

# **Identities, Values, and Religion: A Study Among Muslim, Other Immigrant, and Native Belgian Young Adults After the 9/11 Attacks**

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Individual identity statuses (Marcia, 1980) and collective (national and transnational) identities; value (Schwartz, 1992) hierarchies and priorities; religion–spirituality; social desirability; and opinions related to the September 11, 2001 attacks were investigated in 3 groups of young adults living in Belgium ( $N = 246$ ): native Belgians, immigrants from Muslim Mediterranean countries, and immigrants from other countries. Similar patterns were found across the 3 groups with regard to value hierarchies and the ways religion is related to identity statuses (achievement and foreclosure), value priorities (conservation, low autonomy, and low hedonism), social desirability (impression management, but not self-deception), and collective identities (transnational). However, young Muslim immigrants differed in their high religiosity, tendency for non-explorative identity statuses, values that motivated openness to transnational identities, and correlates of their high anti-Americanism in the interpretation of the September 11 attacks. These and other cross-cultural differences are discussed.

The September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. reopened the question of religion, individual and collective identities, values, and of the possible cross-cultural differences in these realities; the question of how religion may have an impact on, or at least be related to, values and individual and collective identities; and the question of how individual identities and values may relate or explain collective identities. Such questions do not concern only the United States

but other countries as well, such as Western countries including important immigrant minorities in their population, particularly countries with immigration from traditionally Muslim countries.

The aim of this study was to investigate these questions in the context of Belgian society, a part of which is comprised of young adults born of immigration from Muslim Mediterranean countries as well as other types of immigration. The study was conducted 4 to 5 months after the September 11 attacks. To our knowledge, no published study using standardized psychological measures of constructs such as identity statuses or values has been conducted in the context of immigration in Belgium. This study was clearly explorative and focused specifically on the following questions:

1. Are there cross-cultural differences between native Belgian, Muslim immigrant, and other immigrant young adults on religiousness (religiosity and spirituality); individual (identity status) and collective (transnational and national) identities; and values (hierarchy and importance attributed to established pattern of values)?
2. How does religion relate to identity status and values in general, and specifically, for the three aforementioned groups?
3. Can collective, national, and transnational identities, as well as opinions related to the September 11 attacks, be understood as related to or predicted by religion, values, and identity status; and this similarly or differently across native Belgians, Muslim immigrants, and other immigrants?

Because the study was explorative, no specific predictions were provided each time, but considerable theoretical and empirical evidence was in favor of the need for investigating the aforementioned questions.

## CROSS-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

The degree and intensity of *religiosity* may differ across native Belgians, Muslim immigrants, and other immigrants. An increase of religious beliefs and practices in Islam (both in Muslim countries and Europe), the importance of religious tradition among immigrants, and secularization in Western countries constitute at least three reasons for investigating differences in religiosity.

The three groups may also differ in *values* and *identity status*. One can hypothesize, for instance, that immigrants, even second and third generation ones, are to some extent lower in achieved identity or higher in moratorium status comparatively to their native peers, for they have more multiple and complex identity tasks to carry out than the latter. On the other hand, it could also be hypothesized that immigrants from traditional countries such as Islamic ones may be high in traditional values and identity status not involving exploration (e.g., foreclosure). Regarding

values, previous evidence suggests a great deal of variation in the importance of individual values both within groups (e.g., students vs. teachers; Schwartz & Bardi, 2001) and across societies (e.g., Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). Nevertheless, there is a common pan-cultural baseline of value priorities, which means an agreement across societies regarding the importance and hierarchy of the different values (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001).

Finally, it is of particular interest to investigate similarities or differences on *collective identities* and *opinions* related to the September 11, 2001 attacks. For instance, similar, transnational (e.g., citizen of the world, European) and national (Belgian) identities among the three groups could be considered a sign of integration or assimilation of immigrants into the adoption country.

### RELIGION, IDENTITY STATUS, AND VALUES

*Religion and identity status.* Identity formation implies search for unity, meaning, and coherence, especially beyond spatial and temporal discrepancies in the individual's life (van Hoof, 1999); as well as a certain integration of actions with cognitions, representations, ideals, and values (Erikson, 1950). Religion may thus be considered as particularly relevant for identity formation, especially in late adolescence and young adulthood: It encourages the quest for meaning in individual life; offers ways of answering existential enigmas; emphasizes order and structure; supports coherence and integration between cognitions, emotions, and (moral) actions (Hinde, 1999); and postulates an invisible unity (connectedness; Piedmont, 1999) beyond the spatiotemporal discrepancies of the visible world. In post-Eriksonian (Marcia, 1980) terms, religion could then be conceived as encouraging both commitment and exploration in identity. These two orthogonal dimensions define the four identity statuses in Marcia's model: *achievement* (high exploration and commitment), *moratorium* (high exploration, low commitment), *foreclosure* (low exploration, high commitment), and *diffusion* (low exploration and commitment).

Previous research in the United States, Canada, Belgium, and Israel (with Protestant, Catholic, Mormon, and Jewish participants) demonstrated an overall pattern of (a) positive association between religion and achievement or foreclosure, (b) negative association between religion and moratorium or diffusion, or both (Markstrom & Smith, 1996; Markstrom-Adams, Hofstra, & Dougher, 1994; McKinney & McKinney, 1999; Tzuriel, 1984; Verhoeven & Hutsebaut, 1995). Finer distinctions are obtained when focusing on specific religious dimensions. Intrinsic religion or historical relativism predicts high achievement, whereas extrinsic religion or orthodoxy predicts high foreclosure (Fulton, 1997; Hutsebaut, 1997). People high in moratorium tend to present many doubts about religion (Hunsberger, Pratt, & Pancer, 2001; Hutsebaut, 1997), or they may also be high in quest religiosity (Fulton, 1997; Klaassen & McDonald, 2002). Overall, these

studies suggest that religion in the life of adolescents and young adults implies high commitment but not necessarily exploration. Exploration in identity may be typical of a-religiosity or religious doubts, a quest-religious orientation, or both.

No study, to our knowledge, has investigated whether and how religion may relate to identity statuses in Muslim adolescents and young adults. Because the aforementioned theoretical reasons explaining how religion may contribute to identity formation and preference for specific identity statuses may also be applicable to a Muslim context, there is reason to expect findings similar to the earlier ones, from studies in other (mainly Christian) religious contexts.

*Religion and values.* Values may be defined as “desirable, transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in people’s lives” (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001, p. 269). As Schwartz and Huisman (1995) hypothesized, religious people tend to emphasize some specific values and to neglect or minimize the importance of others. A recent meta-analysis (Saroglou, Delpierre, & Dermelle, in press) of published studies on 21 samples from 15 countries with more than 8,000 participants (mostly young adults), all of them having used the Schwartz’s (1992) model and measure of 10 motivational types of values, indicated that religious people tend to favor values that promote conservation of social and individual order (tradition, conformity, and to a lesser extent, security); and conversely, to dislike values that promote openness to change and autonomy (stimulation, self-direction). The same people also tend to favor values that allow for a limited self-transcendence (benevolence, but not universalism) and to dislike values that promote self-enhancement (achievement, power) and hedonism (hedonism). It is interesting to note that in the only study with Muslim participants (Turkey: KUSDIL & KAGITCIBASI, 2000), all results (except the association of religion with benevolence) were similar to the ones mentioned previously, mainly based on studies with participants from various Christian denominations (17 out of 21 samples).

Therefore, it follows that we can expect many similarities in the religion–values associations between the different cultural groups of our study (i.e., native Belgians, Muslims, and other immigrants). However, Saroglou et al.’s (in press) meta-analysis also indicated that the magnitude of the associations between religion and values depends on the socioeconomic development of the country or group. Overall, the more a society tends to be developed, the less religion implies conservative values, the more it reflects self-transcendence values, and the less it implies low importance placed on autonomy and hedonistic values. Similar changes from traditional and survival values toward rational and self-expressive ones seem to be followed by a change from traditional religiosity to modern spirituality (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Consequently, similar differences may exist not only between different countries but also between different cultural and religious groups within the same society, such as those included in our study (i.e., native

Belgians vs. Muslim or other immigrants), often coming from countries generally considered to be more traditional and less socioeconomically developed.

### PREDICTING COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES AND SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS-RELATED OPINIONS

We also investigated transnational identities (i.e., identification as citizens of the world and as Europeans) and national ones (i.e., identification with Belgium [origin country for Belgians and adoption country for immigrants] and with another [origin country for immigrants] country). Because the study was carried out 4 to 5 months after the September 11 attacks, we also asked participants about their opinions on (a) the religion of Islam and its distinction from terrorism, (b) the responsibility of the American policy with regard to the Middle East for these attacks, and (c) the increase of Islamophobia. Religiosity, identity status, and values were then considered as possible predictors of collective identities and September 11 attacks-related opinions. With regard to these questions, the study was merely explorative. However, there were reasons to investigate these possible predictors.

