

The age of divergence: Georgia and the lost certainties of the West
Robert Hogenraad¹ and Rauf Garagozov²

¹Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium; ² Institute of Strategic Studies of the
Caucasus, Baku, Azerbaijan

Sixth General Meeting of the World Public Forum
“Dialogue of Civilizations” (Rhodes, October 9-13, 2008)

Running head: The age of divergence

Abstract

We analyze the speeches of President Saakashvili to trail the risk of war between Georgia and the Russian Federation over the separatist regions of Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia. Both sides have recently been bracing themselves, causing the zone of danger to loom ever larger. We also analyze a series of statements by UN Security Council Members, the OSCE, and other international parties in the conflict. We apply a model which we then ferry into the tool that goes with it for predicting war from the analysis of relevant texts. The marker of risk of war is the gap between power words and affiliation words in texts supposed to contain them (McClelland, 1975). The larger the gap, the greater the risk of war. The Motive Dictionary is a computer-readable thesaurus devised to crack the power and affiliation motives in texts. The risk of war is always a menace in motion. We filter the texts using the thesaurus and look for prevailing trends.

The speeches of President Saakashvili display a trend toward negotiation and appeasement. This trend goes along another trend signaling increasing motives of underachievement and failure. The statements of the international community, they, present a trend toward more assertiveness. Yet, they, too, show motives of doomed failure. The words of President Saakashvili have a tinge of suavity that is markedly absent from the statements of the international community. His words are also vaguer than those of the international community, and increasingly so over time. We do not settle our analysis of disturbingly contradictory events too close to the present. Bakhtin's notion of heteroglossia allows us to integrate part of the results. A better knowledge of the history of the Caucasus (told by Caucasus scholars themselves) and of its relations with Russia might help to understand the divergences between the West and Russia.

The age of divergence: Georgia and the lost certainties of the West

“How did it all happen?”

(Emperor Wilhelm to Bethmann-Hollweg, July 27, 1914, alighting from the train in Berlin from his northern cruise).

Samuel Marshall (2001, p. 50). *World War I*.

We analyze the risk of escalation or de-escalation of the stalemated conflict between Georgia and the Russian Federation over the separatist regions of Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia. We do not resort to political, legal, economic, or geostrategic arguments here. Such arguments demand a knowledge and expertise we do not have, not to mention being too close to the events to allow one to see what’s going on. Too much glamorizing gloss about the conflict stands in the way to real understanding. Instead, we rely on words in public documents and steer clear of political opinions and ideological preferences passed along by the media. Reporters Martin, Riché and Servenay (2008, August 22) accused for example French philosopher Lévy (2008, August 19) of having made up what he claimed he saw in Georgia. In our view, it matters little some public documents are not available. We do not even want nor need all of them, but only those documents that are available to everybody through the Internet. Secrets and truth are not identical. Our interest is in the narrative truth, not in the historical truth (Spence, 1982). “We doubt the speaker, not the tongue we hear: Words have no words for words that are not true” (Auden, “Words”, 1994).

Our model for predicting war rests on the gap created by a high degree of power words and a low degree of affection words in statements by political decision makers (McClelland, 1975). The larger the gap, the greater the risk of war. Intimacy, friendship, and positive emotional relations with a person define the need for affiliation, instanced and much craved for in Robert Putnam’s book “Bowling alone” (2001). The will to power, to have an impact on another person, is the essential of the need for power. We made up a Motive Dictionary out of power and affiliation words. The dictionary is a computer-readable thesaurus devised to crack the power and affiliation motives in texts.

The risk of war is always a menace in motion. We filter texts using the thesaurus and look for prevailing trends.

What we want to prevent with the help of a model for anticipating conflicts is the lack of clarity about the future. Using archived files, our concern is to dispose quickly of signals of risks of escalation between two sides. The practical use of the tool fits with a logic of security coalition, that is, to prevent a country from acting on its worst impulses. One such impulse is the whim that only great nations declare wars themselves and do not let themselves have wars declared on them.

