

What the Words of War Can Tell Us About the Risk of War

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McClelland (1975) argued that reform movements have the unintended result of creating an action orientation that makes war possible. The use of one's own accumulated power to save the others is often the link between an *imperial motivation pattern* (i.e., the gap created between a high need for power and a low need for affiliation) and later wars. Conflict-related documents, real and fictional, were analyzed with the help of the new Motive Dictionary, a computer-readable thesaurus devised to detect the power and affiliation motives in texts supposed to contain them. Results confirm McClelland's theory. An increasing gap between affiliation and power words consistently precedes the outbreak of wars including World War I and the war in Iraq (2003–).

This study draws on the possibility of predicting war from the analysis of the words contained in documents describing the moments before war breaks out. If we can predict previous wars from the analysis of documents of the past, then perhaps we can also detect ahead signals of forthcoming wars through the analysis of documents of the present. The indicator is a content-based approach to wars that considers the state of motivation of top political decision makers (McClelland, 1975). This indicator complements other indicators, formal (Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977), event-based (Schrodt & Gerner, 2000), normative (Bremer, 1992; Maoz & Russett, 1993), or institutional (Gleditch & Ward, 1997). The proposed motivational indicator rests on the idea of "putting the words first." This idea is applied here first on fictional texts, then on historical documents. There is something to be said after all for stories. Stories are useful pilot data free of the constraints of the

real world, although they “describe a slice of a fictional world that is similar in most respects to the real world” (Black, 1984, p. 235).

The issue of coupling words to the risks of war appealed to other scientists as well. The integrative complexity analysis (Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977) addresses the rules by which information is processed (“conceptual rules used in thinking, deciding, and interrelating;” Guttieri, Wallace, & Suedfeld, 1995, p. 598). The analyses of the Cuban Missile Crisis (Guttieri et al., 1995) and the outbreak of World War I (Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977) showed the efficacy of the integrative complexity indicator. By contrast, McClelland’s model of motivation draws on the content of communications. It too has been widely applied, including to the Cuban Missile Crisis and the outbreak of World War I (Winter, 1993, 2003, 2004).

The integrative complexity and the motivational analyses rely on the competence of trained coders. This study hinges on McClelland’s model of motivation, this time converted into a computer-readable dictionary. The latter is itself part of a computer-aided content analysis software, PROTAN (Hogenraad, Daubies, Bestgen, & Mahau, 1995). This computerized version of McClelland’s model was shown to be a valuable tool for analyzing documents about the Cuban Missile Crisis and the outbreak of World War I (Hogenraad, 2003).

McClelland’s (1975) motivation theory involved three basic needs: achievement, affiliation, and power. McClelland concentrated on affiliation and power to foreshadow war. Intimacy, friendship, and positive emotional relations with a person defined the need for affiliation. The will to power, to have an impact on another person, is the essence of the need for power. These two crisscross threads, power and affiliation, are always difficult to reconcile with each other. Auden (1968, p. 62) wrote, “we tend to deprive of their faces any person whom we believe to be at the mercy of our will,” which is not a bad description of the unstable balance between affiliation and power. McClelland (1975, pp. 314–359) showed how passionate reformist zeal for social justice—the use of one’s own accumulated power to save others, whether they like it or not—is often the link between an *imperial motivation pattern* (measured by the gap “need for power minus need for affiliation”) and later wars.

The violent logic that leads from reformist zeal to war has to do with the nature of spiritual perfection. For all one’s uninhibited certainties, striving for spiritual perfection is endless, whether in fundamentalism, sects, or mere religious behavior. The awareness of spiritual perfection coupled with the impossibility of reaching it causes one to indulge oneself with pretending to be perfect. Subject to that, one vents the awareness of one’s flaws through more militant calls to perfection in others, thus coercing them to an unrepentant degree. “Exigency creates hypocrisy as one of its inevitable by-products,” wrote Shklar (1984, p. 49). What militancy and noble lies set in motion is a machine for just wars (Walzer, 1977). Enduring is one’s belief that there is a special dispensation for

abuses waged out of a devotion to a cause. Even the outbreak of World War I, the precipitant of which is often imputed to the murder of Archduke Ferdinand on June 28, 1914 (Saperstein, 1995), was about moral and religious ideas (Strachan, 2003). Puritan Germany viewed its *Tugend* (virtue) as threatened by British materialism and French atheistic rationalism.

