AfCHPR, Request for Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in Relation to Climate Change

Africa in Search of Global Climate Justice?

Climate Change – African Court on Human Rights – State obligations – African Solidarity – Climate-Related Human (Im)Mobility.

On 2 May 2025, the Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU) and several partner organisations submitted a request to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights for an advisory opinion on the obligations of African States with regard to climate change. The request argues that the climate crisis compromises the exercise of the rights to life, health, development and a satisfactory environment, as guaranteed by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The first initiative of its kind in Africa, following advisory opinions issued in the same year by the International Court of Justice and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, this referral marks a decisive step towards the establishment of African climate law based on regional solidarity, the protection of vulnerable populations and the shared responsibility of States. It also opens up a new space for reflection on climate-related human mobility, inviting the Court to clarify the obligations of African States towards individuals and communities forced to move as a result of the effects of climate change.

Gabriel Ajabu Mastaki

A. Opinion

1. Facts

On 2 May 2025, the coalition of NGOs led by the Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU), supported by the African Climate Platform, Natural Justice, Resilient40, and the Environmental Lawyers Collective for Africa, submitted a request to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR) for an advisory opinion on the obligations of African states with regard to climate change. The request is based on Article 4(1)[1] of the Protocol establishing the Court and Article 82 of its Rules of Procedure.[2] The request alleges that the climate crisis acts as a multiplier of threats to human rights in Africa by degrading access to water, increasing droughts, floods, population displacement, food insecurity, coastal erosion, biodiversity loss and resource-related conflicts. It argues that these effects directly impede the exercise of rights guaranteed by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, including the right to life (Art. 4), health (Art. 16), property (Art. 14), development (Art. 22) and the right to a satisfactory environment conducive to development (Art. 24). It points out that Africa, although responsible for a marginal fraction of global greenhouse gas emissions, suffers disproportionately from these consequences and that this historical inequality reinforces the normative dimension of state obligations. The application requests the Court to clarify the duties of African states in terms of mitigation, adaptation, resilience, protection of vulnerable groups (women, children, elderly people, indigenous peoples, environmental defenders), regulation of private actors (multinational companies), and international cooperation (technology transfer, climate finance, compensation for loss and damage), in order to define an African normative basis for climate rights.

On 2 October 2025, the Court officially invited the member states of the African Union to submit their observations within 90 days, thus opening the participatory phase of the proceedings.

2. Reasoning and Legal Scope of the Application

The application takes a human rights-based approach, arguing that the framework of the African Charter (and other regional and international instruments) provides a sufficient legal basis for defining the responsibilities and duties of States in relation to climate change. More specifically, it invites the Court to explicitly consider Articles 2 (equality and non-discrimination), 3 (equality before the law), 4 (right to life), 5 (dignity and prohibition of inhuman treatment), 8–12 (freedom of conscience, association and movement), 14 (right to property), 16 (right to health), 17 (right to education), 18 (protection of the family, women and children), 19–24 (rights of peoples, including equality, development, free disposal of their natural resources and a satisfactory environment) (para 98).

The application asserts the link between climate change and the enjoyment of the rights listed, adding that States must respect the rights of individuals in the measures they adopt to respond to the crisis (para 99). 

The application cites Article 24, which recognises “the right of all peoples to a satisfactory and comprehensive environment conducive to their development,” as the central provision for linking state obligations to climate impacts. It recalls the interpretation given by the African Commission in the case of SERAC and Others v. Nigeria, which identified a threefold obligation to “prevent pollution and environmental degradation, to promote conservation, and to secure an ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources” (paras 52–53). The application thus invites the Court to transpose these obligations into the contemporary climate context, incorporating the duties of prevention, protection, remediation and cooperation (paras 101–103).

It also emphasises, upstream, that States, as holders of obligations to protect environmental assets of common interest, must guarantee the rights to a healthy environment, health, life, water and sanitation for present and future generations (para 100).

On this basis, the application invites the Court to specify positive obligations centred on the obligation to prevent, protect, remedy and cooperate, by reading Article 24 in conjunction with other substantive rights (life, health, development) whose enjoyment is affected by climate impacts (paras 98–103).

