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**Robert Hogenraad**

**Terrorism and literature: Trading violence for words**

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Terrorism and literature: Trading violence for words

This essay bobs happily along on a tide of conflicts, attempted peaces, and secret negotiations. Whether addressing conflict, peace, or negotiation, being able to anticipate them may alter the course of lives. The idea we want to test is that, in a conflict, negotiation becomes possible when both sides of the conflict, sensing they share the same event, accept to talk to each other (Arendt, 2005). And so we go, relying on the primacy of theory and facts in the form of words and sentences taken from political documents, to break through the pattern of motivation that triggers the sequence of conflict and negotiation. And eventually to predict the outcome of negotiations. Not that we have much merit. All it takes to predict is a correlation (Scriven, 1959).

*Words versus violence*

Fantasies on terrorism are not often part of fiction except as a way to spice up a story by taking it to the underground world. Novelist Joseph Conrad (1984; Then–Now, 2007) innovated in 1907 by making his “terrorist” — the secret agent — an ordinary citizen. Before September 11, 2001, Don DeLillo (2001) too thought it was possible

for novelists to assimilate terrorism into fiction. The events of 9/11 made it clear to him that terrorists had taken that possibility from novelists. 9/11 is now the big three-digit symbol, shorthand for terrorism. “*I think — wrote DeLillo (2001) — the culture absorbs almost everything. It cannot absorb terrorist attacks. This is too powerful.*” That novelists cannot reproduce terror is a point he had made in “Mao II” (1992:41), “*I used to think it was possible for a novelist to alter the inner life of the culture. Now bomb-makers and gunmen have taken that territory. They make raids on human consciousness*”. The terrorist act forestalls the fantasy, the fiction. “*What terrorists gain, novelists lose*” (p. 157). In the language of terrorists, words are deeds, saying is doing. So spoke British-born Mohammad Sidique Khan, supposed ringleader of the 7/7 London bombing: “*But our words have no impact upon you, therefore I’m going to talk to you in a language that you understand. Our words are dead until we give them life with our blood*” (<http://www.guardian.co.uk/attackonlondon/story/0,,1561411,00.html>).

#### *A marker of the risk of conflict*

The two bookends of McClelland’s predictive model of conflict (1975) are the need for affiliation and the need for power. Intimacy, friendship, and positive emotional contacts with a person, define the need for affiliation. The will to power, to have an impact on people or to get control over them, forms the essential of the need for power. Power and affiliation do not enjoy each other’s company, as they continuously shift time-frames like two stage magicians playing tricks on each other. The use of one’s own power to save others — call it the rage to convince if you want — is often the sign of conflicts to come. That pattern of motivation is measurable. It is the gap created by high need for power and low need for affiliation. The wider the gap, the greater the risk of conflict. We use words of affiliation and words of power to build up a “motive dictionary” that serves as a semantic filter. More anon.

Conflicts are more often waged for nonmaterial reasons than for getting worldly goods (Hirshleifer, 1998; Strachan, 2001:1115). McClelland (1975) argues how reform movements have the unintended outcome of creating “*an action orientation that makes war possible (...). This atmosphere of righteous action has led to war in too many instances in the history of the United States and England for such consequences*

*to be accidental*” (p. 355). Yet, Hannah Arendt’s notion of “pressure towards unity” (2005:5, “Denktagebuch” of September 1951)<sup>1</sup> seems a better key to understand how tyranny becomes possible. Indeed, power hates diversity in any of its forms, linguistic, religious, nationality, skin color or sexual orientation. At the same time, for power to call for unity is impossible, except at the risk of destroying the plurality of men, that is, under tyranny. (Arendt, 1985, chapter 7 on “Race and bureaucracy”; Owens, 2007). It was unity that President Bush called for on September 20, 2001 “*You are either with us, or you are with the terrorists*” (<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>).