First, it is possible that religion encourages transnational, broad, if not universalistic identities. From a sociobiological (Batson, 1983) and evolutionary psychology perspective (Kirkpatrick, 1999), religion has been considered as promoting extension of the limits of natural kinship to a broader cultural kinship and as reinforcing social networks and the creation and maintenance of coalitions. The religious ideals and imagery of universal love and brotherhood may be responsible for such an impact. However, it can also (or rather) be expected that religion is associated with strong national and narrow identities. There is much historical and contemporary evidence (conflicts in Northern Ireland, Israel, Palestine, and ex-Yugoslavia) in favor of this hypothesis, and it is unclear whether the religious dream of a kingdom of God materialized in a specific geographic area (e.g., nation) is only typical of religious nationalism or of religion in general. There is also some relevant empirical evidence: Religious identity of young adults in many European countries is positively associated with strong national identity (Campiche, 1997), and the meta-analysis of studies on values and religion in many Western countries (countries with Christian backgrounds, Israel, and Turkey) indicated no or negative association between religiosity and the importance attributed to the value of universalism (Saroglou et al., in press). Finally, it is possible that the religion–national identity association differs across societies: Burris, Branscombe, and Jackson (2000) found that intrinsic religiosity is positively related to national identification in the United States, whereas in Canada it is unrelated to national identification and is even positively related to multiculturalism.

Second, identity status and values may be related to specific collective identities. It can be hypothesized, for instance, that people with a foreclosed identity are

more prone to be attached to traditional, narrow, national identities, whereas exploration in identity may lead to broad transnational identities and related opinions relative to events such as the September 11 attacks. Moreover, previous studies using the Schwartz's (1992) model demonstrated that values may differ between nationalist, centrist, and liberal Israeli students (Schwartz et al., 2001; see also Barnea & Schwartz, 1998) and that specific values (achievement, stimulation, conformity, and security) can predict Flemish nationalism (Duriez, Luyten, Snauwaert, & Hutsebaut, 2002).

### SOCIAL DESIRABILITY

Finally, we included a measure of social desirability in this study. Previous evidence suggests that religiosity is positively related to social desirability (Trimble, 1997), although it remains unclear whether this is the only case for impression management or also for self-deception (Gillings & Joseph, 1996; Leak & Fish, 1989). The association with social desirability also holds for values (Schwartz, Verkasalo, Antonovsky, & Sagiv, 1997) but not for identity status, according to Bennion and Adams (1986). In addition, the context of the administration of this study (secondary schools) could increase social desirability demands when students, both native and born of immigrants, reported strong attachment to collective, especially transnational, identities.

### METHOD

#### Participants

Participants were 246 late adolescents and young adults (16–24 years old,  $M = 17.8$ ,  $SD = 1.3$ ), 118 men and 127 women (1 without mention of sex). Three additional participants were not included in the analyses as they left many questions unanswered. All the participants were students in high schools in urban areas of Belgium that were selected for the important proportion of students they had from immigrant families (mainly second generation). The schools belonged to the Catholic education network. In Belgium, most schools belong either directly to the state or to the Catholic network; it should be mentioned, however, that even in the latter, secularization is known to be predominant among teachers and students. The students were asked to participate in a study whose aim was to “investigate the visions of young people regarding life, world, profession, romantic relationships, and religion.” They were allowed to withhold their participation from the study if so inclined. A researcher and the teacher were present during the administration of the measures, which took approximately 40 to 45 min. Participants were thanked and informed of the results 3 months later. The study was carried out in January

and February 2002, 4 to 5 months after the attacks of September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington, D.C.

## Measures

*Identity status* (Revised extended version of the Objective Measure of Ego Identity Status; Bennion & Adams, 1986). To not make the administration of measures too long, especially given the age of the population and the context of administration, we selected four out of the eight domains of the measure: occupation, dating, sex roles, and philosophical life style (i.e., domains that did not have an overlap with other measures administered, e.g., religion, and seemed to be particularly relevant for the purposes of our study). Participants rated their agreement or disagreement with the statements included in the measure (4 Domains  $\times$  4 Statuses  $\times$  2 Items = 32 items) on a 6-point Likert-type format scale. Four scores were computed by totalizing the scores across the different domains for each identity status. Reliabilities were .70, .38, .66, and .56 for achievement, moratorium, foreclosure, and diffusion, respectively. To increase the reliability of moratorium (.46), the items referring to sex roles were finally not included.

*Values.* The Schwartz (1992) value survey includes 56 single-value items representing a group of 10 (types of) values: tradition, conformity, security, power, achievement, self-direction, hedonism, stimulation, universalism, and benevolence. Respondents rate the importance of each value item as “a guiding principle in my life” on a 9-point scale ranging from 7 (*of supreme importance*) to -1 (*opposed to my values*). The structure of 10 values has shown cross-cultural stability across dozens of countries and has been found to relate meaningfully to real behaviors such as prosocial, antisocial, environmental, political, consumer, and intellectual behaviors. Definitions of the values, corresponding single-value items, as well as the way structural relations between the 10 values may be spatially represented can be found in many published articles (e.g., Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bardi, 2001; Schwartz & Sagie, 2000). In the analyses carried out on our data we used all 56 items (except the self-respect item) and not only the pool of 44 items (as in several studies; see Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995), because reliability of the 10 types of values decreased in the latter case. Reliabilities varied from .53 to .69 (mean  $\alpha$  = .61). Also, as one of the components of the value of tradition in Schwartz’s (1992) model and measure is the item “devout” (in the French version of the measure: “religieux”), we computed tradition without including this item. Because we used a distinct measure of religiosity (see the following), this solution seemed necessary to us to not (a) overevaluate the relation between religiosity and tradition through a content overlap, and (b) confuse tradition and religion in predicting other constructs.

*Social desirability* (Tournois, Mesnil, & Kop, 2000). This French scale includes 36 items (7-point Likert-type format) measuring the two dimensions of social desirability (2 × 18 items), impression management and self-deception, similar to Paulhus's (1991) Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR). The scale has been validated with 250 students in France, and the two components demonstrated convergent validity with the BIDR (Tournois et al., 2000). In our data, a principal component analysis followed by varimax rotation failed to replicate the two dimensions of the original normative data in France. When asking for extraction of two factors, too many items (15) were found to have their first loading in a factor other than the expected one; and in several cases, the second loadings were as high (or low) as the first ones. In addition, when we computed the two factors following the normative French data, they were importantly intercorrelated ( $r = .39$ ). For subsequent analyses, we then selected the items with clear and high first loadings in the appropriate two factors. A new factor analysis (principle component analysis) followed by varimax rotation on this shorter version of 20 items (10 × 2 dimensions) faithfully replicated the two dimensions when asking for extraction of two factors. All of the items had their first loading in the expected factor (loadings: .70–.44, for impression management; and .70–.46, for self-deception), and no second loading was higher than .26. Total explained variance was limited to 33%. Reliabilities were satisfactory (.75, .77), and the two dimensions were unrelated ( $r = .08$ ). This 20-item bidimensional version of the social desirability measure was then used in subsequent analyses.

*Religion.* A 7-point Likert format scale of 10 items was developed to measure (a) personal–intrinsic religiosity as reflected in positive attitudes toward different aspects of religion and (b) spirituality. In a previously published study where this scale was used ( $N = 240$ ; Saroglou, 2002a), two factors emerged: classic religiosity and spirituality–emotional religion. Since then, however, new factor analyses in our total data from more than 2,000 participants (the vast majority of which were Belgians with Catholic backgrounds) suggested a better solution of four factors:

1. Classic religiosity (importance of God in life, importance of religion in life, frequency of prayer).
2. Traditional religion (interest in religious rituals, interest in religious identity through belonging to a tradition).
3. Emotional religion (interest in values and a quest for meaning in religion, emotional aspect, personal experiential aspect, and community aspect of religion).
4. Spirituality (importance of spirituality in life).

In the data of this study, separate factor analyses for each of the three cultural groups (see the following for the constitution of the three groups) revealed that

the items of Factor 2 (ritual and identity) behaved differently across these groups, so we did not take these items into account in the subsequent analyses. New factor analyses on the remaining eight items, conducted separately for each group, established a clear three-factor structure with the factors mentioned previously: religiosity (3 items), emotional religion (4 items), and spirituality (1 item). Each time, 75% to 80 % of the total variance was explained. Although one-item indexes may appear theoretically restrictive, we cannot neglect that they are still valid, predictive (e.g., Gorsuch & McFarland, 1972; Schwartz & Huisman, 1995), and particularly useful when long lists of other measures are administered. This eight-item version was then used in subsequent analyses. Reliabilities were .89 and .87 for (classic) religiosity and emotional religion, respectively.

*Collective identities.* Four questions in a 7-point Likert-type format scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*absolutely*) tended to tap the following collective identities: “how much do you define yourself in terms of identity as ... 1. citizen of the world; 2. European; 3. Belgian; and 4. other (please specify).” Forty-six out of the 72 Muslim immigrants (see the following for the constitution of the cultural groups) specified an “other” identity, and 36 of them gave the name of another country other than Belgium as a pole of identification. Fifty-five of the 86 other immigrants specified the other identity, and 47 of them provided the name of another country. (Alternative responses for other were “myself,” “foreign,” “refugee,” “anti-capitalist,” “all countries,” or “human.”) For further analyses regarding Question 4, we only retained answers that mentioned another country as other.

*Opinions related to the September 11, 2001 attacks.* As the study was carried out 4 to 5 months after the September 11 attacks, we asked participants to give their agreement or disagreement (7-point Likert-type format scale) with the following statements:

1. “A Muslim cannot be delighted at such attacks because Islam condemns this type of attack.”
2. “The authors of these attacks cannot consider themselves as Muslims because Islam is a religion of peace and moderation.”
3. “One can understand that American politics with regard to the Middle East might have exasperated Islamic extremists.”