Continuing its logic of clarifying positive obligations, the application also devotes a section to the protection of groups described as “particularly vulnerable,” calling for differentiated measures and specific guarantees in their favour, in particular for women and girls, children, older persons, indigenous peoples and environmental defenders. These safeguards relate to participation, access to information, protection against reprisals and recognition of indigenous knowledge (para 171).

With regard to third parties, the request sets out in concrete terms the duty of care incumbent on States with regard to private actors. It emphasises that States must regulate activities that are likely to have a significant impact on the climate by imposing due diligence obligations, in particular through the carrying out of environmental impact assessments (EIAs). Drawing on the framework established by ITLOS in its 2024 advisory opinion, the application specifies that States must adopt binding standards applicable to companies, require rigorous EIAs and regulate their activities on the basis of the results, while ensuring the existence of effective complaint and redress mechanisms (paras 156–165).

Finally, the request asks the Court to clarify the nature of African States’ cooperation obligations, particularly with “historical emitters,” to keep global warming below 1.5 °C and address loss and damage, as summarised in the Issues for determination and the Summary of the Request (paras 92–93).

B. Insight

Examination of the request for an advisory opinion highlights a singular ambition to make the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights a major normative player in global climate litigation. By seeking a broad interpretation of the African Charter, the applicants are inviting the Court to fill the gaps in international climate governance and adapt human rights principles to the structural realities of the African continent.

The expected opinion is part of a broader dynamic, marked by the advisory opinions issued in 2025 by the International Court of Justice and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, both of which focused on the obligations of States with regard to climate change. These decisions paved the way for normative convergence, but they still leave room for further exploration by the African court, particularly with regard to the articulation of climate-related human (im)mobility in the African context. Although the request for an advisory opinion only addresses this issue implicitly, it nevertheless highlights its significance through the protection of vulnerable populations and collective rights.

The following analysis therefore seeks to situate the request for an advisory opinion from the African Court in light of the contributions and limitations of these two previous opinions. The aim is, on the one hand, to show how this referral contributes to the emergence of an African climate law and, on the other hand, to analyse the challenges and opportunities it opens up for the regional human rights system and the legal governance of climate-related mobility on the continent.

1. Gradual Establishment of African Climate Law as a New Protected Legal Right

One of the major original features of the request for an opinion is its ambition to make climate an explicit component of the right to a healthy environment, thus extending the logic of ecological protection already enshrined in the African Charter. This conceptual shift, already implicit in the SERAC v. Nigeria (2001) case law, is fully embraced here. Whereas the African Commission had recognised a threefold obligation on the State, namely “to prevent pollution and ecological degradation, to promote conservation, and to secure an ecologically sustainable development” (para 52), the applicants asked the Court to give these duties a climate dimension, in line with the evolution of global threats (paras 102–103).

From a dogmatic point of view, this approach corresponds to a functional extension of the scope of Article 24 of the Charter, which proclaims that “[a]ll peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their development”. Legal doctrine, following Fatsah Ouguergouz, emphasises the generative nature of this provision, particularly as it establishes a genuine obligation to achieve results in terms of environmental protection. Similarly, Frans Viljoen points out that the African Charter differs from other regional instruments in that it establishes an organic link between individual rights and the rights of peoples, which promotes an integrated and collective approach to human rights in Africa.[3] By interpreting it in the light of the principles of sustainability and intergenerational solidarity, the Court can, without creating a new right, bring about a “right to a stable climate” as a contemporary expression of the right to a satisfactory environment.

The two advisory opinions issued in 2025 confirm this development, albeit to varying degrees. The International Court of Justice, in its opinion of 23 July 2025, enshrines a customary obligation of climate diligence applicable to all States (paras 132–139, 280–300), but without ruling on the existence of a subjective right to climate, which is beyond the nature and jurisdiction of the court, which focuses on inter-state obligations (para 111).

This approach, in line with the ICJ’s adjudicative role, nevertheless produces a normative asymmetry in which States appear to be bound by obligations of prevention and diligence, while the individual or collective holder of the right to a safe climate remains legally indeterminate.