In “Under Western eyes”, novelist Joseph Conrad (2003, p. 1) has it that “Words (...) are the great foes of reality”. Yet there are signs that language does hook on to the world (Wittgenstein, 1975, p. 63). With Georgia, we were only too close to the mark in focusing on the language of war. By August 8, 2008, the protracted territorial conflict between Georgia and its pro-Russian separatist regions that had sharply intensified in July suddenly set loose a surprising new disorder. On this day, the server of the Georgian Presidency became unavailable by 2:00 pm. “*The server at www.president.gov.ge is taking too long to respond*” was the answer. According to the Estonia-based CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team), several Georgian official portals had been under attack of the DDOS sort (“Distributed Denial of Service”) (Lepik, 2008, August 9; Markoff, 2008, August 13).

Nation-building in the Caucasus, as when fever is on the move

It is not too bold a statement to hint the West does not know much of the Caucasus. And it is not the team “hurriedly assembled” –Rayfield’s words, 2008, August 15– by Charles King (2008) to write a book on the Caucasus that will make the difference (see also VVAA, 1883-1915, referred to by Price, 1998, p. 59). With its motley ethnic groups, Georgians, Svans, Azeris, Armenians, Pontic Greeks, Abkhazes, Russians, Ossetes, to name a few (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008; <http://www.joshuaproject.net/countries.php>), Georgia is not one of those regions about which one must speak cursorily. Many former Soviet republics experience different degrees of historical consciousness on the way to reinvent itself (Garagozov, 2008, p. 5). As one Azeri scholar has it, “nation building continues in this region” (Mammadov, 2008, p. 4).

There is a critical difference between nation-building in the West and in the Caucasus. In Western Europe, nation-building occurred before any popular demands for democratic rights or any possibility to defend the rights of minorities. In the West, ethnic unifications and forced changes of identities did not stir any protest abroad. Nation-building in our nowadays of globalization and obsession with minority rights is ticklish, especially in multi-ethnic societies. “Democratization and nation-building [are] antithetical in circumstances of ethnic diversity” (Welsh, 1993, p.44).

Of the three South Caucasus states, two, Azerbaijan and Georgia, are multi-ethnic. Armenia became a monoethnic state after it deported 150,000 Azeris from Armenia between 1948 and 1952 (Junusof, 2005) and drove away another 200,000 between 1988 and 1989 (de Waal, 2003). Some ethnic groups did rebel against their respective states. Armenians rebelled in Azerbaijan, and Abkhazes and Ossetes in Georgia, mostly for territorial motives. Of all the ethnic groups of Azerbaijan and Georgia, those that rebelled were the ones the Soviet administration had granted autonomy to. This administration had indeed artificially mixed up in the same regions ethnic groups with competing collective memories and identities.¹ Now and then, this artificial partitioning pitted one ethnic group against another, sometimes just for economic or political reasons, but not only (Kaufman, 2001; Wertsch, 2006). The deepest source of these conflicts was in the historical consciousness of these groups (Garagozov, 2006). Above and beyond, the conflict of Georgia with Abkhazia and Ossetia, like that between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Broers, 2006), do not help much to unify Georgia or Azerbaijan. Structuring a nation to achieve political stability calls for anchoring the nation to three constituents. These are being proud of one’s country (nationalism), decision-making procedures binding the whole country (democracy), and an inclination to compromise (conflict resolution). Failing which, fever will be on the move in Caucasus.

Procedure

Texts

We collated the Presidential speeches from the web site of the President of Georgia (<http://www.president.gov.ge/?l=E&m=0&sm=3>). After August 8, to avoid the

overload on the official Georgian server (DDOS cyber-attack), we collated extra documents (April 4 to August 9, 2008, Table 1) using the “Georgia Updates” backdoor site of the New-York-based “Georgian Daily” (http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_search&Itemid=99999999&searchword=georgia+update&submit=Search&searchphrase=exact&ordering=newest). Its capacious pages contain statements by UN Security Council Members, the OSCE, and other EU intervening parties in the conflict (Table 1).

Insert Table 1 about here

Computer-aided content analysis and semantic filter

We clinched the Motive Dictionary to the PROTAN software of computer-aided content analysis (Hogenraad, and others, 1995). The Dictionary is available in English, French, and Spanish. Each version contains over 2,000 entries, of which one-third of affiliation words and two thirds of power words. To evaluate the feelings of achievement or underachievement in political statements, we also developed a separate category of “need of achievement” (1,200 entries in the English version). The need to excel and to reach long-term goals, to do a better job is the measure of achievement motivation, without any concern for others.