Finally, using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*very much*), we asked them to mention whether

4. They felt “a deterioration in the attitudes toward Muslims in Belgium since the attacks in the United States.”

## Constitution of Cultural Groups

On the basis of demographic information requested from the participants, three subsamples were constituted:

1. Native Belgians (i.e., participants whose fathers were born in Belgium,  $n = 81$ ).
2. Muslim immigrants (i.e., participants whose fathers were born in a Mediterranean country with an Islamic tradition,  $n = 72$ : Morocco, 49; Turkey, 14; Algeria, 6; Tunisia, 2; and Tanger, 1).
3. Other immigrants ( $n = 86$ ; i.e., participants whose fathers were born in other [27] countries in Europe [South, Central, East], Africa, Asia, and South America).

In the subsample of native Belgians, 67 out of 81 mothers were also born in Belgium (10 other mothers were born in other countries belonging to the European Union). In the subsample of Muslim immigrants, 70 out of 72 mothers were also born in a Mediterranean country with an Islamic tradition (the other 2 mothers were born in Belgium), and the country of origin of the two parents was the same in 70 participants. In the subsample of other immigrants, only 12 out of 86 mothers were born in Belgium. Finally, in answering another one of our questions, only 4 Muslim immigrants and only 12 other immigrants seemed to be “newcomers” in Belgium (i.e., they claimed to have been students in Belgium for less than 5 years). In conclusion, the constitution of these three groups seemed to provide relative within-group homogeneity and between-group heterogeneity.<sup>1</sup>

## RESULTS

### Preliminary Analyses

Some outlier values were identified and were then not included in subsequent analyses. Age had no impact on any measure. Men did not differ from women in religious measures, except in emotional religion,  $t(243) = -3.08, p < .01$ . They did

<sup>1</sup>As one reviewer suggested, we could have selected a stricter criterion, like the fact that both parents were born in Belgium or in a Mediterranean country with a Muslim culture or in another, third country. We recomputed the analyses described in the results section with the three groups defined in a stricter way. Most of the results remained the same. However, the stricter criterion excluded from the analyses 28 participants. The decrease of groups' size had as a consequence that the necessary level of significance was not attained for some results that were similar to the ones obtained with the broader criterion (country of father's birth). We thus maintained the constitution of the 3 groups on the basis of the broader criterion in order not to lose important information. Indeed, among students from mixed couples, for those with a Belgian father, the mean score (4.37) on Belgian identity was higher than that of Muslim immigrants (4.11), whereas for those whose mother was Belgian, this score was lower (3.70), although the small  $ns$  do not allow for significance in this difference.

not differ from women in collective identities, identity statuses, and September 11 related opinions, except in achievement identity status,  $t(243) = -3.07, p < .01$ . With regard to importance attributed to values, men differed from women in only three cases: power,  $t(243) = 2.55, p < .05$ ; benevolence,  $t(243) = -1.88, p < .10$ ; and hedonism,  $t(243) = 2.17, p < .05$ . It is interesting to note that women tended to favor impression management more than men,  $t(243) = 4.12, p < .001$ ; whereas men were more prone than women to self-deception,  $t(243) = 4.53, p < .001$ . However, as gender differences remained relatively few given the number of variables and to preserve a sufficient number of participants by cultural group, we did not carry out separate analyses by gender. (When gender was introduced as a covariate, the results of the subsequent analyses presented in the following remained unchanged.)

### Cross-Cultural Comparisons

As detailed in Table 1, value hierarchies (rank order as function of the means weighted by the number of items by value) were very similar in the three cultural groups (Kendall's  $\tau = .91, p > .001$ , for the correlations between native Belgians' and the two immigrant groups' rank orders; and  $\tau = .96, p < .001$ , for the correlation between the two immigrant groups' rank orders). Value importance (between-group comparisons in terms of ANOVA analysis of variance and Scheffé's post hoc comparisons) was also relatively similar in the three cultural groups. However, two interesting differences were observed. First, Muslims attributed greater importance to tradition in comparison to the native Belgians. Second, native Belgians valued stimulation more highly than the Muslim immigrants.

Many cross-cultural differences (ANOVA and Scheffé's post hoc comparisons) were observed in the other domains (see Table 2 for details). In all religious measures, Muslim adolescents and young immigrants were strongly religious comparatively to both their native Belgian peers and their non-Muslim immigrant peers; the latter were more religious than native Belgians. No differences in achievement or moratorium identity status were observed, but Muslim immigrants were higher in foreclosure compared to both the other groups and higher in diffusion compared to the native Belgians.

With regard to collective identities, it is not surprising that native Belgians reported the strongest Belgian identity compared to the other two groups; however, it is interesting to note that Muslim immigrants also felt more "Belgian" than the other immigrants did (see also Table 2). The other immigrants seemed to feel more like "citizens of the world" than the native Belgians. Inspection of rank order of mean importance on the different collective identities for each group revealed that for all groups identification with the country of origin (Belgium for native Belgians, origin country for the two groups of immigrants) was the most important one, whereas Belgian identity was lowest in the two immigrant groups. If we then consider that each group has its own origin country identity, the rank order of col-

**TABLE 1**

Value Hierarchies and Comparisons on Importance of Values Between Native Belgians (1), Immigrants from Muslim Mediterranean Countries (2), and Other Immigrants (3)

<i>Value Hierarchies</i>			<i>Cross-Cultural Comparisons</i>	
<i>Belgians (n = 81)</i>	<i>Muslims (n = 72)</i>	<i>Others (n = 86)</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Post-Hoc<sup>a</sup></i>
BE 5.07	BE 4.92	BE 5.01	BE 0.69	
HE 4.92	HE 4.77	HE 4.91	HE 0.40	
SE 4.58	SE 4.55	CO 4.52	SE 0.74	
UN 4.43	UN 4.42	UN 4.44	UN 1.00	
CO 4.38	CO 4.40	SE 4.43	CO 0.38	
SD 4.24	SD 4.18	SD 4.30	SD 0.21	
AC 4.08	AC 3.99	AC 4.13	AC 0.30	
ST 4.02	TR 3.63	ST 3.57	ST 4.36*	1 > 2*
TR 3.10	ST 3.26	TR 3.28	TR 3.57*	2 > 1*
PO 2.83	PO 2.61	PO 2.47	PO 1.67	

*Note.* BE = benevolence; HE = hedonism; SE = security; UN = universalism; CO = conformity; SD = self-direction; AC = achievement; ST = stimulation; TR = tradition (without the item “devout = religieux”); PO = power.

<sup>a</sup>Scheffé’s tests; only significant results are reported.

\* $p < .05$ . (two tailed).

lective identities (origin, European, and world) is identical between native Belgians and Muslim immigrants, whereas it is significantly similar between the two groups of immigrants (origin, world citizen or European, and Belgian),  $\tau = .67, p < .05$ . Indeed, for all groups, the origin country identity was stronger than the cosmopolitan one,  $F(1, 166) = 57.38, p < .001$  (no significant interaction with the group). In the two immigrant groups, the adoption country identity was weak compared to the cosmopolitan one,  $F(1, 167) = 47.70, p < .001$ ; and the European one,  $F(1, 167) = 75.11, p < .001$ ; and the significant interactions with the group,  $F_s(2, 167) = 9.92, 7.62, p < .01$ , are apparently due to the stronger Belgian identity of Muslim immigrants. Finally, overall for the three groups, the European identity seemed higher than the cosmopolitan one,  $F(1, 235) = 6.13, p < .05$ ; but the significant interaction with the group,  $F(2, 235) = 5.57, p < .01$ , called for separate for each group analyses indicating that this superiority of the European over the cosmopolitan identity was only significant among the native Belgians,  $F(1, 80) = 26.39, p < .001$ .

As far as opinions related to the September 11 attacks are concerned, Muslim immigrants turned out to believe more than the other immigrants that the American foreign policy was somehow responsible for these events and that, since then, society has been treating them negatively.

Finally, the three groups did not differ in social desirability. Computing ANOVA again for all variables (religion, identity statuses, collective identities,

**TABLE 2**

Means and Standard Deviations of Measures, and Comparisons Between Native Belgians (1), Immigrants from Mediterranean Countries (2), and Other Immigrants (3)

Variables	Belgians (n = 81)		Muslims (n = 72)		Other (n = 86)		Cross-Cultural Comparisons	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	F	Post-Hoc <sup>a</sup>
<b>Religion</b>								
Religiosity	8.05	4.9	17.17	3.0	11.39	5.1	78.36***	2 > 1***, 2 > 3***, 3 > 1***
Emotional religion	15.09	6.7	22.92	4.8	17.35	5.9	34.94***	2 > 1***, 2 > 3***, 3 > 1*
Spirituality	3.69	2.0	5.46	1.8	4.32	2.1	15.26***	2 > 1***, 2 > 3**
<b>Identity statuses</b>								
Achievement	29.98	9.1	29.79	7.8	30.20	7.5	0.05	
Moratorium	24.31	6.4	26.37	6.2	25.23	6.5	2.04	
Foreclosure	17.64	5.9	19.88	7.3	17.48	5.7	3.26*	2 > 1 <sup>†</sup> , 2 > 3 <sup>†</sup>
Diffusion	23.42	6.7	26.28	7.9	23.96	7.9	3.04*	2 > 1 <sup>†</sup>
<b>Collective identities</b>								
World citizen	4.28	2.0	4.89	2.0	5.00	1.9	3.08*	3 > 1 <sup>†</sup>
European	5.38	1.6	5.13	1.8	4.78	2.1	2.15	
Belgian	5.57	1.9	4.11	2.1	2.80	2.0	37.97***	1 > 2***, 1 > 3***, 2 > 3***
Other <sup>b</sup>			6.61	0.9	6.33	1.2	1.68	
<b>9/11-related opinions</b>								
Islam anti-terror	5.27	1.9	5.54	2.0	5.53	1.7	0.5	
Not real Muslims	5.58	1.7	5.63	1.8	5.44	1.9	0.23	
USA fault	4.57	1.6	5.19	2.0	4.25	2.0	4.86**	2 > 3**
Deterioration	2.99	1.4	3.38	1.4	2.56	1.4	6.43**	2 > 3**
<b>Social desirability</b>								
Impression management	4.40	0.9	4.66	1.1	4.34	0.9	2.21	
Self-deception	3.32	1.0	3.57	1.1	3.34	1.0	1.31	

<sup>a</sup>Scheffé's tests; only significant results are reported. <sup>b</sup>only for the Muslims and the other immigrants groups.