Let’s get down to business in trying to make these ideas concrete. “Contemporary history”, wrote Hobsbawm (2006:3, about the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution), “is useless unless it allows emotion to be recollected in tranquility”. This “history shaped to present purposes” helps us to appraise unpredictable events without emotional prejudice, though also without the complacency of hindsight. Indeed, we know better now about World War Two than in the early months of 1940. And we know better now about the Cuban Missile Crisis than in the early days of October 1962. Yet, given the “fragility of human affairs” (Arendt, 2005:xix), does not it seem a bit naive to bracket conflict into a couple of psychological motives? With this marker of the risk of conflict, we have picked up a tip on one of the composites of the chemistry of conflict. The proof of a method is what happens when we apply it. Until now, our marker has never produced a false positive throughout the many tests we performed (Hogenraad, 2003, 2004, 2005, in press). But even if that were so, should we dispense with clocks because on occasions they tell the wrong time? So far we have a purpose (detecting signs of appeasement in cases of terrorism). What we need is a tool, a procedure, and data. The tool is the motive dictionary detailed to make the risk of conflict or the chance of appeasement to emerge from the data. The procedure is a suite of content analysis programs. The data (political statements), we capture from official web sites and other certified sources. One of the data is a fictional account of a political negotiation. Stories are similar in many respects to the real world (Black, 1984). When understanding and remembering stories, readers use the same kinds of strategies that they use to understand and remember the real world (p. 235). Memory for an event is much the same whether portrayed in a videotape or in a written description (Lichtenstein–Brewer, 1980). Thus stories of negotiations – cockpits in which we try reality – provide us with a convenient way to study how

parleys change over time: It is easier to control stories than it is to control the real world. No doubt the negotiation strategies apply in a fictional account as they do in the real world. We now detail data, tool and procedure.

## Method

### Texts

The texts analyzed concern the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Communist Combatant Cells (CCC, Belgium). They also include a fictional account of the negotiations between the French Huguenots and the Catholics in France, leading to the “Peace of St-Germain” of 1570. Both the IRA chronology and the CCC chronology are histories by communiqués. The St-Germain negotiations are history by events and meetings. Both the IRA and the French emissaries were in the narrow end of negotiations. A constant in terrorism is that much would always remain obscure. Governments do not vent much information. Secrecy about the texts does not make their study easy.

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Insert Table 1 about here

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*The IRA documents* (<http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/ira/statements.htm>).

The CAIN Web Service — for *Conflict Archive on the INternet* — contains source material on ‘the Troubles’ and politics in Northern Ireland from 1968 to the present. In the web site <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch68.htm>, the chronology of the conflict begins in 1968. The series of statements analyzed here covers the last part of active negotiations between the parties involved in that time-span (Table 1 for details on this and the other series of texts). In <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/pp9398.htm>, CAIN reports the “peace process” starts in April 1993, while major IRA statements begin in 1996. If scale counts, the conflict caused the death of 3,524 people, of which 1,857 civilians (Sutton, 1994; [http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Status\\_Summary.html](http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Status_Summary.html)).

*The Peace of St-Germain.* Signed on August 8, 1570, the Peace of St-Germain ended the Third Civil War of Religion in France. With this peace, Regent Catherine de Medici granted pardon to the powerful French Huguenots. Not for long though. On August 24, 1572, Catholics murdered two thousands Huguenots leaders at the wedding of Henry of Navarre, future Henry the Fourth (the St-Bartholomew' Day Massacre). The Fourth Civil War of religion resumed and lasted until 1573 (Peace of La Rochelle of July 11 , 1573 granted by the Edict of Boulogne). The French novel "St-Germain ou la négociation" (Walder, 1958) is the account of these historical events twisted in a fictional tale. (A movie version of the novel, produced by Gérard Corbiau in 2003 for France 3/ARTE, starred Jean Rochefort, Marie-Christine Barrault, and Rufus.)

