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SSH/IMAQ - Institut multidisciplinaire pour la modélisation et l'analyse quantitative (IMMAQ) SSH/IMAQ/CORE - Center for operations research and econometrics (CORE)
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IMAQ - Voie du Roman Pays 34 bte L1.03.01 à 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve |
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Phone : |
010 47 43 03 |
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Secretary : |
010 47 43 21 |
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Fax : |
010 47 43 01 |
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Building : |
CV09; Floor 00; Office B 028; Site Louvain-la-Neuve |
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Ignace Adant holds a PhD in Economics from Ecole Polytechnique (Palaiseau,France) and is a post-doctoral fellow of CORE for 14 months. His methodology interfaces several disciplines in human sciences: it combines in-depth field studies (complete immersion, participatory observation and/or interviews) with econometrics and formal treatments. In his dissertation, this methodology enabled him to explain how opacity is preserved in the markets for ferrous scrap (a recyclable commodity used in electric arc furnaces to produce crude steel) and under what conditions this type of opacity is socially preferable.
To further look into the properties of opacity in markets and into the role of the informal institutions that overcome market failures, Ignace is analyzing the functioning of “markets for technologies†, actively taking part in the research codirected by Paul Belleflamme (CORE and LSM) and Bernard Remiche (DESO, Faculty of Law and Chaire Arcelor). Arm’s length trades in technology disembodied from physical goods (patents, other IP rights but also knowledge that is not patentable) occur between independent firms or between firms and universities. Such transfers of knowledge are gaining a renewed interest because of the shared diagnosis that too many inventions remain unexploited. In Belgium, SMEs reluctantly rely on licensing agreements and tend to invent around existing patents or, when possible, choose markets where no patent prevails. The determinants of firms’ and universities propensity to rely on such markets to sell a patent or to transfer the right to use it (“patent licensingâ€) are poorly understood. Despite recent scientific contributions, the organization of arm’s length transactions on property rights still raises many questions. Given the uncertainties to overcome in technology transfers, what are the characteristics of the formal and/or informal institutions that could be necessary to organize and sustain such transactions? What are the consequences of their development on the trajectories for technological change and for growth? And how would such markets mould regional agglomeration dynamics?
Articulating primary data collection on patent licensing with case studies, law with econometrics and formal treatments, this joint research with the Federal Public Service, Economy, SMEs, Self-Employed and Energy has received the financial support of the Belgian Science Policy Office. Beyond a thorough examination of factors that impede technology transfers through arm’s length market transactions, this research will help to appraise the role to impart to virtual platforms, either as informational intermediaries (‘infomediaries’) or as two-sided markets for technologies. It fits nicely with various themes that have been largely developed at CORE over the years: R&D strategy (by e.g. Paul Belleflamme, Claude d’Aspremont, Vincent Vannetelbosch), two-sided markets (by e.g. Paul Belleflamme, Jean Gabzsewicz, Xavier Wauthy), and economic geography (by e.g. Florian Mayneris, Dominique Peeters, Jacques Thisse).
Source: CORE Newsletter N°2
http://www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/core/documents/_NewsletterNo2.pdf
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