A good example of the meaning of the *imperial motivation pattern* is in Graham Greene's *The Quiet American*: "He was determined to do good, not only to any individual person, but to a country, a continent, a world" (1955/2001, p. 18). For McClelland (1975, p. 328), it is only when the affiliative need is low that the power need expresses itself as a desire to save or to help people in the abstract, not as particular friends, as in reform movements. The political-religious cycles of *Great Awakenings* in the United States (Fogel, 2000) are an example of such movements. And so is Prime Minister Blair's 1999 moral campaign "We need to find a new national moral purpose for this new generation" (BBC News, September 6, 1999, 3:06 pm, GMT) or the antimilitarist *Make Love Not War* movement of the "High Sixties" (1964–1969; Marwick, 1998). Reform movements have the unintended outcome of creating an action orientation that makes war possible. "This atmosphere of righteous action has led to war in too many instances in the history of the United States and England for such results to be accidental" (McClelland, 1975, p. 355). There is enough in the motivational model to make the case for a hypothesis. Whenever a conflict ends in war, that war in the making should be preceded by an increase in the gap between power and affiliation. Reversely, a decrease in the gap should precede a conflict that settles in a nonviolent way.

METHOD

Texts

Four fictional texts make up the pilot data. Following their analysis, we turn to historical documents (Table 1).

1. Aristophanes' play *Peace* is about Trygaeus complaining to Zeus and asking for peace. Yet the Gods have withdrawn to the highest point of the sky, annoyed by persisting hostilities. The God of War has shut the Goddess of Peace in a cave. Trygaeus releases the Goddess of Peace. Having no natural divisions, this one-act play was divided arbitrarily into 15 segments, each of 783 words.

2. Zola's (1885/1954) novel *Germinal* is the story of a rebellion in a run-down mining area in the north of France at the end of the 19th century. Social injustice is unbearable, so the miners vote on a strike that turns into vandal-

TABLE 1
Statistical Summary of the Corpus

<i>Work</i>	<i>Divisions</i>	<i>Number of Words</i>	<i>Number of Different Words</i>
"Address Unknown"	19 letters (November 12, 1932–March 3, 1934)	6,499	1,599
"Germinal"	40 chapters	178,894	9,811
"Of Love and War"	41 poems	11,693	3,334
"Peace"	15 segments	11,755	2,486
"History of Twelve Days"	12 days (July 24–August 4, 1914; chapters 2 to 13) split into 31 subchapters	89,242	4,922
President Bush	170 speeches (September 11, 2001–March 17, 2003)	256,773	9,442
Prime Minister Blair	72 speeches (September 11, 2001–March 20, 2003)	123,660	6,244
Grand total		678,516	

ism, causing the army to step in. The shooting of one miner by the soldiers ends the strike.

3. The language of Scannell's (2002) war poetry *Of Love and War* was free from the constraints of reality in its use of words. The poet will, for example, use the expressive potential of words such as *Passchendaele* or *Gallipoli* to withhold from disclosure the butchery of World War I, that is, without having to use the word "butchery". The reader sees the reticence present in these foreshadowing words but is that evocative potential transparent for a computer-readable dictionary? Scannell's corpus contains 19 war poems and 22 love poems (pp. 5–84 of the 2002 edition of Scannell's *Of Love and War*).

4. Taylor's (1938/2002) 60-page *Address Unknown* relates 19 imaginary letters between two close friends during the period 1932–1934. Max Eisenstein is an American Jew; Martin Schulse, his best friend, is German. They are partners in a San Francisco art gallery. The letters start on Martin's return to National–Socialist Germany. Martin is progressively taken over by the will to power of the propaganda, whereas Max is saddened and bruised by his buddy's change of attitude reflected in the letters from Germany.

The remaining documents are about real-life conflicts.

