate consequences, whether of a pragmatic or a symbolic nature (selective migration to high-benefit countries, feeling that there is a hierarchy of "castes" of European citizens, whose membership is determined by nationality, etc.).

The roads thus sketched can and will be tried - at least as thought experiments. But my forecast is that, as a result of this process, more and more people will start thinking about a comparatively very simple alternative option.<sup>6</sup> Why not introduce, say at the same time as the European currency, what could be called a Eurogrant? A Eurogrant is a basic income at a comparatively low level (say, 200 ECU per month) paid unconditionally to every adult permanent resident of the EEC, and financed directly by a European tax, for example (in part at least) a uniform taxation of private and corporate energy consumption. This Eurogrant would of course not replace all welfare state provisions (old age pensions, unemployment benefits, student grants, disability allowances, means-tested minimum income guarantees, etc.): these would only be reduced by an amount equal to the grant, and abolished only if they did not exceed this amount.<sup>7</sup>

In low wage countries without a guaranteed minimum income, this would amount to introducing a form of income guarantee that does not create an unemployment trap. It would also provide those countries (and particularly their poorer regions), which tend to consume far less energy per capita than others, with a large, stable and non-stigmatizing net transfer of resources that reaches their citizens directly, instead of having to pass - with a heavy "leaky bucket" toll - through a maze of programmes and organizations.<sup>8</sup> In high wage countries with a

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<sup>6</sup> I argue for the same conclusion from a somewhat different angle in Van Parijs (1996a).

<sup>7</sup> A scheme of this sort was proposed on a national scale by the Dutch Scientific Council for Government policy in an important report (WRR 1985). Although these proposals only mention the taxation of energy as one possible source of funding, it would be neat if a significant (though still very partial) European basic income could be fully financed by a uniform European tax on energy (which an increasing number of people are now advocating). On the basis of rough calculations, however, a partial basic income of 200 ECU (or about £130) per month would require a tax of about 650 ECU per TEP, compared to a current European average of about 100 ECU and a current average tax-inclusive price of 270 ECU. (See Genet & Van Parijs 1992 for further figures and calculations.) It follows that either a basic income of 100 ECU a month could only be phased in very gradually, or that different sources of funding must be tapped.

<sup>8</sup> The redistributive impact of even a modest basic income financed by a uniform energy tax would be incomparably greater than the one currently effected by the European Social Fund and the Fund for Regional Development. The same countries are net beneficiaries and net contributors under both schemes, with the sole exception of Britain, currently a net beneficiary, who would become a net contributor. But the extent of inter-country redistribution (as measured by the average absolute level of the twelve countries net contributions or benefits) involved in a basic income of 200 ECU a month funded by a European tax on energy would be 26 times greater than the redistribution currently achieved by Europe's so-called structural funds. In other words, a basic income of 8 ECU a

guaranteed minimum income, on the other hand, the introduction of a non-means-tested Eurogrant is more like the introduction of a right to work than like the introduction of a right to an income. For contrary to what happens under means-tested income maintenance systems, no one would have to give up her/his Eurogrant when finding a job. Hence, though the proposed package would not suppress the unemployment trap - because of residual income supplements provided nationally -, it would significantly reduce its depth. Such a scheme, moreover, could serve as a partial substitute for European agricultural policies. It would help guaranteeing small farmers a regular income, and would constitute overall a large net transfer from the cities to the countryside.

For many, including myself, this partial basic income, would only count as a first step. But it is now high time to focus on it and look closely at the legal, economic, political and sociological problems its implementation will raise. This is the way forward for this - radical but realistic - strategy for today's Europe.

## **Basic income and political theory**

Having thus delineated how and why I view basic income as a central component of the institutional structure of a desirable new Europe, let me now try to spell out what this approach presupposes with respect to the questions which form the focus of this book.

**(1) Structure of political authority.** Subsidiarity - understood as the demand that the state, or some larger-scale public authority, should not attempt to provide what civil society, or some smaller-scale public authority, can provide better - has a lot to commend itself. For it tends to locate decision-making at the points where information about the needs to be met is most accurate and where control over the use made of the resources is likely to be closest. Moreover, it makes maximal room for spontaneous variety and responsible experiments. There is nothing wrong, in my view, with subsidiarity so conceived. But is it not blatantly at odds with the notion of a basic income introduced, funded, administered by a European State? Not at all, if appropriate attention is paid to the limits explicitly stated in the principle itself, and if the latter is not turned into something else with which, in the field of social policy, it is all too often confused.

First then, the principle itself justifies the state taking over from civil society, or a larger-scale public authority from a smaller-scale one, when the services considered are better provided at those levels. This is the case, in particular, in those areas in which environmental externalities

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month (financed in this way) would be sufficient to redistribute as much from the rich areas to the poor areas as is currently done. See again Genet & Van Parijs (1992).

and/or distributive issues, are essentially and significantly involved. Why? One reason is common to both these categories of cases. In an open economic environment, whichever area "does the right thing" - by appropriately taxing polluters or by achieving a high level of redistribution - at the expense of lower profits, will pay a high, possibly prohibitive price, due to capital migration towards other, less "virtuous" areas. Hence, locating decisions at a level that covers a significant portion of the relevant economic environment may well be a precondition for anything substantial being durably done. There is one further reason for attributing to a larger-scale authority the task of dealing with one category of externalities - those which are largely borne by people who are not just distinct from the economic agents responsible for them but who live in a different political area. In this case, a higher-level political authority is not only necessary to enable each area to adopt environmental policies which are in its own interest. It is also required, or at least most useful, to effectively prevent the export of nuisances or risks. And there is of course also one additional reason for entrusting the task of dealing with distributive issues to a larger-scale authority as soon as distributive justice is viewed as a matter which transcends the boundaries of particular areas. Hence, there is little ground for doubting that organizing on a European level the eco-funded basic income suggested above is fully consistent with the subsidiarity principle, as stated.