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ . † $p < .10$  (two tailed).

and September 11 related opinions), with the three cultural groups as the independent variable and social desirability as a covariate, did not change the results, although some significant *F*s became marginally significant.

### Religion and Identity Status

Because considerable previous empirical evidence suggests the direction of the associations, correlational tests were based on a one-tailed level of statistical significance. As detailed in Table 3, in all three groups, religiosity was positively related to both achievement and foreclosure identity statuses. Emotional religion was also positively related to achievement and foreclosure in native Belgians, and to foreclosure in Muslim immigrants. Spirituality was related to high moratorium in native Belgians, and to high achievement and low diffusion in the other immigrants group, but was unrelated to identity statuses in Muslim immigrants. Moreover, in native Belgians, all religious measures were negatively associated with diffusion and only in this group was religiosity positively associated with moratorium (Fisher's  $z_s = 1.81, p < .05$ , comparatively to Muslims). Finally, in the total sample, the two religious measures were positively related to achievement, moratorium, and foreclosure; spirituality was almost similarly related to achievement (.11) and moratorium (.10), although the latter association did not reach significance.

There are two realities, however, that may have had an impact on these results. First, there was some overlap between the identity statuses: the absolute values of their interrelations varied from .00 to .35. Second, social desirability was positively related to both religion and identity. Table 3 details how all religious measures were related to impression management (but not self-deception), except in Muslim immigrants where this was only the case with emotional religion. Achievement in all three groups ( $r$ s varied from .20,  $p < .10$  to .33,  $p < .01$ ) and foreclosure in native Belgians ( $r = .38, p < .001$ ) and other immigrants ( $r = .23, p < .05$ ) were positively related to impression management. Moratorium was negatively related to self-deception in Muslim ( $r = -.24, p < .01$ ) and other immigrants ( $r = -.21, p < .05$ ), whereas diffusion in Muslim immigrants was related to high impression management ( $r = .39, p < .001$ ) and self-deception ( $r = .21, p < .10$ ).

To control for the overlap between statuses and the impact of social desirability, we thus computed multiple regression analyses with the four identity statuses and the two components of social desirability as predictors, and the religion measures as dependent variables. In native Belgians (as detailed in Table 4), beyond the impact of impression management, religion measures were associated to high moratorium (religiosity and spirituality) and low diffusion (spirituality and emotional religion). In Muslim immigrants, religiosity was associated with achievement, but the other measures (emotional religion and spirituality) were unrelated to identity status. In the other immigrants group, beyond the impact of impression management, only spirituality was related to low diffusion. However, when taking the par-

**TABLE 3**

**Coefficients of Correlations of Religion Measures with Identity Statuses, Values, and Social Desirability**

	Identity Statuses <sup>d</sup>										Values <sup>b</sup>					Social Desirability		
	ACH	MOR	FOR	DIF	TR <sup>c</sup>	CO	SE	SD	PO	AC	BE	UN	HE	ST	IM	SD		
<b>Native Belgians (n = 81)</b>																		
Religiosity	.21*	.21*	.25*	-.15 <sup>†</sup>	.13	.17 <sup>†</sup>	-.09	-.11	-.08	-.22*	.01	-.03	-.20*	-.32**	.38***	-.10		
Emotional religion	.28**	.12	.22*	-.15 <sup>†</sup>	.05	.22*	-.02	-.17 <sup>†</sup>	-.18 <sup>†</sup>	-.09	.14	-.13	-.07	-.20*	.43***	-.08		
Spirituality	.04	.18 <sup>†</sup>	.05	-.25*	.04	-.01	-.23*	.13	-.27**	.01	.10	.04	-.19*	-.12	.15 <sup>†</sup>	.02		
<b>Muslim immigrants (n = 72)</b>																		
Religiosity	.34**	-.09	.21*	.08	.25*	.18 <sup>†</sup>	.00	-.22*	-.04	-.23*	-.00	.09	-.11	-.21*	.06	-.01		
Emotional religion	.13	.06	.19 <sup>†</sup>	.15 <sup>†</sup>	.14	.07	.08	-.06	-.22*	-.11	.12	.04	-.34*	-.12	.19 <sup>†</sup>	.02		
Spirituality	.08	-.02	-.12	.06	.05	-.10	-.13	.18 <sup>†</sup>	-.34**	.05	.04	.28**	-.10	.00	.02	-.07		
<b>Other immigrants (n = 86)</b>																		
Religiosity	.22*	.03	.25*	-.03	.24*	.20*	.16 <sup>†</sup>	-.32**	.09	.05	-.17 <sup>†</sup>	-.07	-.34**	-.50***	.28**	-.08		
Emotional religion	.12	.03	.10	-.08	.04	.14	.03	-.13	-.14	-.06	.01	.22*	-.15 <sup>†</sup>	-.47***	.24*	.03		
Spirituality	.22*	-.03	.11	-.26**	.07	.09	-.03	.05	-.04	.11	-.14	.19*	-.31**	-.24*	.24*	-.12		
<b>Total (N = 246)</b>																		
Religiosity	.17**	.12*	.26***	.06	.25***	.14*	.01	-.19**	-.05	-.10	-.10	.01	-.23***	-.41***	.27***	.01		
Emotional religion	.16**	.11*	.22***	.03	.15*	.12*	.02	-.13*	-.17**	-.10	.03	.02	-.18**	-.33***	.31***	.02		
Spirituality	.11*	.10	.05	-.08	.09	.00	-.11*	.06	-.20**	.04	-.05	.16**	-.25***	-.20*	.13*	-.03		

Note. ACH = achievement; MOR = moratorium; FOR = foreclosure; DIFF = Diffusion; TR = tradition; CO = conformity; SE = security; SD = self direction; PO = power; BE = benevolence; UN = universalism; HE = hedonism; ST = stimulation; IM = impression management; SD = self-deception.  
<sup>a</sup>Zero-order correlations. <sup>b</sup>Partial correlations, controlling for mean importance of values. <sup>c</sup>Tradition does not include the item "devoût = religieux".  
<sup>d</sup>\*p < .05. \*\*p < .01. \*\*\*p < .001. <sup>†</sup>p < .10 (one tailed).

ticipants as a whole, it turned out that the two religion measures, beyond the impact of impression management, were associated with moratorium and foreclosure (and religiosity was related to achievement), whereas spirituality, which was not affected by impression management, was associated with high moratorium and low diffusion. Apparently, there is still an association of religion with commitment (foreclosure and achievement) that is not only due to social desirability, although this association is lost in separate for each group analyses given the decrease in group size.

### Religion and Values

Partial correlations were computed between values and religious measures, controlling for mean importance of values (following Schwartz and Huismann's, 1995, previous studies), to make the predictive power of the importance of each value more discriminant. Based on systematic previous evidence indicating stable directions of correlations (Saroglou et al., in press), a one-tailed level of statistical significance was used in these tests.

As detailed in Table 3, tradition, a value purified of its religious component, was positively correlated with religiosity (but not emotional religion or spirituality) in the two immigrants groups but not in the native Belgians.<sup>2</sup> However, this between-group difference was not significant (Fisher's  $z_s = 0.75$  and  $0.73$ ). In the total group, spirituality clearly contrasted with religiosity in not predicting tradition, Williams's  $t(242) = 2.65, p < .01$ .

In all three groups, religiosity (and emotional religion in native Belgians) but not spirituality, was associated with conformity, and the difference between spirituality and religiosity in relating to conformity was significant: for the total sample, Williams's  $t(242) = 2.28, p < .05$ . Security was positively related to religiosity in the other immigrants group (significantly different from native Belgians, Fisher's  $z = 1.58, p < .10$ ), and only negatively related to spirituality among the native Belgians (significantly different from the other immigrants,  $z = -1.29, p < .10$ ). Religiosity was associated with low importance attributed to achievement in native Belgians and Muslims but not in the third group,  $z_s = 1.74, p < .05$ . Similarly, in the former two groups, both spirituality and emotional religion predicted low importance attributed to power (the contrast with the third group was significant with spirituality,  $z = 1.50, p < .10$ , with native Belgians; and  $z = 1.93, p < .05$ , with Muslims). In all groups, religion (emotional religion in native Belgians and religiosity in the other two groups), but not spirituality, was negatively related to self-direction (for the total sample: Williams's  $t[242] = -4.17, p < .001$ ); this value was even positively related to spirituality in Muslims. Most or all religious mea-

<sup>2</sup>Inclusion of the single value "devout-religious" in tradition as in Schwartz's (1992) model leads to much higher coefficients of correlations:  $r_s = .49, .26$ , and  $.08$ , in native Belgians;  $.55, .27, .25$ , in Muslim immigrants; and  $.60, .41, .31$ , in other immigrants, respectively, for religiosity, emotional religion, and spirituality.