An increasing gap between affiliation and power words is the signature-beat of war, consistently foreshadowing the outbreak of wars. Our marker of the risk of war has never produced a false positive throughout the tests we performed (Hogenraad, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007). This includes the diplomatic archives of the twelve days (July 24–August 4, 1914) that preceded the outbreak of WWI. It also included the speeches (September 11, 2001–March 20, 2003) of President G. W. Bush and PM Blair before the Anglo-American action in Iraq. Results confirm McClelland’s theory. A dwindling gap augurs a peace settlement, as with the Irish Republican Army peace agreement (1996–2007) (Hogenraad, 2008a) . We also analyzed speeches by Iranian and the American leaders (January–September 2006), surmising there would be no war between these two, at least for the moment (Hogenraad, 2008b).

Using computer-readable dictionaries has advantages. The first is the rapidity with which one gets results once one has collated and edited the documents. This advantage compares favorably with hand-scoring documents using trained coders, for example as with the integrative complexity model of Suedfeld and Tetlock (1977). In their model, complexity characterizes periods of negotiation and appeasement. Even without the advantage of speed, their model showed efficacious in the analysis of the outbreak of World War I and the Cuban missile crisis (Guttieri, Wallace, & Suedfeld, 1995). The second advantage is a logical extension of the first. Computer-readable dictionaries easily treat large volumes of texts, a chore for human coders. A third advantage of such dictionaries is the possibility to translate and adapt them to other languages. English translations of conflict-related texts are not always available. We used the English version of the Motive Dictionary to analyze the present documents. All our documents were available in English or in Georgian. But no Georgian version of the dictionary is available so far.

Results

Risk of war

We removed the autocorrelations from the series (Hogenraad, McKenzie, & Martindale, 1997). The trend for the risk of war in President Saakashvili's speeches is clearly decreasing [$R^2 = .27$, $F(1, 20) = 7.3$, $p < .01$] (Figure 1). After 20,000 resamplings (Diaconis & Efron, 1983), the average degree of linearity for the linear constituent is $-.09$ (95% confidence interval [ci] $-.17$ to $-.02$). In contrast, the risk of war in the statements by the international community ("Georgia Updates") is increasing [$R^2 = .19$, $F(1, 37) = 8.6$, $p < .01$] (Figure 2). After 20,000 resamplings, the average degree of linearity for this linear constituent is $.06$ (95% ci $.02$ to $.11$). The mean values of the two samples are different from each other (3.6 for the "Updates" of the international community versus $-.8$ for the Saakashvili's speeches) (mean difference = 4.4). The t value is 10.9 ($p < .0001$). After 20,000 resamplings, the t value is 11.2 (95% ci 8.2 to 14.9) and the mean difference is -4.4 (95% ci -3.7 to -5.2).

Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here

Need of achievement

The Presidential speeches and the “updates” series both show a decreasing trend on the need of achievement. [$R^2 = .35$, $F(1, 19) = 10.1$, $p < .01$] for the speeches of President Saakashvili (Figure 3). And [$R^2 = .20$, $F(3, 35) = 2.98$, $p < .05$] for the statements by the international community (Figure 4). After 20,000 resamplings, the average degree of linearity for the linear constituent of the Presidential speeches is $-.09$ (95% ci $-.14$ to $-.03$). For the international community, the confidence intervals of the average degrees of curvilinearity never span zero. That is, for the linear part, $-.32$ (95% ci $-.54$ to $-.01$), $.02$ (95% ci $.003$ to $.03$) for the quadratic one, and $-.0003$ (95% ci $-.0006$ to $-.0001$) for the cubic one. On the need of achievement, the mean values of the two samples are close to each other, 7.9 for the “Updates” of the international community and 7.7 for the Saakashvili’s speeches) and the t value is $-.6$ (ns).

Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here

The words that count

What are those words that make a difference between the speeches of President Saakashvili and the statements of the international community? Suavity best qualifies the style of President Saakashvili (Table 2). His contrasts with the self-assertive style of the international community. Under favorable circumstances, the human eye too can catch in a text what a computer detects in a nanosecond. Since July and August 2008 and before, the media took on board the details of the events in and out of Georgia. Even an irregular exposure to the media would have been enough to be aware of the local colors characteristic of each, the Georgian leadership and the international community. A case in point is cartoonist Dave Brown fittingly picturing in *The Independent* of August 11, 2008 the way the media grasped the events (http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_7561000/7561785.stm).

