[May 23-26, 2011] 2011 ECORE Summer School on "Market Failure and Market Design"


2011 Summer School

Market Failure and Market Design

Louvain-la-Neuve, May 23-26, 2011

call for papers

 keynotes         group



May 23

08:30 - 09:00

Registration and welcome coffee (Auditoire Doyen 31)
Plenary session I
09:00 - 10:30 Vincent Crawford (University of Oxford)
Lecture 1 - Strategic Thinking .
Chair: Patrick Legros
10:30 - 11:00 Break
11:00 - 12:30 Parag Pathak (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Lecture 1 - Markets with Indivisibilities. (Paper 1 - Paper 2)
Chair: François Maniquet
12:30 - 14:00

Welcome lunch

Parallel session A1: Industrial Organization 1
Chair: Victor Ginsburgh
14:00 - 14h30 Jiangli Dou (Toulouse School of Economics)
A Model of Piracy.
14:30 - 15:00 Claudio Karl (ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles)
The Spillover Effects of Universal Service Obligations.
15:00 - 15:30

Tim-Paul Thomes (Friedrich-Schiller-University of Jena)
An Economic Analysis of online streaming - The Case of the Music Industry.

Parallel session B1: Fair Allocation
Chair: Eve Ramaekers
14:00 - 14h30 Estelle Midler (LAMETA, Montpellier Supagro)
Avoiding Deforestation Efficiently and Fairly: A Mechanism Design Perspective.
14:30 - 15:00 Paolo Piacquadio (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain)
An Egalitarian Approach to Dynamic Resource Allocation.
15:00 - 15:30 Jingyi Xue (Rice University)
Egalitarian Division Under Leontief Preferences.
15:30 - 16:00 Break
Parallel session A2: Industrial Organization 2
Chair: Florian Mayneris
16:00 - 16h30 Renaud Foucart (ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles)
On Goods and Premises.
16:30 - 17:00 André Veiga (Toulouse School of Economics)
Platforms with Heterogeneous Externalities.
17:00 - 17:30

Alistair Wilson (New York University)
Clearinghouses for Two-Sided Matching: An Experimental Study.

Parallel session B2: Cooperative Game Theory & Contracts
Chair: François Maniquet
16:00 - 16h30 Sonja Brangewitz (Bielefeld University & Université Paris 1)
Inner Core, Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution and Competitive Payoffs.
16:30 - 17:00 Jan-Philip Gamp (Bielefeld University)
Competitive Outcomes and the Inner Core of NTU Market Games.
17:00 - 17:30

Christoph Schottmüller (Tilburg University)
Adverse Selection Without Single Crossing.


May 24

Plenary session II
09:00 - 10:30 Douglas Bernheim (Stanford University)
Lecture 1 - Poverty and Self-Control.
Chair: Jean Hindriks
10:30 - 11:00 Break
11:00 - 12:30 Vincent Crawford (University of Oxford)
Lecture 2 - Level-k Auctions. (Paper 1 - Paper 2 )
Chair: Luc Bauwens
12:30 - 14:00

Lunch (not organized by the summer school)

Parallel session A3: Auctions/Entry Deterrence
Chair: Vincent Crawford
14:00 - 14h30 Alessandro De Chiara (ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles)
Holding an Auction for the Wrong Project.
14:30 - 15:00 Hinnerk Gnutzmann (European University Institute)
Pay-Per-Bid Auctions.
15:00 - 15:30

Christoph Wagner (BGSE, University of Bonn)
Versioning and Entry.

Parallel session B3: Behavioral Economics
Chair: Douglas Bernheim
14:00 - 14h30 Dominique Chariot (Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis, Bruxelles)
Generalized and Limited Morality in Coordination Games.
14:30 - 15:00 Claudia Hupkau (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain)
Poverty, Reflected Appraisals and Non-Take-Up.
15:00 - 15:30 Natalia Shestakova (CERGE-EI)
Understanding Consumers' Choice of Pricing Schemes.
15:30 - 16:00 Break
Parallel session A4: Industrial Organization 3
Chair: Axel Gautier
16:00 - 16h30 Hamideh Esfahani (University of Bologna)
Profitability of Horizontal Mergers in the Presence of Price Stickiness.
16:30 - 17:00 Anton Giulio Manganelli (Toulouse School of Economics)
The Slow Rise of Prices Within a Cartel: A Behavioral Explanation.
17:00 - 17:30

Fabrizio Spargoli (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Information Disclosure and Market Discipline of Banks.