**TABLE 4**

Regression Analyses of Identity Status and Social Desirability on Religion Measures

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Religiosity</i>		<i>Emotional Religion</i>		<i>Spirituality</i>	
	<i>b</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>t</i>
Native Belgians						
Achievement	.18	1.46	.19	1.61	.12	0.95
Moratorium	.27	2.26*	.16	1.40	.26	2.04*
Foreclosure	.12	1.04	.06	0.56	.03	0.27
Diffusion	-.17	-1.58	-.20	-1.92 <sup>†</sup>	-.27	-2.37*
Impression management	.26	2.18*	.32	2.69*	-.09	-0.75
Self-deception	-.11	-0.96	-.11	-0.95	.07	0.57
	$R^2 = .23$		$R^2 = .23$		$R^2 = .12$	
Muslim immigrants						
Achievement	.35	2.64*	.01	0.75	.01	0.68
Moratorium	-.08	-0.60	.02	0.13	-.06	-0.44
Foreclosure	.16	1.23	.15	1.15	-.16	-1.17
Diffusion	.12	0.85	.09	0.63	.13	0.81
Impression management	-.06	-0.46	.01	0.67	-.03	-0.22
Self-deception	.01	0.06	.02	0.17	-.06	-0.45
	$R^2 = .17$		$R^2 = .08$		$R^2 = .04$	
Other immigrants						
Achievement	.14	0.98	.07	0.51	.09	0.67
Moratorium	.08	0.70	.12	1.03	.08	0.65
Foreclosure	.15	1.20	.01	0.09	.04	0.28
Diffusion	.02	0.17	-.06	-0.48	-.23	-1.85 <sup>†</sup>
Impression management	.23	1.97*	.22	1.79 <sup>†</sup>	.21	1.85 <sup>†</sup>
Self-deception	-.09	-0.78	.07	0.58	-.07	-0.60
	$R^2 = .15$		$R^2 = .08$		$R^2 = .15$	
Total						
Achievement	.13	1.79 <sup>†</sup>	.08	1.14	.08	1.13
Moratorium	.14	2.10*	.11	1.66 <sup>†</sup>	.12	1.71 <sup>†</sup>
Foreclosure	.18	2.71**	.14	2.10*	.03	0.37
Diffusion	.01	0.18	-.03	-0.43	-.12	-1.77 <sup>†</sup>
Impression management	.19	2.73**	.23	3.43**	.11	1.50
Self-deception	-.00	-0.06	.02	0.28	.02	0.32
	$R^2 = .14$		$R^2 = .12$		$R^2 = .05$	

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . <sup>†</sup> $p < .10$  (two tailed).

asures in all three groups were negatively related to the two hedonistic values, hedonism and stimulation. Finally, no association was found between religious measures and benevolence (with only one surprising exception of marginally significant negative correlation in the other immigrants group), whereas spirituality in the two groups of immigrants, but not in native Belgians (who differed significantly from Muslims,  $z = 1.50, p < .10$ ), and emotional religion in the other immigrants group (who differed significantly from native Belgians,  $z = 2.25, p < .05$ ), were related to universalism. In the total sample, it was spirituality but not religiosity that related positively to universalism, Williams's  $t(242) = 2.45, p < .05$ .

In partial correlations between values and religion, controlling for the two components of social desirability (together with the mean importance of values), beyond minor changes in the magnitude, most of the associations mentioned previously remained significant; and some new associations became significant. This is the case among native Belgians, where religion did not relate to conformity and achievement, but was negatively related to security ( $r = -.18, p < .10$ ); and where emotional religion did not correlate with power and stimulation, but correlated positively with benevolence ( $r = .19, p < .05$ ) and negatively with universalism ( $r = -.19, p < .05$ ). No change was observed in the Muslim immigrants group. In the other immigrants group, religiosity was still not significantly related to conformity and security.

### Religion, Identity Status, and Values as Predicting Collective Identities

Correlations were computed between collective identities (i.e., citizen of the world, European, Belgian, and other; origin country for the two immigrant groups), on the one hand, and religion measures, identity statuses, and social desirability, on the other. Also, partial correlations were computed between these collective identities and values, controlling for mean importance of values.

As detailed in Table 5, native Belgians who identified themselves as citizens of the world also tended to be high in religion (all measures) and in moratorium identity status, and they attributed high importance to universalism but also low importance to self-direction. Native Belgians who identified themselves as European also attributed high importance to universalism and low importance to tradition. No religious measure was associated with the European identity. Surprisingly (but keeping in mind that Belgium is a federal country with two different major linguistic communities), identification as Belgian was predicted by low importance placed on tradition, high importance placed on stimulation, as well as by low spirituality and high moratorium. Finally, social desirability dimensions had no impact on these collective identities.

Among Muslim immigrants, religion (classic and emotional), but not spirituality, predicted high identity as other (Moroccan, Turk, etc.), whereas emotional religion was related to high identity as citizen of the world (see Table 5). The attachment to the country of origin was also related positively to tradition, foreclo-

**TABLE 5**

Coefficients of Correlations of Collective Identities with Religion, Identity Statuses, Values, and Social Desirability

Variable	Native Belgians			Muslim Immigrants			Other Immigrants			
	World Citizen	European	Belgian	World Citizen	European	Belgian	World Citizen	European	Belgian	
Religion <sup>a</sup>										Other Country (n = 47)
Religiosity	.31**	.07	-.16	.01	-.06	.03	.32**	-.13	-.02	.25 <sup>†</sup>
Emotional religion	.34**	.16	-.03	.29*	.09	.01	.28*	-.08	.16	.09
Spirituality	.21 <sup>†</sup>	.02	-.26*	-.06	-.00	-.13	.27*	-.09	.07	.17
Identity statuses <sup>a</sup>										
Achievement	-.12	-.00	-.10	.01	.12	.12	.04	.12	.01	.19
Moratorium	.31**	.17	.19 <sup>†</sup>	-.00	.22 <sup>†</sup>	.13	-.11	.04	-.15	.01
Foreclosure	-.04	.01	.02	.14	.00	.11	.20 <sup>†</sup>	-.03	.01	.26 <sup>†</sup>
Diffusion	-.06	.08	.16	-.06	.17	.01	-.20 <sup>†</sup>	-.02	.01	-.10

(Continued)

TABLE 5 (continued)

Variable	Native Belgians			Muslim Immigrants			Other Immigrants			
	World Citizen	European	Belgian	World Citizen	European	Belgian	World Citizen	European	Belgian	
Values <sup>b</sup>										
Tradition <sup>c</sup>	.02	-.24*	-.23*	.16	-.17	.19	.17	-.28*	-.08	.03
Conformity	-.14	.04	.02	.04	-.29*	-.23 <sup>†</sup>	.04	-.25*	-.18	.16
Security	.04	.08	.07	-.07	-.05	-.03	.02	.03	.18	-.12
Self-direction	-.21 <sup>†</sup>	-.17	-.14	.02	.02	-.07	.00	-.06	-.09	-.17
Power	-.11	-.03	-.05	-.03	-.06	.19	-.12	-.01	.18	-.02
Achievement	-.14	-.08	-.07	-.13	-.04	-.16	.05	-.02	-.04	-.07
Benevolence	-.02	-.01	-.12	.13	-.06	-.03	-.03	.01	-.22 <sup>†</sup>	-.01
Universalism	.29*	.21 <sup>†</sup>	.09	-.07	.18	.09	.27*	-.01	-.09	.18
Hedonism	-.10	.02	.09	-.01	.28*	.30*	-.27*	.26*	-.04	-.07
Stimulation	.07	-.01	.19 <sup>†</sup>	.05	-.08	.13	-.31**	.19 <sup>†</sup>	-.12	-.09
Social desirability <sup>a</sup>										
Impression management	.12	.09	.06	.24*	.48***	.29*	.25*	.09	.07	.14
Self-deception	-.02	-.12	-.05	.01	.11	-.05	-.04	.12	.12	-.33*

<sup>a</sup>Zero-order correlations. <sup>b</sup>Partial correlations, controlling for mean importance of values. <sup>c</sup>Tradition does not include the item "devoût = religieux."

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .001$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ . <sup>†</sup> $p < .10$  (two tailed).

sure, and diffusion, and negatively to power, achievement, and moratorium. Moreover, identification of Muslim immigrants as Belgian and European tended to reflect low conformity and high hedonism; the latter identification also reflected high moratorium. Finally, high identification of Muslim students with all the “open” identities (world, Europe, Belgium) was clearly determined by impression management.

Immigrant students from other, non-Mediterranean, countries who identified themselves as world citizens tended to be high in all religious measures, low in diffusion, and high in universalism, but also high in foreclosure and low in the hedonistic values (see Table 5). This cosmopolitan identity was also related to impression management, but the European and Belgian identities were not affected by social desirability. Somewhat similar to Muslim immigrants, the other immigrants who attributed low importance to tradition and conformity and high importance to hedonism and stimulation tended to strongly identify themselves as Europeans. The identification as Belgian was not related to any measure, except a marginally negative association with benevolence. Similar to Muslims, religiosity and foreclosure predicted high identification with the country of origin; in addition, this identity was associated with low self-deception.