1. The first corpus is about World War I, Headlam's (1915) *History of Twelve Days*. It is the diplomatic history of the fortnight between the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia (July 24) and the British ultimatum to Germany (August 4, 1914). Headlam's chronological countdown to World War I covers the exchanges of diplomatic telegrams and reports of conversations and negotiations. For this analysis, we used Chapters 2 to 13 of Headlam's *History*. Chapter 1 is an introduction to the previous relations between Serbia and Austria. Chapters 2 to 5 report the diplomatic efforts to keep the conflict local (between Austria and Serbia) and avoid a pan-European conflagration between the alliances¹ by pressing parties to exercise restraint on force. Yet, the hope of restraint on force went away with the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia on July 28, 1914 (Chapter 7) and the following mobilization across Europe (Chapters 8 to 13). The 31 subchapters of the document form the natural basis for the analysis.

2. The Anglo-American action in Iraq of March 2003 was analyzed through speeches of President Bush and Prime Minister Blair. President Bush's speeches were extracted from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/response/resources2.html> and, where the first web site had not been updated completed with other speeches, from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news>. Only the speeches that contained references to terrorism or war were kept; speeches that focused on tax cuts and similar internal matters were excluded. The 170 war speeches collated span 19 months, from September 11, 2001 to March 17, 2003, the day of the U. S. ultimatum. One might argue the period covered encompasses two wars, first against Afghanistan, then against Iraq. The Afghanistan war was a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) coalition led by the United States under Article 5 of the NATO chart ("an attack on any of its member is an attack on all"). All the same, one might consider that both wars were one and the same "war on terrorism."

Prime Minister Blair's material was extracted from <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page5.asp>. The 72 speeches and interviews were given between September 11, 2001 and March 20, 2003, the day of the entry of the British troops in Iraq. This Anglo-American action was analyzed before the actual conflict occurred. The unique lead was the series of President Bush's speeches collated daily between September 11, 2001 and March 17, 2003. The prediction came true on March 19, 2003. The speed at which one could feed data into the computer was determinant. The President made his March 17 ultimatum speech at 8:01 p.m. EST. This speech was added to the previous ones; the whole set of 170 speeches was reanalyzed in the morning of March 18, 2003. The war started the day after.

¹The "Triple Entente" between France, Great Britain, and Russia, and the "Triple Alliance" between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy.

The Motive Dictionary

A dictionary, in content analysis, is no more than a list of words organized into categories, that is, words with a role in a hierarchy. When one applies a dictionary to a text, one looks for matches between a word in a dictionary and a word in a text. One then puts the text words into the categories, counts the number of word matches in each category, and takes the percentage of the number of word matches. A word assigned to one category cannot be present in another, except in its superordinate one. The dictionary is set up in the PROTAN program of computer-aided content analysis (Hogenraad et al., 1995; Table 2).

Hogenraad (2003) adduced evidence for the validity of the Motive Dictionary. Two illustrative examples:

1. Thucydides *History of the Peloponnesian War* (1954) account of the 27-year series of wars was often analyzed by social and political scientists to picture the relations of ethics to security and interest (Lebow, 2003; Russett & Antholis, 1992). The gap (power minus affiliation) increases linearly over the whole history from the high point of Thucydides account (Chapters 18 to 26), to the Sicilian war (416–404 BC) that led to the final surrender of Athens in 404 BC.

TABLE 2
Affiliation and Power Categories of the Motive Dictionary (Version 4.2)

<i>Category</i>	<i>Number of Entries</i>	<i>Examples</i>
Affiliation	759	
Affection	96	Mate, sweetheart
Social behavior	78	Answer, escort
Affiliation	427	Accompany, courteous
Affect loss	24	Alone, indifference
Affect participants	56	Dad, mistress
Affect words	44	Family, nostalgic
Positive affect	35	Affable, thoughtful
Power	1,307	
Power	713	Ambition, justice
Power gain	35	Emancipate, nominate
Power loss	53	Captive, weak
Power ends	9	Plead, recommend
Power conflicts	300	Adversary, invade
Power cooperation	63	Arbiter, reciprocal
Power authoritative participants	62	Patriarch, detective
Power ordinary participant	23	Emissary, orator
Power doctrine	22	Conservatism, dogmatic
Power authority	27	Legitimate, reign
Residual power words	100	Colonialism, terrorize

2. The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 (Blight & Welch, 1989) served as a counterexample. Kennedy's (1969) *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis* recounted the story of a conflict that was avoided. The linear decrease of the gap (power minus affiliation) in the memoir of this crisis signals a restraint on force that led finally to a satisfactory agreement for all parties. Using a hand-scored content analysis of diplomatic exchanges, Winter (1993, 2003) also noted this decrease. From an integrative complexity perspective, Guttieri and colleagues (1995) analyzed statements extracted from ExComm meetings held during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Their finding about the moderate levels of integrative complexity that was preserved through the crisis is consistent with what Winter (1993, 2003) and Hogenraad (2003) found using the motivational indicator.