This position is justified by the fact that the Court does indeed note the recognition by United Nations bodies of the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment as essential to the exercise of other human rights (paras 390–392), affirming that it constitutes “a precondition for the enjoyment of many human rights” (para 393), without, unfortunately, recognising the autonomous nature of this right. As for the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in its opinion OC-32/25 of 3 July 2025, it took a decisive step forward by explicitly recognising the right to a safe and stable climate as a component of the right to a healthy environment (para 300). It incorporates several specific positive obligations, including prevention, cooperation and participation (paras 317–325). Above all, the Court adopted a collective, intergenerational and eco-centred approach, affirming that this right protects the interests of present and future generations as well as Nature itself (paras 302–311), while recognising the right of every person to develop in a climate system free from dangerous anthropogenic interference (para 303).

This recognition marks a major turning point, especially since, although the climate has not yet been established as an autonomous legal right, it has become an object of collective and systemic protection, paving the way for a possible convergence with the African concept of peoples’ rights and solidarity.

It is precisely on this point that the African Court could play a founding role, by establishing climate stability as a collective good protected by regional law. Although not explicitly stated, this interpretation follows from the reasoning of the applicants, who invite the Court to clarify the positive obligations of African states in terms of prevention, cooperation and protection of populations affected by climate impacts (paras 98–103, 171). The African system is distinguished by its collective and teleological conception of human rights: Individual rights are in, inseparable from the rights of peoples (arts 19–24). This unique architecture allows for an ecosystemic interpretation according to which climate stability, a condition for life and development, can be considered a constituent element of the right of peoples to freely dispose of their natural resources (art. 21) and the right to development (art. 22).

Thus, unlike the inter-American or universal systems, African law already has an endogenous textual basis for the recognition of a collective right to a stable and viable climate, guaranteeing the continuity of life and the realisation of peoples’ rights.

Moreover, the continent’s structural vulnerability gives this interpretation added legitimacy. The continent, which is responsible for less than 4% of global emissions, is already suffering from massive biodiversity loss, famine and internal displacement. Recognising an African right to climate is to recognise a historical ecological injustice and establish a principle of African climate justice. From a methodological point of view, the African Court could draw on the evolutionary interpretation method it has been applying since Tanganyika Law Society v. Tanzania (2013) to interpret the Charter in light of the conditions of its time and relevant international instruments. This approach would enable it to incorporate the findings of the ICJ and the Inter-American Court while formulating its own approach, in particular: (i) a duality of beneficiaries (individuals and peoples); (ii) a reinforced intergenerational dimension, based on solidarity and shared responsibility between generations; (iii) effective protection for people displaced for climate reasons.

Thus, the emergence of an African climate law would not be the result of jurisprudential voluntarism, but rather a systemic reading of the Charter. It would express the logical continuity between environmental, economic and collective rights, and would enable the African Court to assert itself as a third normative voice in global climate litigation alongside an ICJ that has established customary principles and behavioural obligations of climate diligence, and an Inter-American Court that has clarified the substantive obligations and guarantees for the protection of rights affected by climate change. The African Court, for its part, would thus be called upon to enshrine the collective, solidarity-based and justice-oriented dimension of climate change.

2. Emergence of an African Standard of Diligence and Cooperation in the Fight Against Climate Change

The request for an advisory opinion submitted to the African Court seeks to clarify the nature and content of African states’ climate obligations by articulating two principles, namely diligence and cooperation. It invites the Court to recognise that states not only have an obligation to prevent serious damage to the environment (duty of diligence), but also an obligation to cooperate actively with each other and with the international community to address the effects of climate change (duty of solidarity) (paras 98, 106).

• Consolidating a Strengthened Duty of Environmental Diligence

In line with Article 24 of the African Charter, the application asserts that States must exercise increased due diligence to prevent serious damage to the environment and climate. It links this obligation to Articles 4, 16 and 22, relating to the right to life, health and development, in order to give substantive content to state responsibility (paras 106–110). This dynamic approach brings the Charter closer to the principles of customary international law as set out by the ICJ in its 2025 advisory opinion, which establishes the prevention of significant harm to the global environment as an erga omnes obligation (paras 440–442).

In the same vein, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights recognises a heightened duty of care requiring States to prevent foreseeable damage from climate change, taking into account the specific risk to threatened rights and the degree of vulnerability of the holders of those rights (paras 231–237).