As intercorrelations between some variables may be suspected to be strong, and as social desirability (mainly impression management) was sometimes related to collective identities, we carried out regression analyses separately for each cultural group and for each collective identity (citizen of the world, European, Belgian, and other). Each regression analysis included as predictors the variables found among the three groups to be associated with the specific collective identity in correlational analyses. When more than one religious dimension was significantly related to a specific collective identity in zero-order correlations, to avoid multicollinearity effects, we selected the religious measure that had the strongest association as predictor for the regression analyses.

As detailed in Table 6, religion predicted identification as citizen of the world in native Belgians and Muslim immigrants. In addition, it predicted identification with the culture of origin in Muslim immigrants, whereas spirituality predicted low Belgian identity among native Belgians. The cosmopolitan identity was predicted by high importance attributed to universalism in native Belgians and other immigrants; this value also predicted European identity in native Belgians. Low traditionalism in values predicted European identity in native Belgians and other immigrants; whereas low power, achievement, moratorium, and high mean importance attributed to values were related to identification with the origin country in Muslim immigrants. In the latter participants, all identities indicating openness (citizen of the world, European, Belgian) were influenced by social desirability (impression management), and the identification with Belgium and Europe seemed to be hedonistically motivated. Stimulation predicted identification with Europe in other immigrants and identification with Belgium in native Belgians. Identification of Muslim immigrants with the new country (Belgium) was predicted both by low conformity and high tradition (a finding possibly due to

**TABLE 6**

Regression Analyses of Predictor Variables on Collective Identities

<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Native Belgians</i>		<i>Muslim Immigrants</i>		<i>Other Immigrants</i>	
	<i>b</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>t</i>
<b>World citizen</b>						
Religion	.35	2.92**	.33	2.34*	.06	0.48 <sup>†</sup>
Moratorium	.17	1.55	-.04	-0.28	-.03	-0.23
Foreclosure	-.08	-0.72	.07	0.55	.18	1.57
Diffusion	-.07	-0.64	-.17	-1.32	-.19	-1.67 <sup>†</sup>
Self-Direction	-.17	-1.32	.01	0.05	.21	1.65 <sup>†</sup>
Universalism	.41	2.73**	-.18	-1.14	.33	2.40*
Hedonism	-.09	-0.62	.08	0.52	-.12	-0.97
Stimulation	.14	1.00	.09	0.63	-.18	-1.42
Mean values	-.08	-0.42	.23	1.03	-.16	-0.88
Impression management	-.11	-0.86	.31	2.25*	.19	1.62
	$R^2 = .32$		$R^2 = .28$		$R^2 = .34$	
<b>European</b>						
Moratorium	.15	1.35	.01	0.92	-.09	-0.75
Tradition	-.42	-2.84**	.13	0.93	-.38	-2.72**
Conformity	.08	0.61	-.22	-1.53	-.15	-0.88
Universalism	.34	2.31*	.13	0.95	.09	0.65
Hedonism	.01	0.07	.41	3.30**	.01	0.78
Stimulation	-.10	-0.71	-.06	-0.44	.24	1.81 <sup>†</sup>
Mean values	.04	0.19	-.19	-0.80	.15	0.61
Impression management	.09	0.68	.52	4.69***	.11	0.90
	$R^2 = .19$		$R^2 = .46$		$R^2 = .22$	
<b>Belgian</b>						
Spirituality	-.27	-2.44*	-.14	-1.25		
Tradition	-.18	-1.25	.45	2.55*		
Conformity	.20	1.47	-.34	-2.38*		
Benevolence	-.07	-0.58	-.05	-0.36		
Hedonism	.08	0.53	.36	2.74**		
Stimulation	.32	2.30*	.13	0.88		
Mean Values	-.14	-0.61	-.24	-0.84		
Impression management	.09	0.73	.35	2.95**		
	$R^2 = .24$		$R^2 = .34$			

TABLE 6 (continued)

Predictors	Native Belgians		Muslim Immigrants		Other Immigrants	
	<i>b</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>t</i>
Other country						
Religion			.28	1.67 <sup>†</sup>	.17	0.92
Moratorium			-.36	-2.22*	-.11	-0.61
Foreclosure			.14	0.86	.31	1.69 <sup>†</sup>
Diffusion			.07	0.41	-.01	-0.58
Tradition			-.10	-0.39	-.03	-0.15
Power			-.48	-2.51*	-.16	-0.87
Achievement (value)			-.36	-1.76 <sup>†</sup>	-.06	-0.29
Mean values			.95	3.07**	.05	0.22
Self-deception			.02	1.27	-.40	-2.27*
			$R^2 = .58$		$R^2 = .28$	

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . <sup>†</sup> $p < .10$  (two tailed).

multicollinearity effects: the two values were importantly intercorrelated,  $r = .55$ ). Among the other immigrants, those who were high in foreclosure status, low in self-deception, or both were also strongly attached to their country of origin, whereas low scores in diffusion identity and high scores in self-deception predicted high cosmopolitan identity.

### Religion, Identity Status, and Values as Predicting September 11 Attacks-Related Opinions

As detailed in Table 7, both native Belgians and Muslim immigrants who found that "a Muslim cannot be delighted about such attacks because Islam condemns this type of attack" tended to be people high in universalism and low in security. In addition, native Belgians who agreed with this question also tended to be high in tradition, low in achievement, and low in stimulation. Finally, all religious measures predicted high accordance with this question among native Belgians; and this was the case in the other immigrants group with spirituality.

Agreement with the second question, "the authors of these attacks cannot consider themselves as Muslims because Islam is a religion of peace and moderation" (a question that correlated with the first one;  $r = .33$ ), was associated with high spirituality and high self-direction in both groups of immigrants, high religiosity and low security in Muslims, low power in other immigrants, and high benevolence and low impression management in native Belgians.

An interesting difference appeared between native Belgians and Muslims regarding the agreement with the question relative to the responsibility of the United States. The more native Belgians were universalistic in their values and the less

TABLE 7

Coefficients of Correlations of Religion, Identity Statuses, Values, and Social Desirability with Opinions Related to the September 11 Attacks

Variables	Native Belgians			Muslim Immigrants			Other Immigrants			Deterioration	
	Islam Anti-Terror	Not Real Muslims	USA's Fault	Islam Anti-terror	Not Real Muslims	USA's Fault	Islam Anti-terror	Not Real Muslims	USA's Fault		
Religion <sup>a</sup>											
Religiosity	.24*	.09	-.03	.21 <sup>†</sup>	.00	.29*	.08	.08	.05	-.01	.02
Emotional religion	.19 <sup>†</sup>	.08	.01	.13	.02	.09	.11	.13	.18	.02	-.06
Spirituality	.26*	.09	.02	.11	.17	.20 <sup>†</sup>	-.28*	.21 <sup>†</sup>	.20 <sup>†</sup>	.01	-.08
Identity <sup>a</sup>											
Achievement	-.10	-.11	-.04	.42***	-.17	.02	.08	.10	.12	-.03	-.06
Moratorium	.12	.10	.13	.08	-.03	-.14	.19	-.03	-.13	.04	.08
Foreclosure	-.07	-.10	-.17	.23*	-.10	-.16	.24*	-.09	.04	-.07	-.09
Diffusion	-.14	.06	.01	.07	-.10	-.02	-.16	-.09	-.03	.07	.07



they valued security, the more they agreed that the policies of the United States in the Middle East had exasperated Islamic extremists. The opposite was the case with Muslims, who in addition turned out to be low achievers in identity. Also of interest was that agreement with the United States' responsibility was predicted by high importance attributed to tradition and benevolence and low importance attributed to self-direction and achievement in native Belgians, and low importance attributed to power in the other immigrants. Finally, in the two immigrant groups but not in native Belgians (Fisher's  $z_s = 2.34, 2.36, p < .01$ ), strong agreement with this question was negatively related to social desirability and positively related to tradition in the other immigrants group.

Finally, both common and different reasons seemed to motivate native Belgians and Muslim immigrants in affirming that they felt deterioration in the attitudes toward Muslims in Belgium since the attacks in the United States. High perception of negative attitudes toward Muslims was related to foreclosure in both groups, to conformity in native Belgians, and to low self-direction in Muslims. However, in the former participants, religiosity and achievement identity status also predicted high rates of answer to this question, whereas in Muslims it was low spirituality and valuing of security that had this effect.

We conducted multiple regression analyses on each question of all the variables found among the three groups to relate significantly with the question in correlational analyses. To avoid effects of multicollinearity, only one religious variable was again included as predictor. As detailed in Table 8, a positive attitude to Islam and distinction between Islam and terrorism (one or the other of the two first questions) was predicted by spirituality (native Belgians, other immigrants) or religiosity (Muslim immigrants); universalism and low impression management (native Belgians); importance attributed to self-direction (the two immigrant groups); and low importance of security (Muslim immigrants). The attribution of a responsibility to the policy of the United States for the September 11 attacks seemed to be typical of native Belgians valuing tradition and not valuing security, of Muslim immigrants not valuing universalism and low in achieved identity, and of other immigrants high in tradition and low in power and social desirability. Finally, native Belgians with achieved identity, valuing conformity, or both tended to report deterioration of anti-Muslim attitudes in society; but in Muslim immigrants, this was only the case with those low in spirituality.