In the speeches and in Table 2, the words of President Saakashvili look vaguer (Wodak, 2007) than those of the international community. We tested our theory using Hiller (1971) list of 362 vague and ambiguous words and expressions. In this list, entries

such as “more or less”, “about”, “sort of”, “considerations”, “many”, “process”, “variety”, “situation”, “very”, make up the list. In President Saakashvili’s speeches, the average value of the index of vagueness is 7.2 versus 5.7 for the international community (difference = -1.5). Here we want to ask if these two mean values are different from each other. The t value is -6.8 ($p < .01$). After 20,000 resamplings, the t value is -7.1 (95% ci -10.2 to -4.3 and the mean difference is -1.5 (95% ci -1.1 to -1.9) . Besides, these speeches contain more and more different vague words over time [$R^2 = .34$, $F(1, 20) = 10.3$, $p < .01$] (Figure 5). After 20,000 resamplings, the average degree of linearity for the linear constituent is .06 (95% ci .02 to .09). There is also a negative correlation between the need of achievement and the rate of vagueness in the Saakashvili’s speeches (but not in the international statements) ($r = -.46$, $p < .05$, $n = 22$, ci -.72 to -.04). The international statements show a non-significant inverted U-shaped curve, $R^2 = .13$, $F(2, 36) = 2.7$, $p < .10$ on vagueness.

Insert Table 2 and Figure5 about here

Comments

What do we know now which we did not know before? On the balance of the risk of war, the speeches of President Saakashvili weighted less than the statements of the international community. The President’s speeches tended towards negotiation and compromise, in contrast with the statements of the international community. Yet, both series of texts shared a lack of conviction, as if their authors felt themselves doomed to fail. We noticed also much vagueness in the President’s speeches, and increasingly so over time.

The Georgian conflict painfully shows Western ignorance about the Caucasus. The West ignores the history of the Caucasus, of its populations, languages, religions, and traditions, a history in which Russia has a distinctive share. We now know also, if we didn’t before, that we need to learn more about the Caucasus. Finally we have to admit the contradictions we can only describe, not resolve, between Saakashvili’s words and deeds. We merely mention these questions in the “to-do” list of questions neither

answered nor answerable in this essay. We forbade ourselves from the start to speculate on them. Would a better expertise of the region allow interpreting these contradictions? There is work ahead for political and military historians and analysts.

The language of the two series of documents represents two opposing forces. One, centrifugal (the international community), forces changes, and one, centripetal (Georgian leadership), forces consistency through compromise. The distance between the two is not empty but connective. From the viewpoint of those who receive these messages, this is Bakhtin's (1981) heteroglossia, which invites readers to two worlds simultaneously. In conflicts, the idea of a pure communication is an illusion, even among members of the same side, because these different "dialects", to use Bakhtin's word, serve "specific sociopolitical purposes of the day, even of the hour" (p. 263). Because it creates tension, heteroglossia (*разноречие* [raznorečie], that is, literally "different-speechness") is good for a novel (Bakhtin, 1981; HopKins, 1989). This double-voicing could also do some good to a nation in conflict, as a test of ideas (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 334). Ignoring unresolved refracted intents in a message may "muffle the dialogism native to it" (1981, p. 346).

Our cameo is a bit like closing the stable door long after the horse had bolted. Did our cameo come too late? It does not if it helps some accessing to a vision beyond. The Chinese poet Lao-Zi had it that "it is better to light a candle than curse the darkness" (<http://www.peace.ca/inspiringquotations.htm>). In truth, our documents could refer to more than one conflict. These so transitory texts carry a sense, but the sense only, of the uncontrollable nature of conflicts: It is this local conflict that one country is facing, but it could have been another elsewhere. It does not matter to us then if this particular conflict does not exhaust the subject –which Wittgenstein called "the contemptuous attitude towards the particular case" (1958, p. 18). Sticking to the particular case keeps us away from wallowing in abstractions. We have enough to intuit the rest that extends beyond ground zero of dialogue.