*The CCC documents.* A terrorist cell, the "Communist Combatant Cells" ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist\\_Combatant\\_Cells](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_Combatant_Cells)) was active in Belgium between October 1984 and December 1985 (Francq, 1986; Hogenraad–Bestgen–Nysten, 1995). The four members of the cell committed several attacks within Belgium against capitalist targets and military-industrial establishments (banks, NATO, business firms). The cell addressed a written vindication in French before each bombing, yet caused casualties, especially on May 1, 1985. The arrest of the members of the cell on December 6, 1985 put a permanent end to the attacks.

*Content analysis and the motive dictionary: Words within chips*

We analyzed the texts using the PROTAN, acronym for "Protocol Analyzer", software of computer-aided content analysis (Hogenraad–Daubies–Bestgen–Mahau, 1995). One first changes declensions into the root forms of the words, then looks for matches between an entry in the dictionary and the word in the text. Next, one shoves the text words into categories, counts the number of word matches in each category and takes the percentage of the number of word matches.

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Insert Table 2 about here

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To analyze conflicts, we need the two subcategories “need for affiliation” (*nAff*) and “need for power” (*nPow*) of the motive dictionary (Table 2). Any word assigned to one category cannot be present in another one except in a higher-up category. The present English edition 4.0 of the motive dictionary (March 20, 2007) has 792 entries for affiliation, and 1,440 for power. We ported the dictionary to French (1.0, August 29, 2007) with 633 entries for affiliation and 1,409 for power.

We measure the risk of conflict by computing the average difference, we call it *gap*, between the score for power (*nPow*) and the score for evaluation (*nAff*) by communiqué or by chapter. The *gap* increases when the risk of conflict increases. The IRA statements and the St-Germain tale embody a peace course. In these two cases, we expect the *gap* (*nPow* minus *nAff*) to fall as negotiations progress. About the CCC terrorist group, to our knowledge, no parley ever took place between the cell and the government. In this case, we expect a rise of the *gap* (*nPow* minus *nAff*) matching the confrontational behavior of the terrorist cell over time.

We worked out the details of the power of the dictionary in previous papers (Hogenraad, 2003, 2004, 2005, in press). We used fictional texts and historical documents in which the risk of conflict passed through different phases. Then checked if the dictionary scores, especially the rises and falls of the *gap* between power and affiliation, confirmed the rises and falls of the risk of conflict.

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Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here

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Results and discussion: “War as the father of all thing” (Heraclitus)

Results incorporate computing and statistical treatments like removing autocorrelations and resampling statistics. To guarantee independent observations, as needed in science, we randomize our data. But we cannot randomize textual data, because the temporal order is part of the information carried by the data. We have reasons to believe that, for example, the rate of emotion in chapter 4 of a story depends in some measure on the rate of emotion in the preceding chapter. That

dependency, when it becomes systematic, creates a seeming change without any genuine change. An autocorrelation is a systematic dependency in a series. It is possible to calculate and to remove the autocorrelation from the rate of emotion in the story. The principle consists of correlating the rate (of emotion) in chapter 1 with the rate in chapter 2, then the rate in 2 with the rate in 3, and so on. We then remove this dependency when we regress the rate of emotion over the chapters of the book (Hogenraad–McKenzie–Martindale, 1997).

Scientists repeat their experiments. Writers cannot, for any literary work is unique and unrepeatable. The question concerns the confidence we can have in any statistical test done on a literary work when there is no real sampling error. Resampling statistics consists of simulating what we cannot have. In other words, we treat the scores of each variable of interest, say the rate of emotion in a story, as if they were the population, and recreate several thousands samples from it by sampling with replacement. That is, a particular sample might contain, say, chapter 1, 10 times, chapter 2, none, and chapter 3, 4 times. For each simulated version, we calculate the statistical estimator we have an interest in. Each of the simulated versions of the story is therefore like an experiment — a clone — containing a minor or sometimes major change of the original (Hogenraad–McKenzie, 1999; Hogenraad–McKenzie–van Peer, 1997).

