Disclaimer: This page refers to former member of the group. Validity or accuracy of the following information is thus not guaranteed in any way.
I started a PhD under the direction of Jean-Jacques Quisquater in September 2006. I am member of the UCL Crypto Group. I graduated as an engineer in Applied Mathematics in 2006. I am working on the project Cosmos which is about secured wireless sensor networks, and on cryptanalysis of block ciphers, more especially on the linear cryptanalysis.
| Address: | Microelectronics Laboratory, Place du Levant, 3 |
| Office: | a.104 |
| Voice: | +32 (0) 10 47 80 62 |
| Fax: | +32 10 47 25 98 |
| E-Mail: |
|
Seminars given
February 05, 2009 - A Statistical Saturation Attack against the Block Cipher PRESENT
by Dr. Baudoin Collard
| Abstract: | In this talk, we present a statistical saturation attack that combines previously introduced cryptanalysis techniques against block ciphers. As the name suggests, the attack is statistical and can be seen as a particular example of partitioning cryptanalysis. It can also be seen as a dual to saturation attacks in the sense that it exploits the diffusion properties in block ciphers and a combination of active and passive multisets of bits in the plaintexts. The attack is chosen-plaintext in its basic version but can be easily extended to a known-plaintext scenario. As an illustration, it is applied to the block cipher PRESENT proposed by Bogdanov et al. at CHES 2007. We provide theoretical arguments to predict the attack efficiency and show that it improves previous (linear, differential) cryptanalysis results. We also provide experimental evidence that we can break up to 15 rounds of PRESENT with 2^{35.6} plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Eventually, we discuss the attack specificities and possible countermeasures. BIO: Baudoin Collard started a PhD under the direction of Jean-Jacques Quisquater in September 2006 after he graduated as an engineer in Applied Mathematics. He is now a member of the UCL Crypto Group. He is working on the Walloon project Cosmos, which is about secured wireless sensor networks, and the cryptanalysis of block ciphers. His previous work relates to the linear cryptanalysis of the block cipher Serpent, and on improving the time complexity of the linear cryptanalysis.
|
Publications
Stéphanie Kerckhof, Baudoin Collard, and François-Xavier Standaert. FPGA Implementation of a Statistical Saturation Attack against PRESENT, In Nitaj, Abderrahmane and Pointcheval, David, editor(s), Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2011, Volume 6737 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 100-116, Springer, July 2011 PDF BibTeX
Baudoin Collard, and François-Xavier Standaert. Multi-Trail Statistical Saturation Attacks, ACNS 2010, Volume 6487 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 123-138, Springer, June 2010 PDF BibTeX
Baudoin Collard, and François-Xavier Standaert. A Statistical Saturation Attack on the Block Cipher PRESENT, CT-RSA 2009, Volume 5473 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 195-210, Springer, April 2009 PDF BibTeX
Jean-Jacques Quisquater, Baudoin Collard, and François-Xavier Standaert. Experiments on the Multiple Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round Serpent, Fast Software Encryption 2008, Volume 5086 of Lecture Notes on Computer Science, pages 382-397, Springer, February 2008 PDF BibTeX
Baudoin Collard, François-Xavier Standaert, and Jean-Jacques Quisquater. Improving the Time Complexity of Matsui's Linear Cryptanalysis, In K.-H. Nam and G. Rhee, editor(s), The International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2007, Volume 4817 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 77-88, Springer, November 2007 PDF BibTeX
François-Xavier Standaert, Jean-Jacques Quisquater, and Baudoin Collard. Improved and Multiple Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round Serpent, Inscrypt 2007, Volume 4990 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 51-65, Springer, September 2007 PDF BibTeX
Copyright Notice
(
click here to expand/retract)
Some material that is available from this page is copyrighted.
IACR Copyright Notice: Permission is granted for a user to display all
material at this site, to copy the material onto a single computer, and to make
print copies of the material for personal use only. All other rights are
retained by the International Association for Cryptologic Research. In
particular, any other copying, other redistribution, or any commercial use of
the material requires the permission of the publisher, which may be requested
by contacting the International Association for Cryptologic Research.
IEEE Copyright Notice: This material is presented to ensure timely
dissemination of scholarly and technical work. Copyright and all rights therein
are retained by authors or by other copyright holders. All persons copying this
information are expected to adhere to the terms and constraints invoked by each
author's copyright. In most cases, these works may not be reposted without the
explicit permission of the copyright holder.
ACM Copyright Notice: Copyright © 1999 by the Association for
Computing Machinery, Inc. Permission to make digital or hard copies of part of
this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that
copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that
copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page or intial
screen of the document. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others
than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy
otherwise, to republish, to post on servers, or to redistribute to lists,
requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from
Publications Dept., ACM Inc., fax +1 (212) 869-0481, or
permissions@acm.org.
Springer-Verlag LNCS Copyright Notice: The copyright of these
contributions has been transferred to Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg New
York. The copyright transfer covers the exclusive right to reproduce and
distribute the contribution, including reprints, translations, photographic
reproductions, microform, electronic form (offline, online), or any other
reproductions of similar nature. Online available from Springer-Verlag LNCS
series.