RESULTS

Fictional texts

This pilot section concerns literary documents: Taylor's (2002) *Address Unknown*, Zola's (1885/1954) *Germinal*, Scannell's (2002) *Of Love and War*, and Aristophanes' (1998) *Peace*. We estimated regression models, predicting the power-affiliation gap with time, using both linear and quadratic time-series models. The hypothesis was a linear increase in the gap over time. However, we tested not only the linear time effect but also higher-order effects as well. In no case did any effects greater than the quadratic emerge. We report the quadratic only when it proved significant. The data for the regression equations were resampled 20,000 times from the original data to create real confidence intervals (CI; Cohen, 1994; Diaconis & Efron, 1983; Péladeau, 1996). Correlations between adjacent observations (autocorrelations) may cause each score to be more similar (in the case of positive correlations) to the preceding one than would occur by chance. This similarity reduces the variability in the series and may cause small differences to become signals of a change that does not exist. Negative autocorrelations have the opposite effect. The autocorrelations were removed using the AUTOREG procedure of SAS (Statistical Analysis System Institute, Inc., 1993) described in Hogenraad, McKenzie, and Martindale (1997).

In *Address Unknown* (2002), the crucial texts are Martin's six letters sent from Germany to Max. As expected, the gap (power minus affiliation) increases as Martin is more and more, first fascinated by, and then involved in rising Nazism, $R^2 = .83$, $F(1, 4) = 18.9$, $p < .05$, 95% CI .72/.90. The values of the gap in the series are -4.5, -1.5, -1.5, -1.3, 2.0, and 1.2. That the early gap scores are negative then turn positive means that affiliation was higher than power in the early letters but that this ratio reversed in the later ones. Max's letters show no significant change in the gap scores.

Zola's (1885/1954) *Germinal* is about a social struggle. The increase of the gap (power minus affiliation) over the 40 chapters is confirmed, $R^2 = .41$, $F(1, 38) = 26.7$, $p < .0001$, 95% CI .23/.62. In Scannell's (2002) "Of Love and War" poems, the average value of the gap (power minus affiliation) is .1 for the war poems and -2.4 for the love poems (difference = -2.5). Here we want to ask if these two mean values are different from each other. The t value is -3.2 ($p < .01$). After 20,000 resamplings, the t value is -3.3 (95% CI -5.1/-1.7) and the mean difference is -2.5 (95% CI -1.1/-4.0). Finally, in Aristophanes' (1998) *Peace*, a hymn to peace, the decreasing gap (power minus affiliation) confirms the prediction, $R^2 = .47$, $F(1, 13) = 11.7$, $p < .01$, 95% CI .08/.79.

Historical Documents

The 31 subchapters of Headlam's (1915) *History* cover the period of July 24 to August 3, 1914. The profile of the gap is no exception to the *imperial motivation pattern*, $R^2 = .33$, $F(2, 28) = 6.9$, $p < .01$, 95% CI .10/.61. This profile results from two opposite motivations in sequence. The first was a wish of all parties to keep the conflict (between Austria and Serbia) local and to exercise restraint on force (from July 24 to 28, 1915, Subchapters 1 to 15 in the graph). So uncertain was the British position that, as late as July 24, British Prime Minister Asquith could still write. "Happily there seems to be no reason why we should be anything more than spectators" (Ferguson, 1997, p. 264). The visible effect of this call for restraint on force is a decrease of the *imperial motivation pattern*, which ended in failure anyway. Followed an increase of the *imperial motivation pattern* to which succeeded pan-European mobilization. A second and last mediation took place (Subchapter 25), to no avail. An increase of the risk of war followed soon after, with an effective declaration of war, first on Russia, then on France (July 29–August 3, 1915, Subchapters 16–31; Figure 1).