Over the 12 years analyzed, the gap ( $nPow$  minus  $nAff$ ) in the IRA statements decreases significantly [ $R^2 = .75$ ,  $F(1, 10) = 29.6$ ,  $p < .001$ ] as negotiations progress (Figure 1). After 20,000 resamplings, the average degree of linearity for the linear component is  $-.25$  (95% confidence interval [ci]  $-.35$  to  $-.15$ ). The gap ( $nPow$  minus  $nAff$ ) in the St-Germain negotiation also decreases significantly [ $R^2 = .26$ ,  $F(1, 20) = 6.9$ ,  $p < .05$ ], arguing linear progress in the negotiations between the Huguenots and the Catholics (Figure 2). Here, after 20,000 resamplings, the average degree of linearity is  $-.08$  (95% ci  $-.15$  to  $-.03$ ). In both cases, results square with the predictions. The profile for the CCC unfolds curvilinearly [ $R^2 = .32$ ,  $F(2, 16) = 3.7$ ,  $p < .05$ ]. The average degree of curvilinearity for the linear component (20,000 resamplings) is  $.46$  (95% ci  $-.05$  to  $.81$ ), that for the quadratic component is  $-.02$  (95% ci  $-.04$  to  $.003$ ). The confidence intervals for the CCC profiles (linear and quadratic) span zero. That they veer erratically from the positive to the negative casts suspicion on the statistical significance of the profile in Figure 3, despite it being significant at  $p < .05$ . Otherwise, casualties occurred on the ninth attack (May 1<sup>st</sup>,

1984). For the first nine statements, the average value of the gap ( $nPow$  minus  $nAff$ ) is -1.4, and  $-0.8$  for the remaining ten (difference =  $-0.6$ ). We want to ask if these two non-independent mean values are different from each other over 19 statements. They are not, the  $t$  value is  $-1.2$  ( $p < .25$ ).

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Insert Figure 3 about here

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In reading the results of one, we are provoked to reflect on the meaning of the results of all three, even limited in number. A conflict has always two sides. By “war as the father of all things”, Heraclitus (ca. 535–475 BCE) meant that it is in the opposition to others that men realize themselves. In other words, reality reveals itself under its many facets only in the presence of peers. In a clash, both actor and subject share the same event, like the two sides of the same coin. For Plato (2004), both doers and sufferers share the same event “The affection of the patient answers to the act of the agent” (Gorgias, 476d). When the clash is over, both actor and subject, or doers and sufferers, can use their common experience to rebuild something new out of their shared experience. For sure, the peace that was then is never the same as the one before. Indeed, any agreement is about a new ordering that recognizes the interests of both parties. Both the IRA and the “Peace of St-Germain” negotiators knew what to do with the word “parley”. We may expect new creative ideas to emerge from the new ordering. Creative ideas that are measurable too (Martindale, 1994).

That can only be so as long as no party has committed the irreparable. For “total war”, or war of annihilation, wipes politics itself (Arendt, 2005:159). The short life of the CCC terrorist cell, which might have made a dull short news item in another era, shows how political ideology and blind rampage could promote each other. From a distance, the failure of the group seems more interesting than the organization itself. Indeed, the cell never yielded the will to thaw even after serving a 17-year prison sentence for some. Now here is the dangerous association between prejudice-cum-ideology and chosenness. Being part of the in-group makes it easy for one to think that one deserves it after all. Chosenness (Arendt, 1985:197), the belief that one is a chosen people – for example, chosen to be in a person-to-person agreement with God – is what makes one “the elect of God”. And His interpreter. A problem arises when

being the elect of God – or of one’s country – causes you to believe God – or your country – invested you with a mission. Hear Don DeLillo “In the ruins of the future”, of 22 December, 2001: “*They surely see themselves as the elect of God [...]. It is the presumptive right of those who choose violence and death to speak directly to God.*” The belief that one has been chosen as for a mission because one is part of an elite bears the danger of identifying oneself with the forces of history. From then on, elitism becomes a principle of politics.