Parallel session B4: Networks/Matching
Chair: Mathias Hungerbühler
16:00 - 16h30 Bing Ye (Toulouse School of Economics)
Multi-Homing, Network Effect and Competition.
16:30 - 17:00 Marco Mantovani (Università di Milano and ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles)
Myopic or Farsighted? An Experiment on Network Formation.
17:00 - 17:30

Alexandru Nichifor (Maastricht University)
Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Trading Networks.

19:00 Dinner (at Salle des Tapisseries)


May 25

Plenary session III
09:00 - 10:30 Parag Pathak (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Lecture 2 - Student Assignment Problem. (Paper 1 - Paper 2)
Chair: Estelle Cantillon
10:30 - 11:00 Break
11:00 - 12:30 Douglas Bernheim (Stanford University)
Lecture 2 - Applied Behavioral Welfare Economics: The Goods, the Bad, and the Ugly. (Paper 1 - Paper 2 )
Chair: Erik Schokkaert
12:30 - 14:00

Lunch (not organized by the summer school)

14:00 - 15h30 Vincent Crawford (University of Oxford)
Lecture 3 - Efficient Mechanisms for Level-k Bilateral Trading.
Chair: Georg Kirchsteiger
15:30 - 16:00 Break
Parallel session A5: Matching
Chair: Parag Pathak
16:00 - 16h30 Philippos Louis (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona)
Matching Markets, Herding and the Winner's Curse.
16:30 - 17:00 David Pothier (European University Institute)
Competing Recruitment Mechanisms.
17:00 - 17:30

Alfredo Salgado-Torres (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
Many to One Matching Externalities and Stability.

Parallel session B5: Political Economy
Chair: Marie-Louise Leroux
16:00 - 16h30 Joseph Flavian Gomes (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
The Political Economy of the Maoist Conflict in India: An Empirical Analysis.
16:30 - 17:00 Konstantinos Matakos (Warwick University)
The Politics of Unemployment and Electoral Fractionalization: Empirical Evidence on the "Hostage Voter" Effect from OECD Economies.
17:00 - 17:30

Margherita Negri (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain)
Why Do Good Politicians Take Bad Actions?

 17:30 - 18:00 Orestic Troumpounis (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona)
Participation Quorum in Meetings.


May 26

Plenary session IV
09:00 - 10:30 Parag Pathak (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Lecture 3 - Recent Developments. (Paper 1 - Paper 2)
Chair: Vincent Vannetelbosch
10:30 - 11:00 Break
11:00 - 12:30 Douglas Bernheim (Stanford University)
Lecture 3 - Revealed Preference Without Choice .
Chair: Julio Davila
12:30 - 14:00

Lunch (not organized by the summer school)

Parallel session A6: Industrial Organization 4
Chair: Claude d'Aspremont
14:00 - 14h30 Evangelia Chalioti (Athens University of Economics and Business & Yale University)
Incentive Contracts Under Product Market Competition and R&D Spillovers.
14:30 - 15:00 Regine Oexl (University of Padua)
Trilateral Contract and the Holdup Problem.
15:00 - 15:30

Sonali Sen Gupta (University of Birmingham)
Simple Weak Correlation in Duopoly.

Parallel session B6: Environmental Economics
Chair: Jean Hindriks
14:00 - 14h30 Mehdi Fadaee (University of Bologna)
Environment-Damaging Pollution and Trade Policy.
14:30 - 15:00 Corina Haita (Central European University, Budapest)
An Emission Trading Scheme with Auctioning.
15:00 - 15:30 Vahid Mojtahed (University of Ca' Foscari)
Market Design for Tradable Green Certificates: An Example of Market-Based Governance.
15:30 - 16:00 Break
Parallel session A7: Communication and Signaling
Chair: Chiara Canta
16:00 - 16h30 Pau Balart (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona)
The Increase in College Premium and the Decline of College Wages: A Signaling Story.
16:30 - 17:00 Olivier Body (ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles)
How Do Social Preferences Affect Communication?
17:00 - 17:30

Felix Ketelaar (BGSE, University of Bonn)
Noisy Communication with Homogeneous Preferences.