It is interesting to compare Suedfeld and Tetlock's (1977) analysis of integrative complexity samples of diplomatic documents related to the 1914 crisis. Their material differs from the Headlam documents. Also, they compared samples from the period June 24 to July 27 (preliminary) to samples from the period July 28 to August 4 (climax). For the record, the results of both analyses (integrative complexity and motivational indicators) are nevertheless consistent. Complexity decreases between the preliminary and the climax period. With the motivational indicator, the mean gap (power minus affiliation) of the preliminary period (July 24–July 27) is 1.5 and that of the climax period (July 28–August 3) is 2.2, t value being 1.95 ($p < .05$). After 20,000 resamplings, the t value of the gap is 2.0 (95% CI .03/2.4). Using expert scores trained in the motivational indicator, Winter (1993) too analyzed diplomatic documents exchanged between July 24 and August 4, 1914. This finding (Figure 1) parallels Winter's results.





FIGURE 1 The gap (power minus affiliation) in Headlam's "History of Twelve Days: July 24th to August 4th, 1914."



President Bush's 170 speeches between September 11, 2001 and March 17, 2003

2001: speeches 1 to 93
 2002: speeches 94 to 156
 2003: speeches 157 to 170

FIGURE 2 The gap (power minus affiliation) in 170 speeches made by President Bush between September 11, 2001 and March 17, 2003.

War Speeches by President George W. Bush

To give shape to the passage of time, markers have been added to the graph and the legend of Figure 2. For the rest, the reader may be better served by a note on the monthly distribution of the speeches (see Table 3). The arrow under the legend “Feb. 6, 2003” points to the speech in which the President said, “The game is over.” Another arrow points to the March 17, 2003, speech in which the President signified the ultimatum to Iraq. The profile of the gap (power minus affiliation) was as expected, $R^2 = .16$, $F(2, 167) = 15.4$, $p < .0001$, 95% CI .07/.28. The deeply human urge to grieve after a loss, and to anger after mourning, is echoed in the Presidential speeches by massive references to sharing and solidarity, which are the opposite of an *imperial motivation pattern*. See, for example, “We remember the courage of the rescue workers and the outpouring of friendship and sympathy from nations around the world. We remember how we felt that day: our sadness, the surge of love for our country” (“President: The World Will Always Remember September 11,” December 11, 2001; <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011211-1.html>). These references to solidarity lasted until early March 2002 (lowest point of the smooth curve is March 11, 2002). After March 2002, all the diplomatic shuffling to and fro did not alter the increasing risk of war that succeeded to references to solidarity, a risk which hardened into an idea of war that came true on March 17, 2003. One example: “We’re hunting down trained killers. And that’s all they are—nothing but a bunch of cold-blooded killers. We’re destroying their weapons” (“President Signs National Defense Authorization Act,” December 2, 2002; <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021202-8.html>).

TABLE 3
Monthly Distribution of the G. W. Bush's
Speeches

2001	
September: 1 to 32	November: 63 to 81
October: 33 to 62	December: 82 to 93
2002	
January: 94 to 107	July: 137 to 141
February: 108 to 115	August: 142 to 143
March: 116 to 120	September: 144 to 147
April: 121 to 122	October: 148 to 152
May: 123 to 128	November: 153 to 155
June: 129 to 136	December: 156
2003	
January: 157 to 158	March: 165 to 170
February: 159 to 164	


War Speeches by Prime Minister Blair

The linear trend of the gap profile of Prime Minister Blair's speeches signals an increase in the risk of war right from the start, $R^2 = .12$, $F(1, 70) = 9.7$, $p < .01$, 95% CI 02/.33 (Figure 3). A few speeches show negative scores during the early months of 2003. Such scores mark the presence in the speeches of more affiliation than power content. A press conference with French President Chirac on February 5, 2003, (speech number 62) is an example of such negative scores. During this press conference, Prime Minister Blair referred to the "entente cordiale" between France and Great Britain. And during press conference number 68 with Portuguese Prime Minister Barroso on March 11, 2003, 9 days before the British entry in Iraq, Prime Minister Blair still mentioned the hope of "disarming Iraq peacefully."