Authors' note

We started this analysis by mid-July 2008, before the conflict between Georgia and its neighbors broke out at full strength.

We thank Nicolas O. Kervyn (Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium), for his steady and motivating interest in this study born of our concern about a war too many. Much thank too for their help to our partners in thought. We mention Yves Bestgen (Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium), Victor Nemchinov (Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow), and Andrew Wilson (Lancaster U., UK). The present study did not depend on any private or public grant. We report no conflict of interest relevant to this study.

Robert Hogenraad's address: robert.hogenraad@uclouvain.be

Professor Emeritus, Honorary Senior Research Associate, Nat'l F. for Scientific Research
Psychology Department, Catholic University of Louvain

10 place du Cardinal Mercier, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)

ph: +32-(0)10-474411 # fx: +32-(0)10-473774 # mobile: +32-(0)479-583530

web site: <http://www.uclouvain.be/en-41429.html>

Rauf Garagozov's address: rgaragozov@gmail.com

Ph.D., Leading Research Associate, Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus

98 Aliovsat Guliyev str., AZ 1009 Baku (Azerbaijan)

ph.: +994-12-494-46-37 # fx: +994-12-596-11-73 # mobile: +994-50-332-72-93

web site: <http://www.ca-c.org/info-issc-e.shtml>

Note

1. The Soviet regime created in three Caucasus states the following administrative divisions. (1) In Azerbaijan, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Area composed of a minority of Azerbaijanis and a majority of Armenians. (2) In Georgia, the Adjara Autonomous Republic, mainly composed of Muslim ethnic Georgians, the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic, mostly composed of Abkhazes and Georgians, and the Southern Ossetia Autonomous Area, composed of a majority of Ossetes and a minority of Georgians. (3) Armenia had no such division, regardless of its 300,000 ethnic Azeris living there.

References

- Auden, W. H. (1994). *Collected poems*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Bakhtin, M. M. (1981). *The dialogic imagination. Four essays* (Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, Trans.). Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Broers, L. (Ed.). (2006). *The limits of leadership: Elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process*. London: Conciliation Resources. (Retrieved September 3, 2008 from <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/nagorny-karabakh/contents.php>)
- Central Intelligence Agency (2008). *The 2008 world factbook*. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency. (Retrieved August 26, 2008 from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>)
- Conrad, J. (2003). *Under Western eyes*. London: Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1911).
- de Waal, T. (2003). *Black garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through peace and war*. New York: New York University Press.
- Diaconis, P., & Efron, B. (1983). Computer-intensive methods in statistics. *Scientific American*, 248(5 (May)), 96-108.
- Garagozov, R. (2006). Collective memory in ethno-political conflicts: The case of Nagorno-Karabakh. *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, 41(5), 145-155.
- Garagozov, R. (2008). *Azerbaijani collective memory and the Karabakh conflict: Filling in the blank spots of history* (Vol. 1, No. 9). Baku: Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy (School of International Affairs).
- Guttieri, K., Wallace, M. D., & Suedfeld, P. (1995). The integrative complexity of American decision makers in the Cuban Missile Crisis. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 39(4), 595-621.
- Hiller, J. H. (1971). Verbal response indicators of conceptual vagueness. *American Educational Research Journal*, 8(1), 151-161.
- Hogenraad, R. (2003). The words that predict the outbreak of wars. *Empirical Studies of the Arts*, 21(1), 5-20.
- Hogenraad, R. (2004). Prognozirovanie razvitiia konfliktov s pomoshch'iu komp'iuternogo kontent-analiza [Predicting conflict development by means of