Parallel session B7: Miscellaneous (Money, Finance, ....)
Chair: Andrès Carvajal
16:00 - 16h30 Nikolaos Kokonas (University of Warwick)
Unemployment Equilibria in a Monetary Economy.
16:30 - 17:00 Vincenzo Platino (Paris School of Economics)
Private Versus Public Consumption Within Groups: Testing the Nature of Goods from Aggregate Data.
17:00 - 17:30

Abhishek Ranjan (Université Paris 1)
Existence of Financial Quasi-Equilibria with Rectricted Participation.

Keynote Speakers:

Douglas BERNHEIM, Stanford University
[Sponsored by BNP Paribas Fortis]

Lecture 1: Poverty and Self-Control
Lecture 2: Applied Behavioral Welfare Economics: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
Lecture 3: Revealed Preference without Choice

, University of Oxford
[Sponsored by Fondation CORE]

Lecture 1: Strategic Thinking
Lecture 2: Level-k Auctions
Lecture 3: Efficient Mechanisms for Level-k Bilateral Trading

Parag PATHAK, Massuchusetts Institute of Technology

[Sponsored by McKinsey Company]

Lecture 1: Markets with Indivisibilities
Lecture 2: Student Assignment Problem
Lecture 3: Recent Developments

and presentations by junior participants.

Organizing Committee:

Jean Hindriks, CORE, Université catholique de Louvain
Georg Kirchsteiger, ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles
François Maniquet, CORE, Université catholique de Louvain

How to submit a paper (CLOSED) - How to register:

We welcome submissions in all fields of economics. A link to market failure and market design is not necessary. Applications are encouraged from any interested researcher, but priority will be given to doctoral students and postdoctoral researchers or the equivalent.

  • To submit a paper (CLOSED):
    Those interested should submit a title for their presentation AND a paper as well as your curriculum vitae by April 10 (CLOSED!!) to . The selection of speakers will be announced by April 26. A preliminary program will be available by mid-may.
  • To register (without presenting a paper):
    Just send an e-mail to or with your complete affiliation. There is no registration fee, but registration is NECESSARY before May 10.

Funding (only for PhD):

Limited funding is available upon motivated request and they will be allocated on a case by case basis (please, send your application to ).

In case that financial support is granted, it will cover accommodation :

  • Accommodation for speakers (PhD only): If a participant is selected to present her/his paper, we will cover up to 5 nights at Hotel Mercure). Speakers are asked to share a room (in this case, Mercure will bill us directly). Speakers who do not want to share the room are free to ask for a single room, but she/he will have to pay the accommodation at check out, and we will cover up to 50€/night.
    (Please do not make the hotel reservation yourself, ask Sylvie Mauroy.)
    Speakers from Universities involved in a funded network with ECARES and/or CORE (e.g., PAI, ....) are asked to ask for funding in their own University.

Scholars who want to participate without presenting a paper should send an email to or . For those participants, we will cover NEITHER the travel expenses NOR the lodging. They are also asked to make their own reservation as soon as they can. Deadline for registration (without presenting a paper) is May 10.


  • Plenary sessions (a.m.):
    Auditoire Doyen 31
    Place des Doyens 1
  • Parallel sessions (p.m.):
    CORE, room b_135 & C-035
    34 voie du Roman Pays

The distance between both places is 3' walking.


  1. Hotel Mercure
    Boulevard de Lauzelle 61
    1348 Louvain-la-Neuve
    Tel: (+32)10/450751
    @: h2200@accor.com
  2. Hotel Leonardo (more difficult public transportation to LLN)
    Rue de la Wastinne 45
    1300 Wavre
    Tel: (+32)10/411363
    @: info.wavre@leonardo-hotels.com
    To benefit of the university rate: just mention that you are coming for an event at Université catholique de Louvain (CORE); the will give you the price of the day -15% + breakfast and a return shuttle (each day) to reach Louvain-la-Neuve (to use the shuttle, you have to order it the day before).
  3. At Home Hotel (more difficult public transportation to LLN)
    Place Bosch 33
    1300 Wavre
    Tel: (+32)10/228383
    @: contact@at-homehotel.be
  4. Hotels in Brussels (30km/45' by train)

How to get to Louvain-la-Neuve?

Contact & Information:


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