However, unlike these two approaches, the African request places diligence in a context of shared structural vulnerability: African States, which are generally low emitters but heavily affected, are called upon to implement diligence measures adapted to their technical, economic and institutional capacities. This approach is based on regional solidarity and cooperation, not vertical but horizontal, aimed at strengthening the continent’s collective resilience to climate impacts (paras 92–93). Such an interpretation highlights both the originality and the limitations of the potential contribution of the African Court. While the Court cannot impose obligations on emitting States outside its jurisdiction, it can nevertheless specify the duties of cooperation and mutual support between African States, in line with the spirit of the Charter and the shared responsibility of peoples in the face of common vulnerability.

• Duty of Cooperation and African Climate Solidarity

The second dimension of the African standard lies in intra-African cooperation and international solidarity. Indeed, the application calls on the Court to recognise that climate obligations transcend territorial boundaries and extend to technical, financial and scientific cooperation between African States, but also with the States historically responsible for emissions (paras 93(g), 106, 173). This approach is echoed in the ICJ’s case law, which links the duty to cooperate to the United Nations Charter and the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations (paras 140–142). However, the ICJ remains focused on cooperation between sovereign states, without drawing any distributive conclusions. What is interesting is that it concludes that this duty to cooperate to protect the environment is a matter of customary international law (para 142).

The Inter-American Court, like the ICJ, recognises that environmental cooperation constitutes a genuine obligation of conduct under international law. Both require States to act in good faith by sharing scientific knowledge, exchanging information and coordinating regionally in order to prevent transboundary environmental damage. However, the Inter-American Court is unique in that it links this duty to cooperate to climate justice and differentiated responsibilities in the current crisis. In particular, it emphasises that the effective protection of the human rights of people in situations of mobility requires active cooperation between States (para 430), and that it is incumbent upon the international community to implement financial mechanisms in accordance with the principles of equity, solidarity and common but differentiated responsibilities in order to support the most vulnerable countries (para 431).

The African request is in line with this approach and extends it further, conceiving cooperation not as a simple exchange mechanism, but as a duty of continental solidarity, based on the collective responsibility of African States to ensure the resilience of their peoples. This vision is in line with the spirit of Article 29(4) of the Charter, which imposes on each individual the duty to preserve and strengthen African solidarity. In this sense, the request for an advisory opinion promotes a cooperative and solidarity-based approach to climate obligations, where prevention, regulation and reparation are articulated within a logic of co-development rather than strict international responsibility.

Thus, the emergence of an African standard of diligence and cooperation marks an important normative step, especially as the African Court is invited to move from a model of individual diligence to a model of shared diligence, where regional solidarity becomes a means of implementing international obligations. This would be a major African innovation, likely to strengthen the coherence of international climate law by adapting it to the structural realities of the continent.

3. Protection of Vulnerable Groups and Responsibility of Private Actors at the Heart of African Climate Justice

While the protection of vulnerable groups and the regulation of private actors have already been extensively addressed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in its opinion OC-32/25 (paras 317–325, 520–539, 556–558), the ICJ, in its opinion, takes a more general approach. It enshrines the obligations of diligence, prevention and cooperation applicable to all States, while specifying that these include the duty to regulate, supervise and control the activities of private actors under their jurisdiction, when these activities are likely to have adverse effects on the climate or the environment (paras 252–254, 404, 409–410, 448).

However, the ICJ does not go so far as to establish an autonomous regime of corporate responsibility or differentiated protection for vulnerable groups, as its mandate remains focused on inter-state relations and the conduct of States.

The request for an advisory opinion submitted to the African Court therefore proposes to reinterpret these principles in light of the realities and needs specific to the continent. It seeks not so much to reaffirm established principles as to reconfigure them from a collective and solidarity-based perspective, anchoring African climate justice in the effectiveness of economic, social and environmental rights (para 171).

In a context marked by structural inequalities, increased human (im)mobility and economic dependence on extractive industries, the recognition of differentiated obligations towards vulnerable populations and corporate accountability take on legal, ethical and political significance. The central question is therefore no longer whether these issues should be integrated into climate law, but how the African system can articulate them differently, filling the gaps left by universal approaches focused on state regulation of private actors and inter-American approaches focused more on the direct protection of rights holders.