- computer-aided content-analysis]. *Sotsiologiya: Metodologiya, Metody, Matematicheskie Modeli* [Sociology: Methodology, Methods, Mathematical Models], 19, 158-175. (In Russian). (Retrieved August 2, 2008 from <http://www.isras.ru/files/File/4M/19/Hogenraad.pdf>)
- Hogenraad, R. (2005). What the words of war can tell us about the risk of war. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, 11(2), 137-151. (Retrieved August 2, 2008 from <http://www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/psor/documents/PAC1102pp137-151.pdf>)
- Hogenraad, R. (2006). The dynamite of the spirit: Power and affiliation, a motivational model of war in life and literature. In V. S. Zhidkov (Ed.), *System approach to cultural issues* (pp. 380-396). St-Petersburg: Aletheia.
- Hogenraad, R. (2007). Perversion and creativity in the language of war. In L. Dorfman, C. Martindale, & V. Petrov (Eds.), *Aesthetics and innovation* (pp. 161-180). Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Hogenraad, R. (2008a). Terrorism and literature: Trading violence for words. In O. Vincze & S. Bigazzi (Eds.), *Élmény, történetek - A történetek élménye* [Experience, story - Experience of stories] (Vol. 4, pp. 61-70). Budapest: Új Mandátum Könyv Kiadó (New Mandate Publishing House). (Retrieved August 2, 2008 from http://www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/psor/documents/Terrorism_and_literature.pdf)
- Hogenraad, R. (2008b). This way to the war. In J. Auracher & W. van Peer (Eds.), *New beginnings in literary studies* (pp. 130-144). Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. . (Retrieved August 2, 2008 from <http://www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/psor/documents/FinalNewIran.pdf>)
- Hogenraad, R., Daubies, C., Bestgen, Y., & Mahau, P. (1995). A general theory and method of computer-aided text analysis: The PROTAN system (PROTOCOL Analyzer). Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium), Psychology Department, Université catholique de Louvain. (www.psor.ucl.ac.be/protan/protanae.html).

- Hogenraad, R., McKenzie, D. P., & Martindale, C. (1997). The enemy within: Autocorrelation bias in content analysis of narratives. *Computers and the Humanities*, 30(6), 433-439.
- HopKins, M. F. (1989). The rhetoric of heteroglossia in Flannery O'Connor's *WiseBlood*. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 75(2), 198-211.
- Kaufman, S. J. (2001). *Modern hatreds: The symbolic politics of ethnic war*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- King, C. (2008). *The ghost of freedom. A history of the Caucasus*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lepik, T. (2008, August 9). Short analysis on the cyber attacks on Georgian websites. *Georgian Daily*. (Retrieved August 13, 2008 from http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5601&Itemid=65).
- Lévy, B.-H. (2008, August 19). Choses vues dans la Géorgie en guerre [What I saw in Georgia at war]. *Le Monde*. (Retrieved August 31, 2008 from http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2008/08/19/choses-vues-dans-la-georgie-en-guerre-par-bernard-henri-levy_1085547_3214.html)
- Mammadov, C. (2008). *Azerbaijanis assume lead in studying their own identity. A conversation with Dr. Chingiz Mammadov* (Volume 1, No. 9). Baku: Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy (School of International Affairs).
- Markoff, J. (2008, August 13). Before the gunfire, cyberattacks. *The New York Times*, pp. A1. (Retrieved August 13, 2008 from <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html?hp>)
- Marshall, S. L. A. (2001). *World War I*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Martin, J., Riché, P., & Servenay, D. (2008, August 22). BHL n'a pas vu toutes ses "choses vues" en Géorgie [Bernard-Henry Lévy didn't see what he claimed he saw]. *Rue89*. (Retrieved August 31, 2008 from <http://www.rue89.com/2008/08/22/bhl-na-pas-vu-toutes-ses-choses-vues-en-georgie>).
- McClelland, D. C. (1975). *Power: The inner experience*. New York: Irvington Publishers.

- Price, G. (Ed.). (1998). *Encyclopedia of the languages of Europe*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers.
- Putnam, R. D. (2001). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. London: Simon & Schuster.
- Rayfield, D. (2008, August 15). Histories of hope. *The Times Literary Supplement*, 11. (Retrieved August 18, 2008 from http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts_and_entertainment/the_tls/article4522162.ece)
- Spence, D. P. (1982). *Narrative truth and historical truth. Meaning and interpretation in psychoanalysis*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Suedfeld, P., & Tetlock, P. E. (1977). Integrative complexity of communications in international crises. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 21(1), 169-184.
- VVAA (1883-1915). *Sbornik materialov dlja opisanija mestnostei i plemen Kavkaza* (SMOMPK) [A collection of materials for a description of the locations and peoples of the Caucasus]. St-Petersburg. (Retrieved August 18, 2008 from http://books.google.com/books?id=CPX2xgmVe9IC&pg=PA59&lpg=PA59&dq=Sbornik+materialov+dlja+opisanija+mestnostei+i+plemen+Kavkaza&source=web&ots=IKNr1_ChXU&sig=iGSbcZCpnWxPei5fzxjjFtWszpI&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result).
- Welsh, D. (1993). Domestic politics and ethnic conflict. In M. E. Brown (Ed.), *Ethnic conflict and international security* (pp. 43-60). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Wertsch, J. V. (2006). Georgia after the Rose revolution. *The Caucasus & Globalization*, 1(1), 54-66.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1958). *The blue and brown books*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1975). *Philosophical remarks*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers.
- Wodak, R. (2007). Pragmatics and critical discourse analysis: A cross-disciplinary inquiry. *Pragmatics & Cognition*, 15(1), 203-225.
- Yunusov, A. (2005). *Karabakh: Past and present*. Baku, Azerbaijan: Turan Information Agency and Institute of Peace and Democracy.