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The Dictionary

Much of this study rests on the value of the Motive Dictionary. Part of that value comes from the validation studies done on the dictionary, from the computer software that goes with it, and from the languages available besides the original



PM Tony Blair's 72 speeches (September 11, 2001 - March 20, 2003)

2001: speeches 1 to 40

2002: speeches 41 to 57

2003: speeches 58 to 72

FIGURE 3 The gap (power minus affiliation) in 72 speeches made by Prime Minister Blair between September 11, 2001 and March 20, 2003.

version. The Motive Dictionary has been validated on several documents (Hogenraad, 2003), including the section on fictional texts in this study. Note that some of these documents are not about war per se and contain no war words such as artillery, blockade, bomb, captive, invasion, terror, terrorize, or war. Yet the results of the analysis of these documents are consistent with the hypothesis. This is the case, for example, in Golding's *Lord of the Flies* (Hogenraad, 2003) and in Zola's (1885/1954) *Germinal* reported here. Dictionaries need also to run within a computer software.

The Motive Dictionary is available for the PROTAN software mentioned earlier and for Péladeau's WordStat software (1998). Finally, dictionaries may be available in different languages. The Motive Dictionary exists only for the English language; a French version is under development. By comparison, Pennebaker's Linguistic Word Count for evaluating positive and negative emotions, exists in at least four languages (Pennebaker, Francis, & Mayne, 1997). And Martindale's (1990) Regressive Imagery Dictionary for assessing sensate and secondary thought contents in texts is available in seven languages.

Dictionaries have advantages and liabilities. Their being independent of human coders is in part an advantage. Speed and quantity of information that can be treated are also an advantage. The need to validate dictionaries is a liability but reliability is not. Dictionaries are rigid, human coders are not. Finally, although one cannot build any content into a dictionary, one can train human coders to analyze almost any content. In the end, neither is more desirable than the other.

Proximal and Distal Indicators

Even when the ability of language to predict war is consistently found, the model is still incomplete. Besides diplomatic and high politics events, distal indicators deliberately excluded here—military alliances, economic rivalries, arms races—are also at work (Russett & Oneal, 2001). Negotiations in the weeks preceding August 4, 1914, or words of solidarity by President Bush after September 11, 2001, may temporarily reverse the *imperial motivation pattern*. Yet in the end, the insistent and violent logic running through the results is that an increasing gap (power minus affiliation) consistently precedes the outbreak of wars. An innocent feature of this study reveals one more of its strengths. The political speeches offer us both a behavioral baseline and a systematic within-subjects reproduction that further avoids the problems of between-subject variability of group statistical procedures.

Some might argue, after the fact, that the March–April 2003 action in Iraq was one of the most easily predictable. Yet the argument does not wash, for it invests the texts with hindsight. Also, the argument jars with many public statements made by political leaders before the war, that war can be avoided (Secretary of State

Powell on December 5, 2002, during an interview with *France* ²; Pope John Paul II, on December 25, 2002³; Prime Minister Blair on March 2, 2003, during a TV debate hosted by the *Sunday Herald*⁴).

All the same, more is needed. One important analysis to do would be to find out the breaking point beyond which war becomes unavoidable. Another valuable analysis would be to use presidential speeches during the 20-year period between 1980–2000. The months before each of the eight major U.S. uses of force, from Lebanon in 1980 to Kosovo in 1998 (Grenada, 1983; Panama, 1989; Iraq I, 1991; Somalia, 1992; Bosnia, 1995; Haiti, 1995) could be paired with periods of respite from war. One should find the *imperial motivation pattern* only when war is approaching.

Narrative Truth and Historical Truth

The first victim of war in the making is usually language. Although secrets and truth are not necessarily identical, censorship and propaganda are necessary ingredients of war, as are misinterpretations, omissions, deceit, half-truths, and sheer lies. Does this discredit the content of these speeches, interviews, and diplomatic notes? Not a whit. One should take these dissimulations seriously, because it is precisely in war in the making that the collapse of language is most present and effective (Hussey, 1991). In the relations between the words of war and the risk of war, one is not so much interested in the historical truth as in the narrative truth (Spence, 1982). Part of that narrative truth lies in the content of words. “We doubt the speaker, not the tongue we hear: Words have no word for words that are not true.” (Auden, 1976/1994, p. 624).

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²http://www.usembassy.it/file2002_12/alia/a2121101.htm

³http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/messages/urbi/documents/hf_jp-ii_mes_20021225_urbi_en.html

⁴<http://sundayherald.com/print31827>

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

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