• Differentiated Obligations Towards Vulnerable Groups

The request for an advisory opinion calls on the Court to recognise that African States have an obligation to protect the populations most exposed to the effects of climate change, in particular women, girls, children, indigenous peoples, older persons, persons with disabilities and environmental defenders (para 171). In doing so, it is in line with Resolution 417 (LXIV) of the African Commission, which already urged States to adopt specific protection measures for communities affected by extractive industries.

This approach is based on an intersectional reading of the African Charter: Articles 18 (protection of the family, women and children) and 19 (equality of peoples) require particular attention to be paid to structurally marginalised groups. The request emphasises that these populations, often dependent on subsistence agriculture, fishing or natural resources, bear the brunt of climate degradation and biodiversity loss, which compromises their right to development (Art. 22) and their right to a satisfactory environment (Art. 24).

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in its opinion OC-32/25, also enshrined this differentiated approach, recognising that women and girls, children, older persons, persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and environmental defenders require special measures of adaptation and protection (paras 599, 614, 556–558). It associates this with an obligation of effective participation in decision-making and a right to environmental information as components of the right to a healthy environment (paras 266, 520–522, 536–539). The ICJ also mentions these human rights, but in a much more succinct manner, recalling their role in the implementation of climate obligations and in the effective realisation of the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment (paras 390–393, 395–398).

The African request is part of this dynamic, while also deepening it by conceiving vulnerability not only as an individual or circumstantial condition, but as a structural reality specific to the African climate system. It thus proposes to link differentiated protection obligations to regional solidarity and the collective duty of African states to ensure the resilience of their peoples (paras 92–93, 171).

• Duty To Regulate Private Actors

The other pillar of this section is the issue of the responsibility of economic actors, in particular multinational companies operating in the extractive, energy and agro-industrial sectors. The request recalls that African states have an obligation to prevent climate damage caused by private actors, including foreign companies, and to control their activities through regulatory, monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms (paras 156–165). This duty of care stems from the obligation to protect human rights enshrined in the Charter and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011).

The ICJ, in its 2025 advisory opinion, refers to this indirect responsibility when it emphasises the obligation of States to “implement adequate rules and measures” to ensure that their activities and those within their jurisdiction comply with international environmental law (paras 252–254, 404, 409–410, 448). It specifies in this regard that states must carry out environmental impact assessments (EIAs) appropriate to the nature and scale of the climate risk, and take their results into account in decision-making (paras 295–298). In its opinion, the Inter-American Court goes further by requiring states to subject private projects to thorough EIAs, publish the results and guarantee mechanisms for redress to affected communities (paras 358–362, 520–522, 556–558).

For the African system, this requirement for environmental vigilance cannot be neutral. Extractive and agro-industrial companies are an economic pillar for many African states, but their activities are also responsible for a significant proportion of climate and social damage. To this end, the responsibility of African states must include the control of transnational actors, particularly in the areas of mining, hydrocarbons and carbon markets, where regulation remains fragmented. In this sense, it is important to develop a climate governance system specific to Africa and based on African realities, founded on transparency and justiciability.

Recognising a duty to regulate does not therefore mean replacing national authorities with the Court, but rather establishing a regional regulatory framework that obliges states to adopt binding legislation and monitor the actions of companies. This approach is consistent with the logic of Article 27(2) of the Charter, which provides that the rights and freedoms of each person shall be exercised with respect to the rights of others, collective security, morality and the common interest. It would enable the African Court to assert an integrated concept of climate justice, based both on the protection of vulnerable persons and on the systemic responsibility of economic actors.

In this way, the African Court could transform African climate justice into a space of shared accountability between states, peoples and businesses, based on the principle that no actor is neutral when it comes to the climate. In doing so, it would go beyond the still cautious stance of the ICJ and the Inter-American Court to propose a truly African model of solidarity and participatory diligence.

4. Climate-related Human (Im)Mobility: An Issue Largely Ignored in Global Litigation, an Opportunity for the African Court

The request for an advisory opinion places the issue of internal displacement linked to climate change among the most worrying effects of the environmental crisis in Africa. Without expressly using the term “human mobility,” it describes the reality of communities forced to leave their land due to drought, flooding, food insecurity or heightened social tensions (paras 15, 17, 36, 55). These forced displacements directly affect the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by the African Charter (para 55).

This factual recognition paves the way for a legal and normative interpretation that is still poorly structured in positive international law, but which the African Court could help to consolidate based on the specificities of the African context, in particular through the Kampala Convention and Articles 16, 22 and 24 of the Charter.