Table 1. Composition of the Georgian corpus			
	Divisions	Total number of words	Number of different words
Presidential speeches	22 speeches	35,716	3,948
“Georgia Updates”, a service of the government of Georgia	(January 20 – August 10, 2008) 39 statements (April 4 - August 9, 2008)	36,283	4,334

Table 2. The words that make a difference
Words that characterize the 22 speeches of President Saakhasvili
able, all, and, before, but, come, common, country, create, day, democracy, free, friend, future, good, great, hand, history, I, if, importance, know, live, many, must, need, no, now, poverty, problem, process, share, should, society, start, strong, think, time, today, together, unite, value, very, want, we, will, without, world, year, you
Words that characterize the 39 statements of the international community
Abkhaz, Abkhazia, act, air, airspace, April, by, call, conflict, council, effort, EU, force, foreign, government, international, military, Moscow, observe, Ossetia, peacekeeping, radar, region, Russia, Russian, say, separatist, Southern, sovereignty, troop, UN, urge

Figure captions

- Figure 1. The risk of conflict as assessed from the speeches of President Mikheil Saakashvili (January 20 to August 10, 2008) (n = 22)
- Figure 2. The risk of conflict as assessed from the statements of the international community (“Georgia Updates”) (April 4 to August 9, 2008) (n = 39)
- Figure 3. The feeling of achievement in the speeches of President Mikheil Saakashvili (January 20 to August 10, 2008) (n = 22)
- Figure 4. The feeling of achievement in the statements of the international community (“Georgia Updates”) (April 4 to August 9, 2008) (n = 39)
- Figure 5. The rate of vagueness in the speeches of President Mikheil Saakashvili (January 20 to August 10, 2008) (n = 22)




Figure 1. The risk of conflict as assessed from the speeches of President Mikheil Saakashvili (January 20 to August 10, 2008) (n = 22)

Distribution of speeches:

January: speech n°. 1

April: speeches n° 2 to 8

May: speeches 9 to 14

June: speeches 15 to 16

July: speeches 17 to 19

August: speeches 20 to 22




Figure 2. The risk of conflict as assessed from the statements of the international community (“Georgia Updates”) (April 4 to August 9, 2008) (n = 22)

Distribution of updates

April: updates 1 to 9

May: updates 10 to 23

June: updates 24 to 25

July: updates 26 to 32

August: updates 33 to 39




Figure 3. The feeling of achievement in the speeches of President Mikheil Saakashvili (January 20 to August 10, 2008) (n = 22). Outlier n° 18 has been filtered out.

Distribution of speeches:

January: speech n°. 1

April: speeches n° 2 to 8

May: speeches 9 to 14

June: speeches 15 to 16

July: speeches 17 to 19

August: speeches 20 to 22




Figure 4. The feeling of achievement in the statements of the international community (“Georgia Updates”) (April 4 to August 9, 2008) (n = 39)

Distribution of updates

April: updates 1 to 9

May: updates 10 to 23

June: updates 24 to 25

July: updates 26 to 32

August: updates 33 to 39




Figure 5. The rate of vagueness in the speeches of President Mikheil Saakashvili (January 20 to August 10, 2008) (n = 22)

Distribution of speeches:

January: speech n° 1

April: speeches n° 2 to 8

May: speeches 9 to 14

June: speeches 15 to 16

July: speeches 17 to 19

August: speeches 20 to 22