Reassuringly, the last word of Don DeLillo’s 1999 *Underworld* is “Peace”.

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I lifted my eyes. A small plane was sky-writing hazy signs, perhaps “•••*STEN* •••*TESSEN* •••*OS*”, the wind blew off the first letters of each word. Not destined to last. I was wondering... I fantasized it was “Isten éltessen, Janos”.  
Great-souled! Let us stand that as the last word.

## Author's note

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1. There is irony in calling in Hannah Arendt here, she who contended that psychology was but “the discipline of adjusting human life to the desert” (Arendt, 2005:202). And that both psychology and totalitarian movements, “present imminent danger to the conjoined faculties of passion and action” (ibid.). For Arendt, psychology, like totalitarianism, are incompatible with a comprehension of freedom. But precisely, it may take some freedom to start parleying with one's opponent, the freedom to recognize the diversity of human beings. Which justifies Arendt's presence here.

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Table 1. The corpus

Texts	Divisions	Total N. of words	N. different words
IRA statements	February 29, 1996 — April 5, 2007 (61 statements over 47 months in 12 years)	22,082	2,679
Communist	October 2, 1984 —	68,919	8,327
Combatant Cells	December 6, 1985 (19 statements)		
The Peace of St-Germain	22 chapters	34,766	6,307

Table 2. Affiliation and Power categories of the motive dictionary (English version

4.0, March 20, 2007)

Category	Subcategory	N. of entries	Examples
Affiliation		792	
	Affection	105	mate, sweetheart
	Social behavior	79	answer, escort
	Affiliation	448	accompany, courteous
	Affect loss	23	alone, indifference
	Affect participants	59	dad, mistress
	Affect words	44	family, nostalgic
	Positive affect	35	affable, thoughtful
Power		1,450	
	Power	795	ambition, justice
	Power gain	40	emancipate, nominate
	Power loss	56	captive, weak
	Power ends	9	plead, recommend
	Power conflicts	227	adversary, invade
	Power cooperation	64	arbiter, reciprocal
	Power authoritative	70	patriarch, detective
	participants		
	Power ordinary participant	25	emissary, orator
	Power doctrine	24	conservatism, dogma
	Power authority	31	legitimate, reign
	Residual power words	109	colonialism, terrorize

## Figure captions

Figure 1. The IRA negotiations: 47 IRA statements over 12 years.

Figure 2. The St-Germain negotiations of 1570 in Francis Walder's tale "St-Germain ou la négociation".

Figure 3. The gap ( $n\text{Pow}$  minus  $n\text{Aff}$ ) in the 19 messages of the Communist Combatant Cells from October 2, 1984 to December 6, 1985.




Figure 1. The IRA negotiations: 47 IRA statements over 12 years




Figure 2. The St-Germain negotiations of 1570 in Francis Walder's tale "St-Germain ou la négociation".




Figure 3. The gap ( $nPow$  minus  $nAff$ ) in the 19 messages of the Communist Combatant Cells from October 2, 1984 to December 6, 1985.

Statement 1: October 2, 1984  
 Statement 2: October 3, 1984  
 Statement 3: October 8, 1984  
 Statement 4: October 15, 1984  
 Statement 5: October 17, 1984  
 Statement 6: October 26, 1984  
 Statement 7: December 11, 1984  
 Statement 8: January 15, 1985  
 Statement 9: May 1, 1985

Statement 10: May 6, 1985  
 Statement 11: October 8, 1985  
 Statement 12: October 12, 1985  
 Statement 13: November 4, 1985  
 Statement 14: November 4, 1985  
 Statement 15: November 4, 1985  
 Statement 16: November 5, 1985  
 Statement 17: November 5, 1985  
 Statement 18: December 4, 1985  
 Statement 19: December 6, 1985