• From Jurisprudential Convergence to the Construction of an African Law on Climate Mobility

The advisory opinion issued by the ICJ on 23 July 2025 marks a cautious consolidation in the recognition of the migratory implications of climate change. The Court acknowledges that the effects of climate change may, in certain circumstances, constitute a direct threat to human life, particularly to people forced to leave their country of origin. It thus applies the principle of non-refoulement when an individual’s return would expose them to irreparable harm to their right to life, in violation of Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (para 378). This approach extends that of the Human Rights Committee in the case of Teitiota v. New Zealand, which recognised that climate change could render certain areas of the planet uninhabitable, paving the way for international protection (para 9.11).

For its part, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in its opinion OC-32/25 of 29 May 2025, develops a much broader conception of climate-related human mobility, which it defines as encompassing migration, internal displacement, relocation and situations of involuntary or chosen immobility (paras 381–386, 419). It links these forms of mobility to a set of positive obligations, including preventing and mitigating forced displacement, regulating relocation and protecting populations forced to remain in areas at risk (para 422). This framework aims to guarantee the effective exercise of several fundamental rights, including life, health, housing, education, social security and participation in the face of the cumulative effects of climate change (paras 423–424).

By recognising this plurality of forms and situations, the Court establishes an integrated interpretation of climate-related mobility, rooted in human rights.

The request for an advisory opinion addressed to the African Court, for its part, focuses mainly on internal displacement linked to climate hazards, such as floods in West Africa, droughts in the Horn of Africa, coastal erosion in Central Africa, and links them to the rights to health (Art. 16), development (Art. 22), and a satisfactory environment (Art. 24) guaranteed by the African Charter (paras 15, 17, 36). By invoking the Kampala Convention (para 89), the application introduces a logic of differentiated protection and solidarity, which places internal environmental displacement within the scope of regional obligations of prevention, assistance and sustainable relocation.

Beyond this internal approach, however, the African Court would have a unique normative opportunity: that of extending the contributions of its sister courts while affirming an African interpretation of climate-related mobility in the broad sense, based on solidarity, shared responsibility and collective dignity. It could thus transform the notion of climate-related human mobility into a relational and solidarity-based category, articulating the three dimensions of mobility: departure, displacement and the choice to remain.

• An Opportunity for the African Court to Assert a Protective Standard Rooted in Regional Law

The specificity of the African human rights system lies in the existence of a regional normative framework that allows for a structured response to the challenges posed by internal climate displacement. In addition to the rights guaranteed by the African Charter, in 2009, the African Union adopted a legally binding instrument dedicated to this issue: the Kampala Convention on the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons. This convention is expressly mentioned in the request for an opinion (para 89) as the basis for analysing the obligations of States in the context of the climate crisis.

Unlike the non-binding UN framework illustrated by the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (UN, 1998) or the Inter-American framework, African law provides an explicit and binding legal basis for asserting that States have an obligation not only to prevent arbitrary displacement caused by environmental disasters, but also to ensure effective protection of the fundamental rights of displaced persons, both during displacement and in the search for a durable solution, whether it be return, resettlement or relocation. These obligations, already specified by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in its opinion OC-32/25 (paras 403–405, 423–424), include the duty to guarantee access to adequate housing, water, food, health care and family unity. 

The request for an advisory opinion addressed to the African Court takes up this approach while recontextualising it within a logic of regional solidarity and collective protection. It invites the Court to recognise that African States have a common duty of assistance and cooperation to prevent and mitigate internal displacement linked to the effects of climate change (paras 92–93 and 171).

The African Court could thus state in its opinion that, under Article 24 of the Charter, the right to a satisfactory environment includes the right not to be forcibly displaced as a result of climate change or climate degradation and, where necessary, to be protected, assisted and reintegrated with dignity. Such recognition would make it possible to articulate environmental, economic and social rights within a single line of reasoning, without compartmentalisation. It would also extend the positive obligations of States already identified by African case law in the areas of environmental health, food security and the right to development.