## DISCUSSION

### Cross-Cultural Differences

Both similarities and differences were observed in religion, values, and individual and collective identities between three groups of young students (i.e., native Bel-

**TABLE 8**

Regression Analyses of Predictor Variables on Opinions Related to the September 11 Attacks

<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Native Belgians</i>		<i>Muslim Immigrants</i>		<i>Other Immigrants</i>	
	<i>b</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>t</i>
<i>Islam anti-terror</i>						
Spirituality	.18	1.69 <sup>†</sup>	.07	0.48	.28	2.24*
Tradition	.16	1.11	.00	0.01	-.06	-0.40
Security	-.19	-1.10	-.08	-0.47	.25	1.54
Achievement (Value)	-.07	-0.40	.01	0.08	.09	0.58
Universalism	.35	2.24*	.30	1.60	-.01	-0.05
Stimulation	-.15	-1.11	-.07	-0.41	.12	0.88
Mean values	.12	0.36	-.03	-0.08	-.26	-0.89
	$R^2 = .27$		$R^2 = .11$		$R^2 = .10$	
<i>Not real Muslims</i>						
Religiosity	.16	1.21	.35	3.06**	.12	0.99
Security	.04	0.20	-.29	-2.13*	-.03	-0.22
Self-Direction	-.06	-0.40	.40	2.49*	.27	1.92 <sup>†</sup>
Power	-.19	-1.01	.10	0.63	-.23	-1.49
Benevolence	.11	0.73	.09	0.64	-.02	-0.10
Mean values	.07	0.23	-.18	-0.77	.18	0.74
Impression management	-.24	-1.80 <sup>†</sup>	.14	1.19	-.03	-0.28
	$R^2 = .10$		$R^2 = .30$		$R^2 = .15$	
<i>USA's fault</i>						
Achievement (Identity)	-.09	-0.83	-.28	-1.78 <sup>†</sup>	.12	1.08
Tradition	.46	3.04**	.03	0.13	.40	2.91**
Security	-.30	-1.82 <sup>†</sup>	.21	1.16	-.07	-0.44
Self-direction	-.19	-1.43	.04	0.22	-.09	-0.58
Power	-.06	-0.34	-.03	-0.16	-.36	-2.00*
Achievement (Value)	.04	0.22	-.06	-0.34	.02	0.12
Benevolence	.16	1.05	.02	0.14	-.01	-0.54
Universalism	.27	1.41	-.35	-1.71 <sup>†</sup>	.01	0.03
Mean values	-.30	-0.62	.06	0.12	.07	0.16
Impression management	.11	0.92	-.11	-0.76	-.26	-2.29
Self-deception	-.19	-1.61	.08	0.53	-.31	-3.08**
	$R^2 = .38$		$R^2 = .26$		$R^2 = .36$	

(Continued)

TABLE 8 (continued)

<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Native Belgians</i>		<i>Muslim Immigrants</i>		<i>Other Immigrants</i>	
	<i>b</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>t</i>
Deterioration						
Spirituality	.13	1.21	-.24	-1.84 <sup>†</sup>	-.10	-0.87
Achievement (Identity)	.38	3.34***	.08	0.62	.05	0.35
Foreclosure	-.00	-0.02	.08	0.63	-.12	-0.89
Conformity	.28	1.98*	-.18	-0.99	-.09	-0.52
Security	-.12	-0.73	.17	1.12	-.15	-0.87
Self-Direction	-.03	-0.24	-.21	-1.16	-.23	-1.55
Mean values	.06	0.26	.18	0.70	.28	1.18
	$R^2 = .27$		$R^2 = .18$		$R^2 = .06$	

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ . <sup>†</sup> $p < .10$  (two tailed).

gians and people living in Belgium whose parents came from either Mediterranean Muslim countries or from other countries; Europe, Africa, Asia, South America).

Muslim immigrants were distinct from the other two groups in many perspectives. First, their religiosity was the highest, a finding indicating the high importance of Islam in their life; the other immigrants were still more religious than native Belgians, a finding that can be interpreted as either resulting from the high secularization of the latter or the importance religion can have in the lives of immigrants. Second, Muslim immigrants were higher than native Belgians in two “dysfunctional” identity statuses (i.e., foreclosure and diffusion), but there was no difference between the three groups in the two explorative statuses (i.e., achievement and moratorium). It is not clear, however, whether the higher scores of Muslims in foreclosure and diffusion can be interpreted as reflecting a real problem in the construction of self or only a chronological delay in their identity formation process, as the debate is still open on whether the four Marcia (1980) statuses may be understood as describing a developmental process (e.g., Meeus, Iedema, Helsen, & Vollebergh, 1999; van Hoof, 1999).

Third, in all groups identification with the country of origin (Belgium for native Belgians, and the origin country for the two immigrant groups) was the most important one. The identification with the adoption country (Belgium) was very weak in the two immigrant groups, even weaker than the European identity. Although this is not an encouraging finding for the “integration” process, it does not necessarily imply a dualism in identity between the countries of origin and adoption: the Belgian and the other country identities were not negatively intercorrelated with each other in the two immigrant groups ( $r_s = -.04$  and  $.09$ ). As previous research indicates (for a review, see Manço, 1999; Sabatier & Berry, 1994), immigrants’ integration into the adoption country culture does not neces-

sarily lead to the abandonment of the original culture: Both a mixed-culture model and a predominance of a one-culture model constitute possible pathways.<sup>3</sup> It is interesting to note that Muslim immigrants identified themselves as Belgians more than the other immigrants, a finding possibly indicating their clearer integration in Belgium (see also Manço, 1998) and their belonging to a clearly identified community that constitutes a recognized part of Belgian society. On the contrary, the other immigrants may be very diversified in their origins, may belong to small national–ethnic communities or ones not existing in Belgium and thus be less attached to the adoption country. It is interesting to note that they seemed to feel more cosmopolitan and less European than native Belgians did, the latter being the only group giving priority to European identity over the cosmopolitan one.

Four, not surprisingly, the Muslim immigrants believed more than the other immigrants that the United States' policies were somewhat responsible for the September 11 attacks, and they reported being a target of negative attitudes in Belgian society since the September 11 attacks more than the other immigrants. Five, again not surprisingly, young students from Muslim Mediterranean countries tended to attribute higher importance to the value of tradition than their native Belgian peers, whereas the native Belgians valued stimulation more than Muslim immigrants; a value that is defined by excitement, novelty, and challenge in life. However, no other differences were observed between the three groups on the mean importance of values; in addition, the value hierarchies were similar. Two possible interpretations can be advanced. This similarity may be due either to the universal, cross-cultural tendency for consensus on the 10 values and their hierarchy (see Schwartz & Bardi, 2001; Schwartz & Sagie, 2000) or the fact that beyond some differences, the young immigrant students (Muslims and others), receiving the same education as their native Belgian peers, share the same values and the same value hierarchies and priorities. Finally, the three groups did not differ in social desirability; however, as presented in the following, they differed in the way social desirability was related to some constructs.

### Religion, Identity Status, and Values

*Religion and identity status.* Zero-order correlations indicated that, in conformity with previous studies (see introduction), in all the three groups religiosity implies commitment in identity either including exploration (achievement) or without exploration (foreclosure); consequently, some negative associations between religion and diffusion were observed. In addition, only in native Belgians, a third possibility was that religiousness may also be followed by high moratorium status. It is possible that, contrary to previous studies in the United

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<sup>3</sup>Accordingly, we did not create specific subgroups among our immigrant participants because crossing out the two identities, Belgian and "other," would lead to subgroups of very small size.

States and Canada (Fulton, 1997; Hunsberger et al., 2001; Markstrom-Adams et al., 1994; McKinney & McKinney, 1999) where moratorium reflected low intrinsic religion and religious commitment—practice or high religious doubts, in Belgium—one of Europe's highly secularized countries (Halman, 2001) where religion is marked by the individuation process and by a shift from traditional forms of religiosity to a rather autonomous expression of religious—spiritual interests (Voyé & Dobbelaere, 2001)—moratorium is either unrelated (in Muslims and other immigrants) or reflects high religiousness (in native Belgians). The latter case may be typical of a quest orientation (see Fulton, 1997; Klaassen & McDonald, 2002).

Both religion and identity status, however, were related to social desirability, especially impression management. With regard to religion, this is not surprising (see Trimble, 1997); but with regard to identity status, this is contrary to Bennion and Adams's (1986) study. Multiple regression analyses, controlling for the impact of social desirability and for the possible overlap between identity statuses, clearly revealed that, in native Belgians, religion reflected high moratorium and low diffusion but not achievement or foreclosure; whereas in the two immigrant groups, the links between identity statuses and religion were weak. In Muslim immigrants (whose religiosity turned out to be unrelated to impression management, possibly because they were the only group of non-Catholics studying in a Catholic school), only religiosity and achievement were interrelated; and in the other immigrants group, only spirituality and low diffusion were interrelated. It seems that young native Belgians who are religious tend to be explorative in their identity, whereas in young Muslims born of immigration, religion contributes to construction and commitment in identity.

Nevertheless, the achieved or foreclosed character of identity as function of religion in all groups should not be totally excluded from our understanding of results on the basis of the regression analyses. First, the debate remains open whether social desirability is a bias or a personality trait overlapping with constructs such as religion, identity, and values (e.g., see Schwartz et al., 1997; Watson, Morris, Foster, & Hood, 1986). Second, when the same regression analyses were carried out in the total sample, religion was clearly related to foreclosure, but also to achievement. It may be that these effects were lost in the group level analyses because of the important decrease in size of the subsamples.