There is, however, an alternative interpretation of the subsidiarity principle in the field of social policy which is plainly inconsistent with any basic income proposal. It consists in construing subsidiarity as the demand that a public authority should only play a role in the attempt to solve a person's "social problem" if all lower levels prove inadequate: the local authority should only intervene if the family or neighbourhood cannot handle the problem; the province or region if the local authority is not up to it; the national State if sub-national entities cannot cope; and the EEC if all else has failed. If such a principle is meant to govern transfer policies, it is clear that the latter can only be conceived in the form of remedial, targeted, means-tested actions focusing on the needy, and not at all in the universal, unconditional form characteristic of basic income. I do not need to restate at this point the fundamental reasons why I believe the latter kind of transfer policy to be preferred to the former. What matters here is that the two construals of subsidiarity are logically independent, and hence that one can consistently be committed to one while rejecting the other.

**(2) Pattern of social and economic rights.** This distinction between two meanings of subsidiarity is also useful for the sake of understanding the pattern of rights into which a European basic income would fit. For while the latter would no doubt replace some of the transfer schemes that currently exist on a national scale and affect the levels, funding structure and significance of many others, beyond this common base (which might also include a basic health insurance, for example), transfer systems would vary a great deal across European nations and

regions. This variation, it is fair to say, would partly be the sheer reflection of a regrettable but unavoidable mess. But it would also be the expression of differences between median preferences in different areas and of a concern that plenty of room should be left for experiments.

**(3) Cultural diversity.** Diversity in the level, funding and structure of these supplementary schemes is one of the ways in which cultural diversity could keep expressing itself in the area of social and economic rights. One country may go for more generous maternity leave arrangements, another for more heavily subsidized child care facilities. One country may want to facilitate early retirement, while another wants to encourage pensioners to keep working on a part-time basis. One country may refuse to subsidize homeopathic medicines, another life-prolonging operations on people over seventy five. The more generous the European basic income, the more numerous, perhaps, the number of national transfer schemes that are thereby made redundant, but also the more leeway for the expression of cultural differences. For a high unconditional income financed on a European level reduces the competitive pressure on the various countries involved and makes it easier for each of them to experiment with social policies that significantly diverge, whether temporarily or permanently, from those that would maximize its competitiveness.

**(4) Europe and the world.** The massive inequalities that exist between Europe and the Third World are morally unjustifiable. A European basic income, as such, will do nothing to alleviate them. Indeed, it is only sustainable if tough immigration policies keep preventing the massive inflow of Third World citizens eager to improve their living standards. But the massive migration of people is not a sensible strategy for reducing the world's inequalities. The migration of profit-seeking capital and technology makes a lot more sense, preferably channeled selectively so as to encourage reasonable military, monetary, demographic and environmental policies, and also the introduction and protection of civil, political and social rights.<sup>9</sup> But this is not enough. If inequality on a world scale is to be kept under check, permanent transfers are needed from richer to poorer areas. If the arguments developed above are correct, a basic income on a world scale would be the ideal - and largely the sheer recognition that those who are in no position to make use of their equal right to consume the resources of the Earth (and in particular to pollute) should get due compensation from those who can only consume as much as they do because not everyone does. If only for technological reasons, this ideal is currently out of reach. But it can nonetheless be helpful as a guiding principle, as actual transnational transfers can gradually be reshaped so as to resemble it more - reliable, paid directly to the people, in cash, ex ante, without clawback.

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<sup>9</sup> For a comprehensive overview of the arguments for and against the free movement of capital versus people, see the useful collection edited by Barry & Goodin (1992).

**(5) Universalism versus contextualism.** Both the intuitive plausibility and the political potential of the universalist, justice-based arguments I have presented in favour of a European basic income are by no means context-insensitive. They are heavily dependent on the constitution of a European audience and discussion space. Only the latter can induce a shift from bargaining between self-interested European countries to arguing on the basis of a sense of justice as equal concern for all Europeans. The significant discrepancy that appears on many issues between the positions of the Council of Ministers and that of the European Parliament is an indication of the difference the jump from bargaining to arguing can make.<sup>10</sup> But giving more power to the European Parliament is not enough for the emergence of a relevant European public forum. Bridging the ethnic, linguistic, cultural, political gaps through countless international encounters, dialogues, debates of all kinds and sizes, is no less important. The initiative which led to this book is one example of what is needed.

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<sup>10</sup> The distinction between bargaining and arguing is illuminatingly elaborated by Elster (1991). I use it to justify increasing the power of the European Parliament as part of an exercise in justice-oriented democratic engineering in Van Parijs (1996b).

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