Following on from the Inter-American approach, the African Court could, in turn, place climate-induced mobility within a framework of systemic obligations, linking prevention, protection, assistance and regional cooperation. In doing so, it would contribute to building contextual climate justice, based on the realities of the continent and consistent with the pan-African tradition of law rooted in solidarity, the protection of peoples and collective dignity. Where the ICJ has opened a breach and the Inter-American Court has laid the groundwork for a human rights-based framework, the African Court can propose its regional consolidation.

Conclusion

The advisory opinion expected from the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights promises to be a decisive moment in the maturation of international climate law. Supported by the normative richness of the African Charter and the density of the reasoning behind the request, this initiative offers the Court an opportunity to affirm an African paradigm of climate justice, based on solidarity among peoples, shared responsibility among States and collective dignity.

Analysing the application reveals an ambition to elevate the climate to the status of a protected legal right, as a corollary to the right to a healthy environment (Art. 24), and to derive from it a coherent set of positive obligations for African states, including prevention, protection, remediation and cooperation. In this sense, Africa is not on the periphery of the global climate debate; it now embodies its legal conscience, linking climate stability to the survival of peoples and the continuity of development.

By comparison, the advisory opinions issued in 2025 by the International Court of Justice and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights were major milestones in the normative construction of international climate law. The ICJ established obligations to prevent transboundary damage and exercise due diligence, based not on human rights but on customary international environmental law, while the Inter-American Court defined an integrated approach to climate-related human mobility, including migration, internal displacement, relocation and involuntary immobility. However, while the approach of the International Court of Justice remains rooted in a universal logic centred on the general obligations of States, the Inter-American Court has already introduced a dimension of solidarity and differentiation, linking climate cooperation to the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities. 

Africa, through the particular structure of its Charter and the collective nature of its rights, offers more fertile ground for this contextualisation. The opinion of the African Court could thus fill the gaps left by its counterparts by laying the foundations for an African climate law based on four structuring principles: (i) the normative unity of human rights and climate, which makes respect for fundamental rights, particularly environmental and collective rights, a condition for climate resilience; (ii) shared and contextualised diligence, based on the continent’s historical vulnerability and African inter-state solidarity; (iii) differentiated climate justice, ensuring enhanced protection for vulnerable groups, effective regulation of economic actors and consideration of climate-related human mobility; (iv) intergenerational equity and just transition, directing cooperation towards sustainable and inclusive development.

By affirming these principles, the African Court would not merely reproduce existing jurisprudential models. It could offer a normative synthesis that builds on the contributions of the ICJ and the Inter-American Court while adding a distinctly African dimension: that of climate justice based on solidarity, where the protection of climate-related mobility becomes a concrete expression of the link between dignity, community and shared responsibility.

C. For Further Information

Read the PALU request: Request for an Advisory Opinion on the Human Rights Obligations of African States in Addressing Climate Change, registered on 20 September 2023.

Texts and Documents

• African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Nairobi, 1981.
• Kampala Convention on the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons, 23 October 2009.
• AfCHPR, Request for an Advisory Opinion on the Human Rights Obligations of African States in Addressing Climate Change, 2 May 2025.
• Protocol establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Ouagadougou, 1998, Art. 4(1).
• Rules of Procedure of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Rule 82.

Case Law and Opinions

• ACHPR, SERAC v. Nigeria (Ogoni case), Comm. No. 155/96, 27 October 2001.
• AfCHPR, Comm. ADHP v. Republic of Kenya, Judgment on Reparations, 23 June 2022, Appl. No. 006/2012.
• IACHR, Advisory Opinion OC-32/25 on the Obligations of States with Respect to Climate Change, 3 July 2025.
• ICJ, Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in Relation to Climate Change, 23 July 2025.
• ITLOS, Advisory Opinion, Request for an Advisory Opinion submitted by the Commission on Small Island States, No. 31, 21 May 2024. 

Doctrine

• Ajabu Mastaki, G., “Climate change and displaced children in Africa: A dual challenge to a sustainable future”, African Journal of Climate Law and Justice, Vol. 2, 2025. 
• Badara Fall, A., “The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: between universalism and regionalism”, Pouvoirs, 2009/2, No. 129.
• Ouguergouz, F., The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A legal approach to human rights between tradition and modernity, Geneva, Graduate Institute Publications, 1993.

To cite this note: G. Ajabu Mastaki, “Africa in search of global climate justice?”, Cahiers de l’EDEM, October 2025.