*Religion and values.* Similar to established evidence (for a meta-analysis, see Saroglou et al., in press), common in the three groups, young students who were religious tended to place low importance on the hedonistic values (hedonism and stimulation) and self-direction; they placed great importance on conformity. The associations of religion with the other values were also in line with previous empirical literature, although less stable across the three groups. In the two immigrant groups, religion was positively associated to tradition, but this was not the case for native Belgians, although this between-group difference was not significant. Security was positively related to religion in the other immigrants group, whereas

this value was unrelated to religion in native Belgians, among whom spiritual people even tended to attribute low importance to security (similarly to what happened with religiousness in Eastern European countries at the end of the Communist period; Roccas & Schwartz, 1997). In addition, taking into account the moratorium dimension in native Belgians' religiosity, it seems that several findings here point out the individualized, exploratory character of religion in a secularized society. Moreover, religion in native Belgians and Muslim immigrants reflected low importance attributed to the values of achievement (religiosity) and power (emotional religion and spirituality), these two values encompassing problematic goals for religious maturity such as influence, ambition, and dominance over people and resources. The lack of these two associations among the other immigrants may be due to the fact that the variety of their origin could include a variety of ways of being religious in different cultures and, consequently, a variety of religious attitudes toward power, dominance, and success. Finally, in the two immigrant groups, spirituality (and emotional religion in the other immigrants), but not classic religiosity, reflected universalistic values; indeed, as found in previous studies overall, universalism is unrelated or even negatively related to (classic) religiosity, but the discomfort of religiosity with universalism seems to decrease as a function of socioeconomic development (Saroglou et al., in press). The contrast between spirituality and religion with regard to several values (tradition, security, self-direction, and universalism) provides additional evidence in previous literature indicating that spirituality reflects openness on experience (for a meta-analysis, see Saroglou, 2002b) and anti-traditional ways of being (Zinnbauer, Pargament, & Scott, 1999), ways that may lead to overcoming in-group and out-group barriers. However, it remains unclear why a positive association between spirituality and universalism was not found among the native Belgians as well as why religious people of the three groups did not necessarily tend to value benevolence, as should be the case according to previous evidence.

### Predicting Collective Identities

By-group regression analyses of all the significant predictors (in zero-order correlations) on the collective identities revealed that religiosity in native Belgians and Muslim immigrants predicts high world citizen identity. However, in Muslim immigrants, it also predicts identification with the origin country, whereas in native Belgians spirituality even turned out to predict weak national identity. In the other immigrants group, religiosity was correlated with both cosmopolitan and origin country identities, but these associations were lost in multiple regressions. Apparently, nationalism among Belgians seems to be incompatible with high modern spirituality. In Muslim immigrants, on the contrary, different aspects of the same religion may be responsible for both universalism and attachment to the origins. However, the universalistic identity as a function of religion may not be that "open," because we found in this study that classic religiosity was not positively

associated with the value of universalism and because, in many previous studies, religiosity was even found to be negatively associated with universalism, especially in uni-religious Mediterranean countries (Saroglou et al., in press). It is not to be excluded that believers from different cultural and religious groups each have their own in-group understanding of the citizen of the world identity: the Church as the universe for Christians, the Umma as the universal community of believers for Muslims. Finally, neither religion nor spirituality seem to have any significance for European identity, a finding that has some importance on the debate on the Christian or spiritual heritage or identity of the European Union (see the recent questions raised by the candidacy of Turkey and the inscription of Christian heritage into the European Constitution).

The same by-group regression analyses also revealed the importance of universalism as a value leading to transnational identities. This value predicted citizen of the world identity in native Belgians and other immigrants, and European identity in native Belgians. The predictability of identity status in collective identities (as found in zero-order correlations) disappeared in regression analyses in some cases but remained significant in other cases: A high diffusion identity status, together with a low importance attributed to self-direction, seemed to be a handicap for universalistic identity in the other immigrants group; and similarly, a low moratorium and a high foreclosure identity status were characteristic of Muslim and other immigrants, respectively, identifying themselves strongly with the country of origin. Low importance placed on conservation values was responsible for openness to European identity among native Belgians and other immigrants, and for openness to Belgium among Muslim immigrants. It is interesting to note that stimulation predicted not only openness to Europe among other immigrants, but also strong Belgian identity among native Belgians; a finding possibly suggesting that the non-seclusion into one of the two dominant linguistic communities in Belgium (Dutch and French speaking) and identification with a broad national (almost "federal") community are a sign of openness to challenge and excitement. Perhaps unfortunately for the acculturation process, new (Belgian) and transnational (world, Europe) identities in Muslim immigrants seemed to be motivated mainly by impression management, hedonism (a value defined by enjoying life, pleasure, and sensuous gratification of self), or both. It is interesting to note that the attachment of these immigrants to their origin country was a sign of low willingness to achieve and seek power in life, and corresponds to a general exaggeration of the importance of values in life. Finally, weak attachment of other immigrants to their origin country showed that they may "lie" to themselves, as may be assumed on the basis of the self-deception as predictor.

### Predicting September 11-Related Opinions

All groups agreed that the terror expressed in the September 11 attacks is not in keeping with Islam as a religion (Questions 1 and 2 in our questionnaire). How-

ever, Muslim immigrants, in comparison to the other immigrants, tended to believe more strongly (a) that the United States's policies in the Middle East were responsible for these attacks; and (b) that since then, the attitudes of Belgian society toward Muslims have become more negative.

By-group regression analyses of all the significant predictors (in zero-order correlations) on the opinions related to the September 11 attacks revealed that the distinction between terror and Islam as religion (Question 1 or 2 in our questionnaire) reflected high spirituality or religiosity among all three groups. In addition, this distinction may indicate autonomy and interiorization in values because it was present among native Belgians who valued universalism and were low in impression management, and among immigrants (Muslim and others) who valued self-direction. Finally, the negative association, among Muslim immigrants, between security and the distinction between terror and Islam as religion may indicate a (in-group?) securitarian motivation of young adults from this group not prone to condemn these attacks as contradicting religious ideals of peace and moderation.

Second, native Belgians' agreement with the "moral" responsibility of the United States for the September 11 attacks reflected both a kind of conventionalism (tradition) and neglect of self-interests (low security; and, in zero-order correlations, high universalism). Somewhat similarly, the other immigrants who agreed with this opinion tended to neglect social desirability and power but value tradition. Conversely, to some extent, Muslim immigrants who tended to attribute responsibility to the United States did not tend to have an achieved identity and gave low importance to universalism (and high importance to security in zero-order correlation). Apparently, different, if not opposite, reasons seem to determine the anti-American attitudes, reasons that may originate in differences in the perceived status of the in- and out-groups: risky openness to an out-group for some, fragile identity and need for protecting the in-group for others.

Third, perception of increased Islamophobia in Belgian society after the September 11 attacks seemed to be typical of an achieved identity but also of conformity among native Belgians, and of low spirituality among Muslim immigrants (and, among the latter, of high foreclosure, low self-direction, and high security in zero-order correlations). These results accentuate the differential pattern between these two groups described earlier based on the perceived status of the in- and out-groups. No predictor of this opinion was found among the other immigrants, whose agreement with this opinion was, in any case, the lowest.

## LIMITATIONS AND PERSPECTIVES

As mentioned in the introduction, this study was exploratory. Some limitations should thus be taken into account in a replication study. Although we tried to control for socioeconomic status by limiting our sample to participants from different cultural groups all studying at the same school, this possible moderator should be

studied more systematically. Although introducing gender as a moderator did not have a major impact on our results, separate for men and women analyses with broader samples may be more appropriate. It is also unclear whether the between-group differences are due to religious, cultural, or immigrant versus native status differences, although our distinction between Muslim and other immigrants can be considered a step in this direction. The results are also limited to the specific age of our participants and cannot necessarily be generalized to other ages.

Overall, clear evidence was documented opening further questions. Beyond some homogeneity between natives, Muslim and other immigrants (see value hierarchies and importance, hierarchy in collective identities, and associations of religion with commitment in identity and with low importance of values reflecting hedonism–openness to change) differences observed in many domains (values, religion, individual and collective identities) are interesting because they can be informative for the acculturation–integration process. Muslim immigrants, for instance, seem to be in a complex and ambivalent position: On one hand, they share the same value hierarchy and priorities as native Belgians, and they feel somewhat Belgian; on the other hand, they are higher in problematic identity statuses, they report increases in Islamophobia, and their transnational identities seem to be motivated mainly by constructs reflecting self-interest.

Finer distinctions, however, should be considered in a future study; for instance, between immigrants with double-high identities (origin and new) and immigrants with a unique identity (old or new). Second, with regard to the similarities and differences in the ways religion is related to individual and collective identities and values across the three groups, the causality remains unclear: Are these differences consequences of other, third reasons (e.g., socioeconomic, historical, cultural), or could it (also) be that changes in religion (due possibly to these third reasons) can have an autonomous impact on changes in identities and values? Third, similar versus different collective identities, as well as opinions related to events with global consequences such as the September 11, 2001 attacks, were found to reflect similarities versus differences in religion, values, identity status, and social desirability; and this beyond the overlap between these factors. Nevertheless, the modest effect sizes of the associations suggest the need to introduce additional psychological and other realities to fully understand the mechanisms that lead to identities transcending the national, historical, cultural, and religious frontiers between people.

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